CA Unpub Decisions

Government Code section 65009 generally provides that actions challenging certain local government decisions must be commenced and served within 90 days of the decision. Section 65009, subdivision (e), provides: “Upon the expiration of the time limits provided for in this section, all persons are barred from any further action or proceeding.” The sole issue in this case is whether section 65009 applies to a decision of the Riverside City Council denying a conditional use permit for a commercial project. Plaintiff on appeal agrees that it was a correct application of section 65009 in a housing case, but he contends that it has no relevance to a denial of a permit for a commercial land use. Judgment Affirmed.

Defendants, City of Los Angeles, acting by and through the Department of Water and Power for the City of Los Angeles (sometimes referred to collectively herein as the City), appeal from an order enjoining them from exporting water from the Owens Valley through the second Los Angeles aqueduct. Defendants contend: (1) the trial court violated their due process rights when it issued an injunction not requested by any of the parties; (2) the injunction is punitive and violates Government Code section 818; (3) the injunction does not meet fundamental requirements for issuing an injunction, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. Court concluded, however, that defendants have forfeited their challenges to the injunction by failing to object or request modification in the trial court. Court therefore affirmed the order.

Defendant appeals from his conviction and sentence for assault, torture and other offenses. Defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of torture, criminal threats and dissuading a witness. Court affirmed the judgment but reversed the sentence in part and remand for resentencing.

A jury found defendant guilty of possession for sale of methamphetamine and misdemeanor vandalism. Prior to sentencing defendant, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike his prior. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion. Court affirmed the judgment.

Mother of child, who is presently almost two years old, appeals from an order of the dependency court terminating her parental rights. Counsel filed a brief setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of facts and requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the entire record. The court provided mother with an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, but she did not do so. The court found no arguable issues. Judgment Affirmed.

Absent “‘special circumstances,’” the owner or bailee of a motor vehicle has no duty to protect third persons against the possibility a thief will steal the vehicle and injure them with it. Leaving the keys in the ignition, and the vehicle unlocked and unattended, is not by itself one of these special circumstances. The issue here is whether additional factors exist sufficient to change this from an ordinary key-in-the-ignition case into one that fits the special circumstances exception to the general rule. The trial court concluded there were no special circumstances, and so granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Court agreed and affirmed.

A jury found defendant guilty of one count of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle and one count of recklessly evading a peace officer. The jury also found true criminal street gang and arming enhancements associated with each count. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences on the unlawful taking/driving and reckless evasion counts violated section 654; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the gang enhancements; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the arming enhancements; (4) the court committed an impermissible dual use of facts when it used the circumstance of a principal being armed as a reason for imposing the upper term on the reckless evasion count; and (5) the court’s imposition of the upper term violated defendant’s constitutional rights. Court Affirms.

Brianna’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, raises no issues, and requests this court to independently review the record. The opening brief also includes the declaration of appellate counsel indicating that Brianna was advised she could file her own brief with this court. The court invited Brianna to submit additional briefing, which she did not do. The court concluded that no reasonably arguable legal or factual argument exists.

After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence and to dismiss the information, defendant pled no contest to transportation of methamphetamine and forgery. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Defendant was sentenced to four years eight months in state prison. Imposition of sentence was suspended due to Defendant’s commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center. On appeal, Defendant contends her motion to suppress was erroneously denied. Court rejects the contention and affirms.

After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence and to dismiss the information, defendant pled no contest to transportation of methamphetamine and forgery. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Defendant was sentenced to four years eight months in state prison. Imposition of sentence was suspended due to Defendant’s commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center. On appeal, Defendant contends her motion to suppress was erroneously denied. Court rejects the contention and affirms.

Appellant appeals from an order entering judgment based upon settlement of an action between him and various parties, including his brother. The settlement agreement determined control of a trust created by Jon and Arthur’s mother. Appellant appeals from the trial court’s order entering judgment consistent with the settlement agreement, which among other things, replaces Arthur and appoints Jon as the successor trustee of the mother’s Trust. Appellant makes three contentions: 1) that he was denied due process because the trial judge coerced him into settling the dispute, 2) that he was denied due process because the trial court did not grant him a continuance to retain counsel, and 3) that appellant was denied an opportunity for a trial. We conclude that the settlement agreement was enforceable and that Appellant has failed to show any cognizable error. Court affirms the judgment.

This is an appeal following a six-month review hearing in juvenile dependency proceedings. Appellant’s sole claim on appeal, however, relates to the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a prior hearing. Appellant, mother, waived her right to appeal the guardianship ruling by failing to timely challenge that ruling; Appellant may not now raise that challenge on the appeal of a subsequent order. Moreover, even if court were to reach the merits of Appellant’s claim, court would find that a guardian was properly appointed to represent appellant. Thus, court affirms.

Plaintiff was treated after an automobile accident at Highland Hospital, a county-owned hospital in Oakland. A few days after his discharge from the hospital, still suffering pain, Plaintiff was admitted to a second hospital and diagnosed with a perforated colon. At some unspecified time, Plaintiff discussed his situation with other doctors and was told Highland Hospital was not at fault in failing to detect the colon perforation. More than two years after the accident, however, he consulted with a doctor who opined, to the contrary, that the hospital’s failure had violated the standard of care. Only after this consultation did Porter submit a claim for personal injury to the hospital. The claim was denied as untimely. Plaintiff then sought leave to file a late claim from the trial court, arguing that accrual of his cause of action was tolled by the discovery rule. The trial court rejected the argument and denied the petition. Court affirms.

Petitioners appeal from a judgment denying their petition for a writ of mandate seeking to invalidate the employment contract between Respondents San Francisco Board of Education (Board) and Arlene Ackerman, the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD) superintendent. They contend that the contract was made in violation of Education Code section 1209 because the issue of increasing Ackerman’s salary was not first discussed at a regularly scheduled public meeting. Court affirms because section 1209 is inapplicable to this action inasmuch as Ackerman’s contract is governed by sections 35032 and 35124.