CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant appeals from an order denying her request under Family Code sections 271 and 2030 for attorney fees and costs she incurred opposing the motion of her former husband, to modify a 2002 qualified domestic relations order. Appellant contends the trial court either failed to exercise or abused its discretion in denying her request. Court disagreed and affirmed order.

Appellant appeals from a judgment dissolving her marriage to respondent. Appellant contests the trial court’s jurisdiction, its imposition of attorney fee sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271, its denial of her request for further attorney fees under section 2030, its award of child and spousal support, and its denial of rehabilitative support. Court affirmed.

Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of the crime of first degree murder, with the special circumstance of torture. Defendant was also separately convicted of the crime of torture. Appellant was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. Defendant contends: 1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance of his trial from that of his codefendant, Debra Soler, and 2) the jury instruction relating to the torture murder special circumstance was prejudicially erroneous. Court rejected both contentions and affirmed.

Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of annoying or molesting a child. Defendant further admitted suffering a prior juvenile conviction and admitted a prior strike conviction. The court denied probation and denied defendant’s motion to vacate a prior serious or violent felony conviction under the “three strikes” law. Defendant appeals his four-year state prison sentence, arguing (1) he was denied due process at his sentencing hearing; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion because it relied upon improper information; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s sentence.

Codefendants were charged by information with various crimes including conspiracy to commit burglary and robbery, attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation, robbery, residential burglary, street terrorism, attempted robbery, and active participation in a criminal street gang. Their trial is scheduled to begin November 9, 2006. Bloom’s codefendants brought various motions to dismiss including motions to dismiss the attempted murder count. Defendant initially only filed a motion to dismiss the street terrorism charge and criminal street gang enhancements, but at oral argument joined in his codefendants “respective arguments.” Those arguments included claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of attempted murder with premeditation. In ruling on the 995 motions, the superior court dismissed the attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation charge with respect to Bloom only. Although the People timely appealed, they seek a writ because, even if the appeal is successful, trial of this matter is to commence before the appeal can be decided. To avoid multiple trials, the issuance of a writ is appropriate. The People filed the petition for a writ of mandate on September 19, 2006; on September 21, 2006, this court requested informal briefing and gave notice that it “may choose to act by issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance.” Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate.

Defendant shot and killed his adult son in the course of an argument. Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and the jury found to be true an allegation that he used a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to 21 years in prison, consisting of the upper term for both the manslaughter conviction and the firearm enhancement. Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s rulings on a motion for mistrial, possible jury misconduct, and his sentence. Court concluded that defendant waived several alleged errors by failing to pursue them at trial, and otherwise concluded that the trial court did not err. Judgment Affirmed.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted appellant of two counts of receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a). Appellant admitted having suffered two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant to four years in state prison. The sentence consisted of the midterm of two years in count 1 and an additional two years for the prison-prior enhancements. The court stayed a sentence of two years in count 2 pursuant to section 654.
Appellant contends on appeal that the judgment of conviction in count 2 must be reversed because his possession of the car and its radio constituted only one offense of receiving stolen property. The judgment in count 2 is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A mother and father, each of whom was found to have physically abused one of their three children, challenge a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights. The parents contend the court erred because (1) the children were members of a sibling group and, therefore, not likely to be adopted and (2) they established the “beneficial contact” exception to termination of parental rights. The parents also challenge court orders denying their petitions seeking family reunification services or the return of the children to their custody. The parents insist they are rehabilitated, and it is in their children’s best interest to give them another chance to permit the parent-child bond to grow. The children’s grandmother also appeals, claiming the court erroneously found the children adoptable and failed to consider her as an adoptive placement resource. Court found no merit in any assertion. Order Affirmed.

Defendant appeals from a judgment rendered against him. Plaintiff brought this suit claiming it is owed money for services and products it supplied to defendant. Defendant responded that (1) plaintiff failed to properly apply, to the appropriate invoices, the payments defendant made, (2) money claimed in two of plaintiff’s invoices was never intended by plaintiff to be paid by defendant, and (3) plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment in its favor because it could not prove that it was properly licensed at all times it was doing business with defendant.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court determined plaintiff met its burden of producing a prima facie case that it was properly licensed, and defendant did not present evidence to controvert that prima facie case. The court also found that some of plaintiff’s invoices were barred by the four-year statute of limitations set out in Civil Code section 337, and that other invoices were not intended by the parties to be debts owed by defendant. After making allowances for those rejected invoices, and determining interest owed by defendant, the court awarded judgment in plaintiff’s favor.
Court find plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it was properly licensed during a portion of the relevant period of time it did business with defendant, and court therefore reversed the judgment and returned the case to the trial court for a redetermination of the amount of money actually owed to plaintiff by defendant.

By petition, Adonis H. (now age 19) was charged with one count each of possession of a firearm by a minor, possession of live ammunition by a minor, and possession of marijuana. The petition gave notice that Adonis was facing confinement on all sustained counts and on “all previously sustained petitions with detention time remaining.” Minor had prior sustained petitions for possession of a firearm in a school zone, resisting arrest, and battery. The juvenile court sustained the firearm and ammunition counts, dismissed the remaining count, and ordered minor committed to the California Youth Authority for a maximum period not to exceed six years, eight months. Minor appeals, contending the juvenile court abused its discretion with regard to his placement and his maximum term of confinement, and that his term for possession of ammunition is prohibited by Penal Code section 654. Court provisionally reversed for reconsideration of minor’s maximum term of confinement, and otherwise affirmed.

Appellant, father of the minor, appeals from the judgment of disposition on a subsequent petition. Appellant contends the juvenile court’s order taking jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (g) was not supported by substantial evidence. Court affirmed.

Defendant pleaded no contest to making a criminal threat and being a felon in possession of a firearm and admitted a prior serious felony allegation and a prior prison term allegation in exchange for a stipulated five-year state prison sentence and dismissal of the remaining counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison, consisting of four years for making a criminal threat, plus one year for the prison term prior. The court did not impose sentence on the felon in possession of a firearm offense.
Having obtained a certificate of probable cause, defendant appeals, contending the trial court (1) abused its discretion in accepting his no contest plea to making a criminal threat and (2) erred in failing to impose a sentence on the felon in possession of a firearm offense. Court dismissed that portion of the appeal challenging the court’s acceptance of defendant’s plea, remanded the matter for sentencing on the felon in possession of a firearm offense and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was committed to state hospital for a potential maximum sentence of life after she was found not guilty by reason of insanity of second degree murder. Defendant appeals from denial of her petition for conditional release, contending the trial court was arbitrary and capricious in rejecting the uncontroverted evidence that appellant no longer posed a danger. Finding no abuse of discretion, court affirmed.