CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an aggravated eight-year prison term for arson of an inhabited structure. Alternatively, Defendant argues that if court found he waived his right to challenge the sentence on appeal, court must conclude he received ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring remand for re-sentencing.
Court affirms. Appellant’s counsel did preserve appellant’s objection to his sentence. However, the sentence imposed was within the court’s discretion.

A jury convicted Defendant of felony assault with intent to commit rape and misdemeanor indecent exposure. The court sentenced Defendant to the aggravated term of six years in prison on the assault conviction and imposed a one-year county jail term for indecent exposure, which was stayed pursuant to section 654. The court also imposed a consecutive eight-month prison term for an earlier drug offense for which defendant had been on probation at the time of the assault. Defendant appeals his conviction for assault and indecent exposure upon claims of evidentiary, instructional and sentencing errors. Court rejects the claims and affirms the judgment.

In appeal number A112385, Petitioner appeals a judgment denying his petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The petition sought to overturn the City of Oakland’s (City) designation of Petitioner’s Oakland property as a public nuisance and the subsequent imposition of civil penalties. On appeal, Petitioner contends: (1) the administrative appeal hearing on the issue of nuisance must be set aside as it was fundamentally unfair due to hearing officer bias; (2) the penalty hearing decision must also be set aside because it followed the invalid appeal hearing decision.

In appeal number A112211, Defendant appeals the trial court’s order granting the City’s motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction. The injunction ordered Defendant to vacate his property, not to rent any units at the property or collect rents thereon, and to provide relocation benefits to each displaced tenant. The injunction further prohibited any use or occupation of the property effective November 1, 2005, ordered Defendant to post a $2000 bond for each unit still occupied on November 1, 2005, and ordered the Sherriff to remove any person found on the property after November 15, 2005.

Judgment in each case is affirmed.

The trial court entered a judgment that decreed that certain purported amendments to the Edna P. Tierney Living Trust (hereafter Tierney Trust) are “void due to the fact that the purported Amendments and Restatements executed March 8, 2002, were the product of undue influence exercised by . . . Marie E. Stacey.” Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from this judgment. Appellant filed an “EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE AND APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY TRUSTEE PENDING APPEAL” in which she sought the following orders: (1) Removing appellant as trustee of the Tierney Trust; (2) Directing appellant to pay Tierney the sum of $115,442.20 in cash, which was allegedly the value of the assets held by Edna Tierney at the time of her death; (3) Directing appellant to pay Respondent the sum of $34,667.72 in cash, which was allegedly the sum of all funds “improperly paid during [Edna Tierney’s] lifetime to, family members, attorneys and/or other third party payees for services rendered for the benefit of and/or her family”; (4) Appointing Respondent as temporary trustee of the Tierney Trust pending the appeal in B180387; (5) Directing appellant to execute a grant deed transferring a residence at 3923 McNab Avenue in Long Beach to Respondent.

Hon. DiLoreto granted each of the requests contained in Tierney’s ex parte application, and entered orders granting Tierney’s requests. Stacey filed a timely notice of appeal from these orders. Appellant informs court that the parties have entered into a written agreement under which they stipulated to stay the enforcement of the judgment, as well as the enforcement of the ex parte orders. The court consolidated the appeals and although the appeals remain consolidated, the court addressed separately the issues raised in the appeals. Judgment is reversed and remanded.

Defendant appeals the judgment entered following his plea of guilty to sale of a controlled substance and admission of a prior narcotics related conviction. Upon finding Defendant in violation of probation, the trial court imposed a previously suspended term of seven years in state prison.
Court examined the entire record and is satisfied that Defendant’s counsel has complied fully with counsel’s responsibilities. The judgment (order revoking probation) is affirmed.

