CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner, in pro. per., seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate the order of the juvenile court setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to his sons. Court denies the petition.

Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate the orders of the juvenile court denying her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her daughter. Court denied the petition.

Appellant petitions for a writ of review contending the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) erred by increasing vocational rehabilitation maintenance allowance (VRMA) payments to an injured worker after finding Paramount Farms at fault for delaying vocational rehabilitation services. Court denied the petition.

Appellant appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter and son. Her daughter and son are Indian children, as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and therefore are entitled to ICWA’s substantive protections. At the termination hearing, the court made findings paraphrasing ICWA that (1) active efforts had been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the family and such efforts proved unsuccessful; and (2) continued custody of the children by the parents was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children. Appellant questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support both of these findings. She also challenges the court’s denial of a section 388 petition she brought to reopen reunification services. Court affirmed the termination under ICWA as well as state law.

In this consolidated appeal plaintiffs, husband and wife, appeal summary judgments in their action against defendants National Life Insurance Company and Life Insurance Company of the Southwest (collectively, National Life) and the Alvarez defendants for damages sustained as a result of defendants’ failure to inform John Zimmerman of the results of a blood test given as a prerequisite for the issuance of a life insurance policy. They contend defendants owed them a duty of care to provide them the test results. The judgments are affirmed.

Defendant appeals the judgment and sentence imposed following his jury-trial convictions for first degree murder, attempted murder, and other offenses. Appellant contends: (1) there was insufficient evidence he committed, or attempted to commit, robbery; (2) the trial court should have given a unanimity instruction with respect to the identity of the victim whose attempted robbery underlay the felony murder charge; (3) the trial court should have instructed the jury sua sponte on assault as a lesser included offense of robbery and attempted robbery; (4) the trial court should have instructed the jury sua sponte on assault with a firearm as a lesser included offense of robbery with a firearm enhancement; (5) the trial court erred in running the 25 year to life sentence for use of a firearm consecutive to the life without possibility of parole sentence imposed for first degree murder;[1] (6) he was denied a fair trial because the jury was selected in a racially discriminatory manner. Finding these contentions without merit, court affirmed.

Appellant raises one issue on appeal from a final judgment which resulted in his receiving a criminal sentence of four years four months in state prison. Appellant contends he was entitled to have a jury decide beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of the sentencing factors relied on by the trial court to impose the aggravated term of three years in state prison for the principal term selected at sentencing. Court reject appellant’s claim. Judgment Affirmed.

The San Francisco County juvenile court sustained a wardship petition against defendant. The court found that defendant had committed two offenses, minor in possession of a concealable firearm, and minor in possession of live ammunition. After the jurisdictional order, the juvenile court transferred the matter for disposition to Contra Costa County, the county of defendant’s residence and where he is on probation. Defendant purports to appeal the San Francisco court’s jurisdictional order. Appeal Dismissed.

Plaintiff appeals a summary judgment in favor of defendant, an insurer, which provided earthquake insurance. Plaintiff sued CFPA to obtain proceeds for the damage allegedly resulting from the earthquake.
The trial court ruled that the doctrine of judicial admission barred plaintiff from presenting evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact that she was the named insured on the CFPA policy at issue. The trial court concluded that because plaintiff could not raise a triable issue of material fact that she was the named insured, plaintiff did not have standing to seek recovery under the policy. The trial court also ruled that plaintiff was not a third party beneficiary of the insurance policy.
Alternatively, the trial court granted CFPA’s motion for summary adjudication as to all of plaintiff’s non-contract based causes of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.9, quoted below, which revived certain “insurance claim for damages,” arising from the earthquake, which were otherwise barred by applicable statutes of limitation.
Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the case to the trial court. Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of CFPA. Court concluded that the doctrine of judicial admission did not apply to bar plaintiff from presenting evidence that she was the named insured.

Appellant filed suit against respondent, all of whom cross-complained against appellant. The trial court entered judgment against appellant and granted some of the relief sought in the cross-complaint. Appellant appeals, arguing that the judgment is inconsistent with the jury’s special verdict. Court affirmed.

Defendants were both convicted of two counts of grand theft. The trial court sentenced Moppin to state prison for a term of three years, eight months, and Smith to a term of two years. Both men appeal, with Moppin (joined by Smith) purportedly challenging the sufficiency of the evidence but in reality claiming instructional error, Smith (joined by Moppin) claiming directly that there was instructional error, and the Attorney General contending the trial court failed to impose a mandatory fee. Court modified the judgment to reflect the fee and, as modified, affirmed.

Defendant was arrested, charged, and convicted of one count of possessing cocaine base for sale, after which he admitted that he had served two prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of seven years. Defendant requested the court independently review the record. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury acquitted defendant of attempted premeditated murder but convicted him of the lesser-included crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter during which the jury found he personally used a firearm. Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in (I) admitting evidence regarding “ghetto mentality syndrome” and (II) imposing an upper-term sentence without a jury finding aggravating factors. Judgment Affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, found he was sane at the time he committed the crime, and found true an allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a term of 17 years -- high term of four years for the assault, doubled because of the prior strike, plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement, five years for the prior felony conviction, and one year for the prior prison term. Defendant appeals, claiming his high term sentence must be reversed because the facts on which it is based (the crime involved great violence and viciousness and demonstrated serious danger to society, and his prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness) were neither found by a jury nor admitted by him. Judgment Affirmed.