CA Unpub Decisions

A subcontractor on a project had its license suspended due to an unpaid judgment. The subcontractor obtained reinstatement of its license, but still found itself in dire financial straits, and sought assistance from the contractor. The subcontractor executed a promissory note by which it agreed to repay, with interest, any amounts advanced by the contractor. The promissory note expressly provided that the contractor had no obligation to advance funds and that any advance of funds would be solely at the contractor’s discretion. Some months later, the subcontractor’s license was suspended for failure to resolve outstanding liabilities. The relationship between the contractor and the subcontractor deteriorated, and they brought cross-actions against each other for breach of the subcontract. The subcontractor also alleged the contractor had fraudulently induced it to execute the promissory note by falsely promising to advance the funds necessary for it to remain afloat.
The contractor successfully demurred to the subcontractor’s cross-complaint. As to the cause of action for breach of the subcontract, the demurrer was sustained on the basis that the subcontractor’s license had been suspended during its performance of the work. As to the promissory fraud cause of action, the demurrer was sustained on the basis that a contracting party cannot sue on a promise that was superseded by, and is inconsistent with, the written contract the promise allegedly induced. The subcontractor appeals; court affirmed.

Defendant was convicted by jury of forcible rape with great bodily injury and unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 16 with special findings that he inflicted great bodily injury. Sentenced to 13 years state prison, he appeals contending, among other things, that the trial court committed evidentiary and instructional error. Court affirmed.

A subcontractor on a project had its license suspended due to an unpaid judgment. The subcontractor obtained reinstatement of its license, but still found itself in dire financial straits, and sought assistance from the contractor. The subcontractor executed a promissory note by which it agreed to repay, with interest, any amounts advanced by the contractor. The promissory note expressly provided that the contractor had no obligation to advance funds and that any advance of funds would be solely at the contractor’s discretion. Some months later, the subcontractor’s license was suspended for failure to resolve outstanding liabilities. The relationship between the contractor and the subcontractor deteriorated, and they brought cross-actions against each other for breach of the subcontract. The subcontractor also alleged the contractor had fraudulently induced it to execute the promissory note by falsely promising to advance the funds necessary for it to remain afloat.
The contractor successfully demurred to the subcontractor’s cross-complaint. As to the cause of action for breach of the subcontract, the demurrer was sustained on the basis that the subcontractor’s license had been suspended during its performance of the work. As to the promissory fraud cause of action, the demurrer was sustained on the basis that a contracting party cannot sue on a promise that was superseded by, and is inconsistent with, the written contract the promise allegedly induced. The subcontractor appeals; court affirmed.

We issued a writ of review to consider whether the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) erred by denying a petition to transfer venue to Santa Barbara County as requested by the employer's insurer, State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF). Court concluded that Labor Code section 5501.5, subdivision (c) mandates that venue be changed from San Luis Obispo County to Santa Barbara County.
The order denying removal is annulled. Board is directed to set aside and vacate its previous order and enter a new order granting the petition for removal to Santa Barbara County.

Appellants appeal a judgment of the juvenile court declaring that their son is adoptable and terminating their parental rights. They also appeal an order denying appellant's modification petition filed pursuant to section 388.
Court reversed the judgment terminating parental rights and remand for the limited determination whether the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") applies. Court affirmed the order denying the modification petition.

In successive confrontations, defendants participated in the shootings of Anthony Ciancio and Michael Fielding. Convicted by jury of attempted murder with gang and firearm use enhancements, defendants appeal. They contend the prosecution used peremptory jury challenges improperly, there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions and enhancements, and the court improperly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. Court affirmed.

Minor, a ward of the juvenile court based upon prior sustained petitions charging arson and battery, admitted violating his probation, and was ordered placed in a group home. Defendant appeals requesting that the court independently review the record. Court found no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to the minor. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant of three counts of corporal injury to a child and one count of willful harm to a child as the result of defendant’s physical assault upon her stepdaughter. The jury also found that defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of counts two and three, and that defendant used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of count four. Jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge that defendant tortured minor within the meaning of section 206.
Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 16 years and 4 months in state prison. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and raises various sentencing errors. Court affirmed the judgment.

In November 1999, defendant pled no contest to one count of child molestation and he was placed on probation for four years. In September 2005, defendant filed a motion to reduce the child molestation offense to a misdemeanor and to dismiss the charge. The motion was denied. Defendant appeals requesting that the court independently review the record. The order denying the motion is affirmed.

Defendant appeals following his conviction by jury of one count of solicitation for murder and one count of solicitation for robbery. Sentenced to nine years in state prison (the upper term on count 1, with sentence on count 2 stayed), defendant contends he should have received the midterm rather than the upper term because he was a first offender. Court affirmed.

A jury found defendant guilty of three counts of robbery and found two firearm enhancement allegations true. Defendant timely appealed, contending the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress his statement to the police because: 1) the statement was not voluntary; and 2) the interrogation began before he was given Miranda warnings. After reviewing the record and the interrogation videotape, the court concluded that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion. Accordingly, court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s orders adjudging the minor a dependent child of the court and removing the minor from parental custody. Appellant contends the allegations contained in the petition are insufficient to provide a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction. Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order of removal. For the reasons that follow, court affirmed the orders.

In this juvenile delinquency case, the minor admitted an allegation that he possessed rock cocaine. Minor appeals, contending the juvenile court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because police officers conducted an unreasonable search and seizure. Court affirmed the judgment.

After defendant pled guilty to abuse on a cohabitant, the court placed him on probation for three years, ordered him to serve 365 days in jail and assessed various fees and fines, including $420 in attorney’s fees. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred by assessing attorney’s fees without a finding of present ability to pay. Defendant also contends, and the People concede, that the trial court erred by failing to include credit for good behavior in its calculation of presentence credits.
Court remanded for a further hearing with respect to defendant’s present ability to pay attorney’s fees. Court accepted the People’s concession as to presentence credit and directed the trial court to modify the judgment accordingly.