CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Vanessa Hamilton was found guilty of felony arson and first-degree burglary. With additional allegations, including a commitment under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) (prison prior), Hamilton was sentenced to six years in state prison.
Hamilton claims that CALCRIM No. 1502’s instruction on the meaning of “burn” is inadequate and that the pinpoint instruction proposed by Hamilton and given by the court did not cure the error. She argues there was insufficient evidence that the inhabited structure burned. As to the lesser offense, the court gave CALCRIM No. 1520 (attempted arson) and CALCRIM No. 3518; Hamilton argues that the court’s oral explanation about completing the verdict form erroneously directed the jury not to consider the lesser offense until it had decided the arson charge. We find sufficient evidence to support the arson conviction and no instructional error as to the arson and attempted arson instructions.

In December 2009, when he was 18 years old, defendant Jeremy Millbrook fired one shot at Sione Manoa while the two were arguing at a party. In addition to seriously injuring Manoa, the bullet struck the hand of Matthew Galvan, a friend of Manoa’s who was trying to defuse the argument. In a prior trial, a jury convicted Millbrook of attempted murder of Manoa, assault with a firearm on Manoa, and assault with a firearm on Galvan and found true several enhancement allegations involving firearms and great bodily injury (GBI). This court reversed the conviction for attempted murder, finding prejudicial error in the trial court’s failure to instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter based on a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122 (Millbrook I).)

Appellant Nick Sellas brought this case alleging that respondents Noah Dehlinger, D.D.S., and Noah Dehlinger, D.D.S., Inc. (collectively, Dehlinger) negligently provided him with dental services. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dehlinger because he presented evidence that his services were not negligent, and Sellas presented no admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to rebut Dehlinger’s evidence. We affirm.

Defendants Riverbed Technology, Inc. and Riverbed Technology Limited (collectively Riverbed) appeal an adverse judgment, following a bench trial, holding them liable for breach of an agreement under which they purchased a software company, Zeus Technology Limited (Zeus), from its shareholders, plaintiffs Scottish Equity Partners LLP and others (collectively plaintiffs). Under the agreement, Riverbed agreed to pay for the company a base price of $110 million, which it paid, plus an additional contingent sum based on first-year revenues as defined in complex contractual provisions. The controversy centers on whether the proceeds from Riverbed’s license to another company, Juniper Networks (Juniper), during the first year following the purchase, of the source code to one of Zeus’s primary products, the “Zeus Traffic Manager,” qualifies for inclusion in the earn-out formula. The trial court concluded that the proceeds of the license agreement, $75 million, do qualify and that River

Jimmie L. Doss, Jr., was convicted by jury of a string of crimes occurring over a one-month period in 2009 in Richmond, including murder (Pen. Code, § 187), attempted murder (§§ 664, 187), three counts of kidnapping for extortion (one with bodily harm) (§ 209, subd. (a)), and related counts, as well as drug crimes, unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, and enhancements based on weapon use, infliction of great bodily injury, and prior convictions, earning him a sentence far beyond what he could serve in his lifetime, including a life term without possibility of parole (LWOP).

A jury convicted defendant Jimmy Sanchez Vasquez of sex offenses involving three minor victims. The trial court imposed a 32-years-to-life prison term. On appeal, defendant challenges the adequacy of his Miranda warnings, the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever the charges involving one of the victims, the admission of testimony he contends was inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court’s refusal to instruct on the defense of unconsciousness. He also raises a cumulative error claim and requests that we review one of the victim’s confidential school records, to which the trial court denied him access following an in camera review, to determine whether that denial was erroneous. We conclude that the court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence, an error that was harmless as to counts 1 through 5, but prejudicial as to counts 6 and 7. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for possible retrial of counts 6 and 7 and for resentencing.

This case concerns the estate of Alan Kohn. Unable to locate a will, Alan’s brother, Byron Kohn, filed a petition for letters of administration and published notice of it pursuant to the Probate Code. After the probate court appointed Byron administrator of the estate and reviewed the final report he prepared in that role, it ordered a final distribution by which Byron received all property of the estate. Months later, Svend Mejdal, Jr., Alan’s godson, came forward with a copy of a will purportedly executed by Alan 40 years earlier; which ostensibly left half of the estate to Mejdal. Mejdal filed a petition to probate the will. Following a bench trial, however, the probate court concluded the petition to probate the will was not timely under Probate Code section 8226, subdivision (c). Mejdal challenges that conclusion, arguing the deadlines specified in the statute do not apply because he never “received notice” of Byron’s petition for letters of administration.

