CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals from her conviction for two counts of stalking. Defendant challenges a postjudgment order directing her to pay nearly $24,000 in restitution to one of the stalking victims. Because the trial court failed to afford defendant an opportunity to challenge the amount of the award, court reversed the restitution order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A jury convicted defendant of possession for sale of methamphetamine, sale or transportation of methamphetamine, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The court sentenced defendant to prison for 14 years and four months, consisting of 6 years for transportation of methamphetamine, one year and four months for possession of a firearm by a felon, four years for the firearm enhancement attached to the transportation of methamphetamine offense, two years for the enhancement for committing a felony while released on bail, and one year for a prior prison term enhancement. Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports his convictions for transportation and possession for sale of methamphetamine. Alternatively, he asserts his sentence for possessing a firearm while a felon should be stayed pursuant to section 654, in light of the firearm enhancement imposed on his transporting methamphetamine conviction. As court discuss, sufficient evidence supports the convictions for transportation and possession for sale of methamphetamine, but defendant’s sentence for being an armed felon must be stayed under section 654. The judgment was modified to stay the sentence on Ma’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, otherwise judgment affirmed.

Defendant appeals from an order of the trial court recommitting him to the Department of Mental Health for a period of two years under the Sexually Violent Predators Act. Cheek contends that the recommitment order must be reversed because (1) the March 26, 2003 petition to extend commitment was not supported by two evaluations by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist, as required; (2) the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata bar the proceedings to recommit Cheek under the SVPA because in 1981 Cheek was found not to be a mentally disordered sex offender; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consolidation of three pending petitions to extend commitment over defendant’s objection.
Court found no reversible error and therefore affirmed the recommitment order.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted carjacking. The jury found true three special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during the commission of an attempted carjacking, an attempted robbery, and an attempted burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and also found true allegations attached to each count that appellant was personally armed with and intentionally discharged a gun (§§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subd. (c)). Appellant’s sentence is a determinate term of 22 years 6 months on the attempted carjacking count; on the murder count, the sentence is life without possibility of parole, plus 20 years. The sentence orders payment of various fines and fees, including a court security assessment and a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.45.

The Merced County Board of Supervisors (the Board) held a public hearing on December 9, 2003, on whether to approve a project known as the Planada Community Plan (PCP) and whether to adopt a mitigated negative declaration for the project. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board voted unanimously to approve the project and to adopt the mitigated negative declaration. No one at the hearing raised any objection that the mitigated negative declaration was insufficient or that an environmental impact report (EIR) was required for the project. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. The petition alleged that the County of Merced (County) erred in failing to require the preparation of an EIR for the project despite the existence of a “fair argument” based on substantial evidence in the record that the project may have a significant effect on the environment. The petition sought a writ of mandate directing the County to set aside its approval of the mitigated negative declaration for the project.

In this family law matter, Gary appeals from the trial court’s order setting the amount of unpaid child support (arrearages) accrued since 1999. Court concluded that the trial court erred in two respects. First, the court erred by interpreting Gary’s written promise to contribute to a college fund for the children as a child support obligation. Second, the court made improper retroactive modifications to an existing child support order that required appellant’s former wife, to pay child support to appellant. Accordingly, court reversed.

A jury convicted defendant of evading a peace officer with wanton disregard for the safety of others and possession of a firearm by a felon. It also found true allegations of seven prior convictions for purposes of the Three Strikes law and three prior prison terms for purposes of one-year sentence enhancements. On appeal, defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to make certain objections. In a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus, which court ordered to be considered with the appeal, defendant raises the same claims of ineffective assistance of counsel supplemented by a declaration of trial counsel. Court affirmed the judgment. Court also disposed of the habeas corpus petition by separate order filed this day.

Plaintiffs signed a contract to purchase a new condominium from defendants. Plaintiffs thought they were buying a unit with a three-foot yard along one side but after the unit was constructed, escrow closed, and plaintiffs moved in, they discovered there was no side yard; the living room window looked directly into the neighbors’ backyard. Plaintiffs sued and the matter was resolved through a judicial reference proceeding. The referee concluded that under the measure of damages described in Civil Code section 3343 plaintiffs had not suffered any compensable damages. Plaintiffs appeal from the resulting judgment. Judgment Affirmed.

Petitioner is serving a term of 15 years to life following his 1982 conviction for second degree murder. In 2004, respondent Board of Prison Terms (now Board of Parole Hearings, hereafter “Board”) found, based on the facts of the crime and other criteria, that petitioner was not “suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison.” It therefore denied parole suitability and deferred reconsideration for three years. Petitioner challenged Board’s decision by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in superior court. The superior court granted the petition and ordered Board to hold a new suitability hearing. It reasoned that, because petitioner has served time beyond the matrix for second degree murder and near or beyond the matrix for first degree murder, due process of law required Board to find some evidence that petitioner’s “acts were more than those amounting to the elements of first degree murder.” Board appealed, and court granted its petition for a writ of supersedeas to stay the superior court’s order pending the appeal. Board contends that the superior court erroneously (1) required it to use first degree murder elements to examine parole suitability for a prisoner convicted of second degree murder, and (2) granted the petition because Board may deny parole suitability based on the facts of the crime alone and the record contains some evidence to support the denial in this case. Court agreed with Board. Court therefore reversed the order granting the petition and directed the superior court to enter an order denying the petition. br />

Plaintiffs appeal the judgment on a jury verdict in favor of defendants and respondents, in the Rentons’ action for legal malpractice. They assert instructional and evidentiary error and abuse of discretion in bifurcating the issue of liability of the non-named defendant in the underlying case from the liability of the attorneys in the present case. Judgment Affirmed.

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of carjacking, robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and other offenses. Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the carjacking and that the court made a number of sentencing errors. Court rejected defendant’s evidentiary challenge and one of the asserted sentencing errors, but agreed that the judgment should be modified so that the sentences imposed on the robbery and assault counts are stayed.

Defendant appeals his robbery conviction. Defendant argues his conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race, and the trial court should have allowed him to show that certain witnesses were unable to identify him in a photographic lineup. Court affirmed.

Appellant is one of two beneficiaries of the inter vivos trust of his deceased mother. Following the filing of the trustee’s first account, appellant objected to several items in the account, including the size of the trustee’s fees and the payment of certain attorney fees. The probate court found merit in some of appellant’s arguments and required a partial reimbursement of fees by both the trustee and her attorneys. The probate court also surcharged the trustee for costs associated with the late payment of estate taxes. Appellant now contends that the probate court should have required even greater reimbursements. Finding no abuse of discretion in the probate court’s order, the court affirmed.

Defendant was found not guilty of burglary, but was convicted on both petty theft charges. Defendant was placed on probation for two years, and timely appealed. Defendant appeals her convictions for two counts of petty theft with a prior on the grounds that the court erroneously excluded lay testimony regarding her mental state. Judgment Affirmed.