CA Unpub Decisions

In 2016, in case No. SS160525A, defendant Sotero Genaro Becerra pleaded no contest to driving or taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and admitted having suffered a prior conviction for the same offense (Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to jail, suspended execution, and placed defendant on mandatory supervision (see § 1170, subd. (h)(5)).

Respondent Diana Estrada (Estrada) and appellant Jean Claude Harel (Harel) are the mother and father of a child who was seven years old at the time of the relevant proceedings. After a review hearing—attended by Estrada but not by Harel—the court, inter alia, ordered that Harel pay Estrada monthly child support of $956 from July 2016 forward. A formal order was filed on September 13, 2016 (hereafter support order). Harel filed an application to set aside the support order pursuant to Family Code section 3691 (hereafter set-aside motion). In his supporting papers, Harel also cited Code of Civil Procedure section 473 in support of his position.

Defendant Orlando Rodriguez was convicted by jury of assault with a deadly weapon. The assault charge stemmed from an incident at a public library where defendant placed another patron in a choke hold and held a knife near the victim’s face. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court should have instructed on brandishing as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon, and that the failure to instruct violated his due process right to present a defense. Defendant also contends the trial court erred by summarily denying his petition for disclosure of jurors’ identifying information, contending he needed the information to determine whether jurors improperly experimented with the knife allegedly used in the assault. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.

Laura Bertoldi provided personal assistant and corporate concierge services for respondent RMR Financial, LLC, dba Princeton Capital, (Princeton Capital). Bertoldi was going to the grocery store for Princeton Capital when the car she was driving struck appellant Lucille Mendes, injuring her. Mendes brought this tort action against Princeton Capital on the theory that Bertoldi was acting as Princeton Capital’s agent at the time of the accident, such that Princeton Capital was vicariously liable for Bertoldi’s alleged negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in Princeton Capital’s favor, concluding that the only inference to be drawn from the undisputed evidence was that no agency relationship existed. Mendes appeals. The sole issue on appeal is whether there exists a triable issue of fact as to whether there existed an agency relationship between Bertoldi and Princeton Capital at the time of the accident. Concluding there does, we reverse.

In this marriage dissolution action, appellant Anthony Segers, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from a postjudgment order denying his request for an earnings assignment order for support. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

In this appeal, plaintiff Ezequiel Hinojos seeks review of a judgment of dismissal entered after the superior court sustained the demurrer of respondent Newport Beach Holdings, LLC (NBH). He also challenges a default judgment entered in his favor against another defendant in the same action, Eagle Crest, LLC (Eagle Crest), on the ground that the relief granted was insufficient. We find no basis for reversal as to either defendant and therefore must affirm the judgments.

This case represents, up to a point, a juvenile dependency proceeding with a happy ending. After being detained at age 11, Richard F. was placed with his father’s sister, H.N., because his parents could not take care of him. His aunt became his legal guardian.
Richard is here now at 18 years old, not with a tale of abuse and neglect, but rather because the guardianship was so successful. He is an honor student with ambitions to be a physician. As with so many families, however, money is tight, and his guardian cannot afford to pay Richard’s college expenses.

We appointed counsel to represent Daniel Julio Cervantes on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client but advised the court he found no issues to argue on Cervantes’s behalf. We gave Cervantes 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That time has passed, and Cervantes has not filed any written argument.

After revoking probation and imposing a suspended prison sentence, the trial court recalculated Andy Kejadi Onwuka’s presentence credits. Onwuka filed a notice of appeal asserting the court unlawfully increased his sentence. Onwuka has a second appeal pending in this court challenging the court’s finding him in violation of probation and the subsequent sentencing (case No. G054760).
We appointed counsel to represent Onwuka on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client but advised the court he found no issues to argue on Onwuka’s behalf.

A jury convicted Jovanny J. Mendez of attempted premeditated murder (count 1, Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code), assault with a firearm (count 2, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), shooting at an occupied building (count 3, § 246), and possession of a firearm by a felon (count 4, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true as to count 1 a penalty enhancement allegation that Mendez personally discharged a firearm in committing the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and, as to count 2, an enhancement for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subds. (a), (d)). Before trial, the court dismissed pursuant to section 995 all gang-related enhancement allegations.

Andy Kejadi Onwuka appeals from a judgment after the trial court found him in violation of probation and imposed a previously suspended prison sentence. Onwuka argues the court erred by permitting him to represent himself at the contested probation violation hearings because he was not mentally competent. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Oakdale Irrigation District (District) appeals from a judgment of the Stanislaus County Superior Court granting the writ petition of Oakdale Groundwater Alliance, Louis F. Brichetto, and Robert N. Frobose (collectively, Alliance) and the court’s order denying a motion to vacate said judgment.

In 2012, appellant Akil Anthony Brown was serving a prison term when he was charged with possessing marijuana (Pen. Code, § 4573.6, subd. (a)). In February 2013, following a negotiated plea agreement, he received an additional and consecutive prison term of three years for this violation.
More than three years later, when his original prison term was almost completed, appellant petitioned the trial court to recall this three-year sentence. He filed his petition under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), (the section 1170 petition) and highlighted various accomplishments he had achieved while in custody. The trial court denied the section 1170 petition.
Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion. We need not address that issue because we agree with respondent that the section 1170 petition was not timely filed. As such, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence appellant. We will dismiss this appeal based on the absence of an appealable order.

In this personal injury case, the dispositive legal question before the trial court was whether primary assumption of the risk applied as a defense to the action. Defendant Ryan Beard (defendant) lost his grip while swinging an aluminum baseball bat, the bat flew out of his hands and struck plaintiff John C. Heflebower (plaintiff) in the face. Plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for his injuries and the case proceeded to jury trial. At trial, the testimony was in conflict on whether defendant was engaged in a sport activity (versus mere horseplay) at the time of the accident, and on the nature of plaintiff’s relationship to that activity.