Gonzales repeatedly molested his stepdaughter for nearly eight years, beginning when she was eight years old, and admitted his conduct to her in a pretextual telephone call. A jury convicted him of three counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years or younger (Penal Code § 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1, 2, and 3), two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 4 and 8), two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subd. (a)(1); counts 5 and 6), and one count of forcible oral copulation of a minor under 14 years of age (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(C); count 7). The trial court sentenced Gonzales to state prison for a determinate sentence of 21 years followed by an indeterminate sentence of 105 years to life.

A jury convicted defendants Jose Arturo Hernandez and Uriel Jesus Pala of two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187), three counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and one count of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). As to all six counts, the jury found the defendants committed these crimes at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). For the two attempted murder counts, the jury also found the defendants were principals in the commission of those crimes, they committed them for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and during its commission, a principal intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced both defendants to indeterminate terms of seven years to life, plus determinate terms of 29 years.

A jury found Adam Ullah guilty of domestic violence against his girlfriend and found true the allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) on her. On appeal, Ullah contends the trial court erred in failing to give, sua sponte, a unanimity instruction with respect to the GBI allegation. He further contends the trial court erred when it determined he was presumptively ineligible for probation based on the jury’s true finding on the GBI allegation. For the reasons stated below, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment.

Parties have a duty to diligently monitor their case in the superior court, to keep track of relevant dates and—if the clerk has made a docketing error, to notify the court at the first indication of a problem. (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1104 (Gaines); Hoffman v. State of California (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1107 (Hoffman).)
In this case, at the parties' request for more time to try to negotiate settlement, the trial court continued the hearing on dispositive motions four times over the course of seven months. When the parties asked for a fifth continuance, the exasperated trial judge instead "stay[ed] all current hearings" and instructed the parties to appear ex parte to schedule a hearing date "if [the] matter does not settle."

Gregory Terry stole a car and led officers on a high-speed chase. In this single-issue appeal, he argues the trial court erroneously denied him credits at sentencing under Penal Code sections 2900.5 and 4019 for two separate periods of presentence detention. The first period was for a PRCS "flash incarceration" commencing on October 6, 2017; the second was a five-day period leading up to the sentencing hearing on November 7.
Terry was entitled to credit only if he could show that his presentence incarceration during those two periods was the result of the same conduct for which he was convicted and sentenced. As we explain, by failing to raise a specific objection as to October 6, Terry forfeited any claim to credit for that date. Even otherwise, he did not meet his burden as to any of the claimed dates to show that he was incarcerated for the "same conduct" for which he was sentenced (i.e., car theft and evading officers).

A jury convicted Raul B. Vargas of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), rejecting the prosecution's theory of first degree murder and the defense theory of self-defense. The jury also found true the allegation that Vargas personally used a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In a bifurcated trial, the trial court found true two prior strike allegations. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)
The court sentenced Vargas to prison for 46 years to life.
Vargas appeals, contending the trial court made several instructional errors. In addition, he claims his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he did not impeach a certain witness during trial. Further, Vargas maintains the court erred in using two juvenile adjudications as prior strikes for sentencing purposes. Finally, Vargas asserts cumulative error necessitates reversal. We conclude Vargas's claims lack merit. As such, we affirm.

Burtech Pipeline, Inc. (Burtech or Employer) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court denied Burtech's petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging a workplace safety citation issued by real party in interest Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health (the Division), and upheld in an administrative appeal heard by respondent California Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (the Board).
In this appeal, Burtech challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and findings supporting the Board's determination upholding the citation. By presenting an inadequate and one-sided summary of the evidence in its opening brief, Burtech has forfeited this challenge on appeal. And, even if not forfeited, we have independently reviewed the record and reject Burtech's appeal on the merits.
We affirm the judgment.