Defendant appeals the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to robbery with the personal use of a firearm. Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant also admitted a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). In exchange, the trial courtDefendant appeals the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to robbery with the personal use of a firearm. Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant also admitted a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). In exchange, the trial court sentenced Pashell to a total term of 12 years consisting of the low term of 2 years for robbery, plus 10 years for the personal use of a firearm.
Court examined the entire record and is satisfied that Pashell’s counsel has complied fully with counsel’s responsibilities. However, because Defendant pleaded no contest and failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause, the appeal must be dismissed as inoperative.
sentenced Pashell to a total term of 12 years consisting of the low term of 2 years for robbery, plus 10 years for the personal use of a firearm.
Court examined the entire record and are satisfied Pashell's counsel has complied fully with counsel's responsibilities.People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.) However, because defendant pleaded no contest and failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause, the appeal must be dismissed as inoperative.

Defendant appeals from a judgment after a jury trial in an action for damages for race discrimination in employment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The jury found Union Pacific liable on a special verdict and awarded $500,000 damages on two rubrics: (1) disparate treatment amounting to an adverse employment action and (2) harassment amounting to a hostile work environment. Union Pacific contends that there is no substantial evidence supporting the first aspect of the special verdict because there is no substantial evidence of an adverse employment action. Court disagrees and affirms the judgment.

A modification decision.

Defendant and fellow gang members accosted a group of people, robbed them, and stole their car. When officers later found Defendant in the stolen car, he led them on a high speed chase before being apprehended.
A jury convicted defendant of carjacking, five counts of robbery, participating in a criminal street gang, resisting or obstructing a peace officer, vehicle theft, and evading an officer. The trial court found a prior conviction to be true, found Defendant had violated probation in another case, and sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 34 years 4 months.
On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court (1) erred in giving a pinpoint instruction on carjacking, (2) mistakenly believed it could consider only those mitigating factors expressly delineated in the California Rules of Court, and (3) violated principles enunciated in Blakely v. Washington when imposing the sentence. Court rejects defendant’s first and third claims, but concluded that the court erred in restricting its consideration of mitigating factors. Court therefore remands for resentencing.

Defendant entered a no contest plea to possession of methamphetamine occurring, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining count as well as other pending matters. Defendant appeals. Defendant did not request a certificate of probable cause. Defendant challenges only the imposition of the court security fee. Defendant argues that the fee was improperly applied retroactively against him. The Attorney General concedes, citing People v. Carmichael, which determined that “the last act or event necessary to trigger application of the statute” was the date of defendant’s offense, and People v. Alford, which determined that “the last act or event necessary to trigger application of the statute” was defendant’s conviction.
The judgment is modified by striking the $20 court security fee. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment accordingly and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant appeals from judgments in two criminal cases. Court granted defendant’s motion to consolidate his two appeals.
Defendant contends the trial court’s imposition of a $5,000 restitution fine violated his plea agreements, or alternatively, was improper given his inability to pay. Court affirms the judgment.

Security cameras caught Defendant, a security guard hired to protect North Tree Ranch (Ranch), removing items from the Ranch. Defendant was charged with grand theft. A jury found defendant guilty of grand theft and the trial court placed her on three years’ probation. Defendant appeals, contending insufficient evidence supports her grand theft conviction, the court erred in denying her second motion for acquittal, and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor. Court affirms the judgment.

Defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to vehicle theft and admitted having served three prior prison terms. In exchange for his plea, a charge for carjacking and two misdemeanor charges were dismissed with a Harvey waiver. The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years for the vehicle theft, plus three consecutive one-year terms for the prison priors. Defendant was awarded 100 days of custody credit and 50 days of conduct credit, and was ordered to pay a $1,200 restitution fine and another $1,200 restitution fine suspended unless parole is revoked. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record the court found no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to Defendant.
The judgment is affirmed.

At a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the court terminated father and mother’s parental rights as to five children. Father contends the court failed to read the preliminary adoption assessment and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support the adoptability finding. Mother contends that the evidence supporting adoptability was insufficient because the background checks of the prospective adoptive parents were not complete. Mother further contends that there was insufficient evidence of the children’s wishes regarding adoption, and that the beneficial relationship between mother and the children or the sibling relationships preclude adoption. Court rejects these contentions and affirms.