CA Unpub Decisions

M.W. appeals the juvenile court’s order that declared him a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) After the court denied M.W.’s motion to suppress evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1), it found true allegations that he was a minor in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610; count 1), was a minor in possession of ammunition (§ 29650; count 2), gave false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a); count 3), and resisted a police officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 4). It ordered him placed at home on probation. M.W. contends the juvenile court’s order should be reversed because the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

In 1987, a jury convicted defendant Darren Williams of four counts of first degree murder. After the jury failed to reach a verdict on the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder, the allegation was tried before a second jury, which found it to be true and returned a verdict of death.

This case involves an appeal from a juvenile court’s order assuming jurisdiction over mother’s three children. Jurisdiction was based on Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). Identical allegations involving domestic violence and physical abuse were alleged under subdivisions (a) and (b). Mother does not challenge any factual allegation; the facts are undisputed. She requests this court reverse the findings under subdivision (a) even though she admits the identical allegations were proper under subdivision (b)(1). The issue is nonjusticiable because we can grant mother no effective relief. We dismiss the appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

The trial court denied an employer’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike its employee’s claim for wrongful termination because that claim arose from the employer’s decision to terminate, which the court concluded was not “protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute. The employer appeals, arguing that the claim was based upon “protected activity” because the employee alleged that part of what made the termination wrongful was the employer’s conduct in using subterfuge to secure an administrative decision finding the employee responsible for violating federal labor law. The anti-SLAPP statute applies only when the “[protected] activity itself is the wrong complained of” rather than “a step leading to [a] different act[ion] for which liability is asserted.”

The juvenile court sustained a petition against T.W. following an adjudicatory hearing. The court found true second degree attempted burglary of a vehicle (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 664) ; tampering with a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10852); possession of burglary tools (§ 466); and giving false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)).
The juvenile court placed T.W. at home on probation. The court declared the maximum period of confinement to be five years eight months. We strike the court’s declaration of the maximum term of confinement. In all other respects, we affirm.

Renato Corzo and his partnership sued the partnership’s accountants for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendant accountants filed a demurrer arguing that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court agreed. Corzo asked for and received leave to amend his complaint. Corzo’s next complaint included new facts he believed tolled the statute of limitations. Defendants demurred again. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the amended complaint was a “sham” pleading engineered to avoid the statute of limitations.
Was it? Yes. We agree with the trial court that Corzo’s amended complaint was a sham pleading. Because Corzo has not demonstrated he can amend the pleading to state a viable cause of action not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the amended complaint with prejudice.

After a tragic traffic accident that took the life of a 29-year-old man chaperoning a group of prospective college applicants to Humboldt State University, the man’s mother and grandmother filed wrongful death claims against the group’s bus driver and the company that employed the driver of the big rig that struck the bus. The trial court ruled that only the mother had standing to pursue the wrongful death claim. The grandmother appeals, challenging that ruling as well as the court’s subsequent refusal to reconsider its ruling after it withdrew the pro hac vice status it had conferred upon one of the mother’s three lawyers. We conclude there was no error and affirm.

Joseph Christopher Moore (defendant), while pretending to be a police officer with a gun, confronted three different women while they were alone and proceeded to grope them. A jury convicted him of assault with intent to commit rape, false imprisonment by violence and other crimes, and the trial court sentenced him to prison for 115 years to life.

Diondre Evins (defendant) stands convicted of 14 counts of human sex trafficking, pimping and pandering (and one count of assault) regarding several underage women. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying one count, three of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and the trial court’s refusal to award pre-sentencing conduct credits. Only the last claim has merit. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions but order that the abstract of judgment be corrected to award 1,592 days of custody credits and to correct a clerical error as to the sentence imposed on one of the counts.

Oscar Maddox appeals from his convictions for felony driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and the following misdemeanors: two counts of battery and one count each of resisting arrest, petty theft, and vandalism. prove

Securitas Critical Infrastructure Services, Inc. (Securitas) employed Joan Myles (Myles) as a security officer. Securitas gave Myles a uniform to wear but did not pay either for the cost of maintaining it or for the black shoes she had to wear. Claiming that she and other security officers were entitled to reimbursement for these costs, Myles filed a putative class action and moved to certify the class. The trial court denied the motion, and Myles now appeals the order denying class certification. Because Myles failed to show there is a well-defined community of interest among the proposed class members, we affirm the order.

In this dependency appeal, Diamond W. (mother) seeks relief from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights with respect to her son D.M. (born April 2014) at a permanency planning hearing held pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that termination of her parental rights was improper absent adequate compliance with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. Respondent effectively concedes error, and our own review of the ICWA noticing in this matter is in accord. We therefore conditionally reverse and remand for the limited purpose of ensuring ICWA compliance.

In April 2017, Glenn Josue Barrera-Izaba pled no contest to insurance fraud (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (b)(3)). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court placed Barrera-Izaba on probation, ordered him to serve 364 days in jail, and pay restitution of $10,000 to Farmers Insurance (Farmers).
Barrera-Izaba appeals. We affirm.

A jury found defendant Jason Loren Dewees guilty of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2), counts 1 and 2), assault with intent to commit rape or oral copulation on a victim under the age of 18 (§ 220, subd. (a)(2), counts 3 through 7), and a forcible lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1), count 8). The jury also found a multiple victim allegation pursuant to section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (e), true. The trial court sentenced Dewees to an aggregate term of 90 years to life.