CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Gloria Jean Malabed-Verona filed this action for injuries arising out of a car accident. Respondent Craig Hollaway conceded liability. After trial on the issues of causation and damages, the jury returned a $10,000 verdict in favor of appellant. However, following an award of costs for respondent under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, the trial court entered judgment for $9,179.83 in favor of respondent.
On appeal, appellant challenges some of the trial court’s discovery-related rulings and argues that misconduct by respondent’s counsel and bias by the court deprived her of a fair trial. Appellant also claims that the court’s award of costs under section 998 was improper. We affirm.

David Lane appeals his conviction of battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)), arguing that the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings and improperly denied his motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct. We affirm the conviction and remand for resentencing.

A jury convicted defendant Giovany Santiago Enriquez of one count of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) insufficient evidence supports his conviction for willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder; (2) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing argument when she argued facts not supported by the evidence and misstated the law on the heat of passion defense to attempted first degree murder; and (3) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s misrepresentations of the evidence. We affirm.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s order to revoke the mandatory supervision of defendant Victor Cruz Miranda for failure to report to probation upon his release from jail. Defendant challenges this order as unsupported by substantial evidence that he willfully failed to report. Defendant also contends the trial court miscalculated his presentence mandatory supervision credits by 20 days, a fact not disputed by the People. We instruct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect this additional 20 days of credit, and in all other regards affirm the judgment.

Andre F. was born in August 2015 to a 16-year-old single mother who herself was a dependent of the court at the time. Mother had significant behavioral problems that led to Andre’s removal from her care under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. After the Solano County Health & Social Services Department (Department) provided her with more than 18 months of reunification services, the court terminated those services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing to determine a permanent plan for Andre. After mother filed a petition under section 388 for additional reunification services, the court held a consolidated hearing on February 15, 2018, to consider her petition and a permanent plan for Andre. Mother appeals from the court’s denial of her petition and termination of her parental rights at the conclusion of this hearing, and claims the court committed error under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We affirm the court’s orders.

This is another appeal by defendants, a landlord and its principal, who lost an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike portions of the pleadings of respondents, their tenants. The landlord had brought three unlawful detainer actions, all of which were unsuccessful, two dismissed and the third decided on the merits for tenants. And two petitions with the rent board were also decided favorably to the tenants, including with many findings that the landlord had breached its habitability obligation. The tenants then sued defendants, alleging three causes of action, for: (1) malicious prosecution, (2) infliction of emotional distress, and (3) breach of contract. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the first and third causes of action. As to the first cause of action, the trial court denied the motion as to the landlord but granted it as to the principal. As to the third cause of action, the trial court denied it, with the exception of striking two clauses. Defendants appeal.

Paula Datesh, appearing in propria persona, appeals from a civil harassment restraining order issued against her and in favor of respondent William Thomas Meyer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6.) She argues that Meyer did not prove a credible threat of violence or criminal stalking. We conclude the record on appeal is insufficient to support her argument and that in any event, Meyer was not required to prove criminal stalking. We affirm.

Plaintiff Chanht Reatrey Keo appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of defendants Nationstar Mortgage and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) in an action she filed alleging violations of federal and state law during a nonjudicial foreclosure. Keo contends the trial court erred in finding her causes of action time-barred or barred by res judicata. We affirm.

Tracy Conrad Smith appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for recall of two indeterminate life sentences under Penal Code section 1170.126, enacted as part of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act or Proposition 36). He contends substantial evidence does not support the finding he was armed with a firearm during commission of his third strike offenses. (§§ 1170.126, subd. (e)(2), 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii).) We disagree and affirm.

Vladimir and Rozaliya Kats and their counsel Nabil Abu-Assal and his firm Cypress LLP (collectively, appellants) appeal a sanctions order entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 striking their cross-complaint and ordering the attorneys to pay $750 to the court and $7,500 to Lodgepole Investments, LLC and Lodgepole Fund No. 1, LLC (collectively, Lodgepole). We find no merit in appellants’ procedural or substantive contentions and shall affirm the order.

Appellant M.J. was declared a ward of the court based on a felonious act that was reclassified as a misdemeanor in the wake of Proposition 47. He appeals from an order in which the juvenile court ruled that his reclassification did not entitle him to have his collected DNA sample and genetic profile removed from the database maintained by the California Department of Justice, arguing that Proposition 47 requires reclassified offenses to be treated as misdemeanors for all purposes, including DNA expungement.
After briefing in this appeal was completed, we ordered the matter stayed pending our Supreme Court’s decision in cases that raised the identical issue, In re C.B. (S237801) and In re C.H. (S237762.) In those cases, our Supreme Court ruled that Proposition 47 does not authorize the relief that M.J. seeks. (In re C.B. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 118, 122.).

On February 23, 2014, Crispin Guajardo, a known associate of the Norteno criminal street gang, was shot and killed outside a bar in Greenfield, California. Following a jury trial, defendant Arnulfo Pineda, a member of the Mexican Klan Locos subset of the Sureno criminal street gang, was convicted of Guajardo’s murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.) The jury also found true several enhancements, including a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and three firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). On appeal, defendant argues (1) the gang enhancement is not supported by substantial evidence, (2) the trial court erroneously permitted the admission of overly prejudicial and unreliable testimonial hearsay, (3) the trial court failed to correctly instruct the jury on the use of hearsay evidence, (4) the trial court did not correctly respond to the jury’s question on how to complete verdict forms when deadlocked on an enhancement, (5) the prosecutor commi

A jury convicted Sean Patrick Melody of two counts of first degree robbery in concert (Pen. Code, §§ 211; 212.5, subd. (a); 213, subd. (a)(1)(A); counts 4 and 5), but accepted Melody’s principal argument at trial that he was not the robber who held a gun to the victims’ heads, finding the alleged personal use of a firearm enhancements (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)) not to be true. (All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.) When the jury could not reach a verdict on count 3, assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), the trial court declared a mistrial and thereafter granted the People’s motion to dismiss the count. At the close of evidence, the court also had granted Melody’s motion to dismiss counts 1 and 2 alleging kidnapping (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), finding the movement of the victims incidental to the robbery. Following the jury’s verdict, Melody in a bifurcated proceeding pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a probationer (§ 2

In an information filed March 13, 2015, defendant was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery (count 1; Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)); second degree burglary (count 2; § 460, subd. (b)); second degree robbery of Eulisses Mercado (count 3; § 212.5, subd. (c)); second degree robbery of Olivero Arvizu (count 4; § 212.5, subd. (c)); first degree robbery of Eulisses Mercado (count 5; § 212.5, subd. (b)); and attempted second degree robbery of Olivero Arvizu (count 6; §§ 664, 212.5, subd. (b).) The information alleged defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of all counts. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) Finally, the information alleged defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of the kidnapping to commit robbery within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). (But see fn. 4, post.)
The jury convicted defendant on all counts (except count 3, previously dismissed) and found true all allegations except the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) al