CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant Los Angeles Unified School District, in plaintiff’s action for racial discrimination and harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Court hold that the District provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the disciplinary action taken against plaintiff, and that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving that reason to be a pretext. Court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant was convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and intentional discharge of a handgun. The trial court sentenced him to a term of forty years to life in state prison.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the jury was improperly instructed as to involuntary manslaughter. Appellant also contends the prosecutor prejudiced the jury during closing arguments by referencing lying in wait first degree murder. Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Appellant appeals from a judgment entered against him after a bench trial on plaintiff's complaint alleging causes of action including an open book account. On appeal, Defendant claims sufficient evidence did not support the trial court’s finding an open book account existed between these parties. Instead, Defendant asserts each of the parties’ transactions constituted a separate contract, and that plaintiff’s claims as to the oldest of these contracts were barred under the applicable statute of limitation governing breach of contract. Court held, the claim has no merit. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that an open book account, rather than individual contracts existed between these parties. Since the complaint was filed within four years of the date of the last entry in that account, the court properly concluded that the action was not barred by the statute of limitation. Accordingly, court affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted premeditated murder and one count each of assault with a deadly weapon, discharge of a firearm with gross negligence and possession of a firearm by a felon. Personal use and gang allegations were also found true. The trial court sentenced Williams to a term of 62 years to life in state prison. Defendant appeals, claiming sentencing error. Court agreed that one error requires modification of his sentence but otherwise affirmed.

Court held that an employer did not violate state law by terminating an employee who, in disobedience to company policy and specific admonitions not to do so, persisted in using company equipment and facilities for religious proselytizing. Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment to defendant in this employment discrimination action. Appellant argues there are triable issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on her cause of action for religious discrimination based on defendant’s failure to accommodate her religious beliefs and practices. Appellant also claims there are triable issues of material fact as to defendant’s failure to prevent discrimination and as to defenses raised by defendant. Based on these arguments for reversal of the judgment, plaintiff contends the award of costs also must be reversed.
Court concluded that plaintiff is not entitled to the accommodation she claimed. Plaintiff has abandoned her other causes of action by failing to present argument on them in her opening brief. Court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of one count of first degree murder and found true special allegations that he personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm in committing the offense. Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury and in punishing him for the firearm enhancements as well as for the underlying murder offense. Court affirmed.

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their action against defendants, after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the Newman defendants’ demurrer to the second amended complaint and the Ampton defendants’ demurrer to the third amended complaint.
Court held as follows: Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint fails to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Ms. Newman as an individual, as a “de facto” general partner of OMDA and Shoprop, or for personal liability as trustee of the Newman Family Trust (Newman Trust) the general partner of OMDA and Shoprop. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint fails to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty or an accounting against OMDA and Shoprop. Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s order of dismissal based on its order sustaining, without leave to amend, the demurrer of the Newman defendants. Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint states a cause of action against the Ampton defendants for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by the Newman Trust. Accordingly, court reversed the order of dismissal based on its order sustaining the demurrer of the Ampton defendants.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of residential burglary. Defendant was found to have used a firearm during the commission of each of the crimes. Following a jury waiver, the trial court found defendant had suffered one prior serious felony conviction and two prior felony convictions for which he had served a separate prison term. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Defendant appeals, alleging the trial court based its sentence on factual determinations not made by the jury and violated his right to a jury trial as established in Blakely v. Washington. Both parties agree that the sentence must be modified with regard to some of the terms imposed for defendant’s prior convictions. Court modified the sentence and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appeals from an order revoking probation and ordering him to serve a four year eight month prison sentence previously imposed but stayed. Court affirm.

Appellant was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of robbery. The trial court found true the allegations that appellant had served two prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced appellant to the upper term of five years in state prison, plus two one-year enhancements for the prior prison terms. Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court's imposition of the upper term violated his federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process. Court affirmed the judgment.

The minor appeals from the order of wardship entered after a finding that he made criminal threats. The juvenile court ordered camp-community placement and set the maximum confinement period as three years. The minor contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding and two probation conditions should be modified. Court modified the court wording but otherwised affirmed.

Appellant is the father of children that were detained in when they were fourteen months old and three months old. The Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was sustained under section 300, subdivision (b), and that reunification services were terminated in March 2005. This appeal is from the denial of appellant's January 25, 2005, section 388 petition, in which he sought a home of parent order or increased visitation. Appellant's contention is that the order denying the petition must be reversed because the trial court and DCFS failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act.
The order denying the section 388 petition is reversed and the case is remanded to the so that DCFS can comply with the notice provisions of Indian Child Welfare Act. If, after proper notice, a tribe claims these children as Indian children, the court shall proceed in conformity with all provisions of Indian Child Welfare Act. If no tribe claims that these children are Indian children, the ruling shall be reinstated.

Mother appeals from the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights, alleging that she did not receive proper notice of the hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, and that the trial court erred in failing to set the matter for a contested hearing. The order of the juvenile court terminating Mother’s rights is affirmed.

Mother appeals from the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights, alleging that she did not receive proper notice of the hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, and that the trial court erred in failing to set the matter for a contested hearing. The order of the juvenile court terminating Mother’s rights is affirmed.