CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound) appeals the trial court’s decision to order a new trial following a verdict in Greyhound’s favor. Respondents, Victor Garay and Olga Lopez Garay, along with Emily Moreno, Jose Gonzalez, Maria Ayda Cordoba, and Sienna Aguilar are family members of Sylvia Garay (Garay), Vanessa Gonzalez (Gonzalez), and Stephanie Cordoba (Cordoba). In July 2010, Garay, Gonzalez, and Cordoba were killed in a collision with a Greyhound bus driven by James Jewett (Jewett). Jewett and two bus passengers also died in the collision. A complex litigation followed, including a multi-week trial to determine any potential responsibility Greyhound had for Garay, Gonzalez, and Cordoba’s deaths. The trial ended with a jury verdict answering “no” to the question, “Was Greyhound Lines, Inc. negligent?” The trial court subsequently ordered a new trial, resulting in the present appeal.

Minor filed a motion to suppress evidence under section 700.1. He moved to suppress the evidence of his gun and statements, claiming that they were the fruits of an illegally-prolonged seizure. Specifically, he argued that the traffic stop was unlawful because it was prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the traffic citation.

Defendant and appellant David Espinoza was charged by felony complaint with elder or dependent abuse (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1), count 1) and resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 69, count 2). He entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to count 1 as charged and to count 2 as a misdemeanor. The parties stipulated to the police report as the factual basis for the plea. Pursuant to the agreement, a trial court placed defendant on probation for 36 months, ordered him not to violate any laws and to complete the InRoads program. The court subsequently found that defendant violated his probation. It sentenced him to the middle term of three years on count 1 and a concurrent 364 days in county jail, with credit for time served.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Linda Ann Gomez pled guilty to assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).) A trial court granted defendant probation for a period of three years, under specified conditions. Subsequently, a petition to revoke her probation was filed, alleging that she failed to report to the probation department after being released from jail. Defendant admitted the probation violation, and the court reinstated her on probation.
On appeal, defendant challenges a condition of her probation requiring her to submit to the search and seizure of her electronic devices. She contends that this condition is unconstitutionally overbroad and requests that it be stricken. We agree that the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad but conclude that it should be modified. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Agustin Jimenez attacked his wife and stepdaughter in the family's home. As a result, Jimenez was arrested and eventually convicted by a jury of multiple crimes related to the incident: Two counts of false imprisonment (Pen. Code, §236 ), making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a)), vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), evading police (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) as a lesser included offense of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)) as a lesser included offense of felony child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)). The jury also found Jimenez not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and could not reach a verdict on a second count of the same crime.

Appellant K.U., mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring the minor a dependent child, removing the minor from her care and placing him with the father, and terminating dependency. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 358, 360.) Although mother’s notice of appeal says she is only appealing from the jurisdiction order, the disposition hearing is the first hearing from which an appeal can be taken in a dependency case. (See In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 112.) Accordingly, mother’s challenge to the jurisdiction order is raised in the appeal from the disposition order, which was heard and entered at the same time. (See In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 624.)
Mother now contends the juvenile court erred in failing to obtain a personal waiver of mother’s rights. Finding no merit in her contention, we will affirm the juvenile court orders.

A jury found defendant Rueben J. Amaro, Jr., guilty of robbery (count one) and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (count two). (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 245, subd. (a)(4).) The trial court sentenced defendant to the lower term of two years in prison for the robbery and a consecutive year (one-third the middle term) for the assault. On appeal, defendant argues the court erred in refusing to give CALCRIM No. 3425, on the complete defense of unconsciousness, and in declining to stay the sentence for assault pursuant to section 654.
We agree that the trial court erred in failing to apply section 654 and shall remand for resentencing.

Convicted by jury of three counts involving the sexual molestation of a minor identified in the pleadings as John Doe (hereafter Doe 1), defendant Jared Michael Tomlinson contends (1) the trial court erred prejudicially by admitting evidence of uncharged acts pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1101; (2) the prosecutor improperly made herself a witness and vouched for the victim’s credibility; and (3) the cumulative effect of the errors violated defendant’s right to due process. We affirm.

O.M., Sr., (father) challenges the juvenile court’s order declining his request to have his son, O.M., Jr. (O., born May 2016), returned to his custody at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.21, subdivision (f), hearing. He contends that the juvenile court’s order is not supported by substantial evidence. He also argues that the juvenile court’s monitored visitation order must be reversed because it erroneously delegated to O.’s therapist the decision of whether father should have unmonitored visits. And, in any event, the juvenile court erred in ordering father monitored visitation. Finally, father challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings regarding his failure to protect his daughter, Sarah M. (Sarah, born Dec. 2017), from Edna M.’s (mother) long-standing and unresolved history of substance abuse despite the fact that she previously lost custody of seven other children, including O., due to the same problem.

Appellant Andres Rene Rodriguez pled guilty to first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189; count 1), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 2), and attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 3). As to count one, appellant admitted that he committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a kidnapping within the meaning of section 207 (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B)) and that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) As to count 2, appellant admitted that he committed the kidnapping while armed with a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). As to count 3, appellant admitted that he committed the attempted murder while armed with a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).

T.J. (Mother) appeals from juvenile court orders terminating dependency jurisdiction and granting sole physical and legal custody of her daughters K.G. and Ka.G. (collectively, the Minors) to their father, B.G. (Father). We are asked to decide whether the termination and custody determinations were an abuse of the court’s discretion. We also decide whether the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related provisions of California law.

David Garza was convicted by jury of possessing a controlled substance in jail. (Pen. Code, § 4573.6.) He admitted a 1998 felony “strike” for first degree burglary. He admitted prior prison terms for the burglary; taking a vehicle; receiving stolen property; and possession of a controlled substance.
The trial court denied appellant’s request to dismiss his burglary conviction. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.) It did, however, erroneously grant his unopposed request to be sentenced to a “split” five year term – three years in county jail and two years in a residential program. (§ 1170, subd. (h)(3).) The court later corrected the order because the law requires that appellant serve his sentence in state prison. We conclude that the court was aware of its discretion under Romero, did not abuse its discretion by refusing to dismiss appellant’s burglary conviction, and did not need to revisit the Romero issue when it corrected the unauth

Plaintiff Caroline Lee appeals from an order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer of David Yang and Christopher Rivas to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO; 18 U.S.C.A., §§ 1961 et seq.) cause of action alleged in her third amended complaint. Because Lee alleged an additional cause of action (breach of fiduciary duty) against Yang, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal as to Rivas only; Yang remains a defendant.
In her RICO claim, Lee alleges she and Yang as partners owned three Los Angeles rental properties, which Yang and Rivas represented they would manage honestly and competently, but instead they misappropriated rent proceeds, failed to make necessary repairs and allowed tenancies to become unregistered, threatening her with foreclosure and government sanctions. As a result of this extortion, she alleges, she incurred code enforcement expenses, lost rental proceeds and lost property value.

Defendant and appellant Ricky Valdez Huffman was convicted of unlawful firearm activity (Pen. Code, § 29825, subd. (a) ) and disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)). On appeal, Huffman contends the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing the jury on the definitions of attempt and specific intent when it instructed the jury on the elements of section 29825, subdivision (a). We affirm the judgment.