CA Unpub Decisions

Hadeer Shamoun appeals from an order revoking his outpatient status following his commitment to a state hospital pursuant to Penal Code section 1608. In 1995, Shamoun was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) following a criminal trial, resulting in his civil commitment to a state hospital. Almost two decades later, Shamoun was discharged from the hospital and placed under community supervision on an outpatient basis. The director of Shamoun's outpatient program subsequently requested the court revoke his outpatient status following several incidents in which Shamoun failed to comply with the treatment program. The court granted that request and ordered Shamoun to be returned to state hospital. Shamoun now challenges that ruling.

Keith Johnson took about $2,000 worth of items from a Walmart store without paying for them. After leaving the store, he pointed a gun at two employees who were attempting to regain possession of the property. Johnson then abandoned the goods and left in a waiting vehicle.
Johnson was charged with robbery, grand theft, and burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 487, subd. (a), 459.) At trial, he conceded the burglary and grand theft counts, but argued he did not commit a robbery. The jury found Johnson guilty on all three counts. The court sentenced him to six years four months, consisting of five years on the robbery count; three years (concurrent) on the burglary count; and 16 months for separate theft offenses to which Johnson pleaded guilty before trial. The court stayed the sentence on the Walmart grand theft count under Penal Code section 654.

Karen Hayes sued the Temecula Valley School District (District), alleging her demotion from middle school principal to middle school teacher violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) because it was motivated by unlawful retaliation, gender discrimination, and/or age discrimination. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (a), (h).) She also claimed the District violated the FEHA because of alleged sexual/gender harassment by several male teachers and by failing to protect her from sexual discrimination and harassment. (§ 12940, subds. (j), (k).) The District successfully moved for summary judgment on all causes of action. Hayes appeals.

Kileigh Carrington filed a complaint against her former employer, Starbucks Corporation, asserting a representative cause of action under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) (Labor Code, § 2698 et seq.), claiming Starbucks failed to properly provide meal breaks or pay meal period premiums for certain employees in violation of sections 226.7 and 512. In a bifurcated bench trial on plaintiff's action, the trial court determined Starbucks was liable for these violations and imposed penalties of $150,000, with 75 percent thereof payable to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25 percent payable to Carrington and the employees she represented in the action. The trial court entered judgment in Carrington's favor. Starbucks appeals, contending Carrington failed to prove she is an aggrieved employee and failed to prove a representative claim. We conclude there was no legal error and find that substantial evidence supports the judgment; accordingly, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Anthony James Galloway of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; statutory section references that follow are to the Penal code; count one), assault with intent to commit rape during commission of first degree burglary, and two counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2); counts three and four). In connection with counts three and four, the jury sustained the allegations that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon (§§ 667.61, subd. (e)(3), 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.3) and committed the offenses with the intent to commit larceny or an act of forcible oral copulation (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(2)).
The court sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate term of 57 years to life, that is, seven years to life on count two, a stayed term on count one, and consecutive terms of 25 years to life each on counts three and four.

The City of Novato entered into a 1983 cooperation agreement with the redevelopment agency (RDA) it had previously created. The cooperation agreement provided, among other things, that Novato could advance funds to the RDA for a redevelopment plan and the RDA would reimburse Novato with 10 percent interest. Novato subsequently made various loans to the RDA, and the RDA made payments to Novato.
After dissolution of the RDA, the Department of Finance (DOF) determined that Novato was required to turn over more than $5 million for distribution to local taxing entities because the RDA made payments to Novato that were not supported by enforceable obligations. Under the dissolution statutes, loan agreements between a city and the RDA created by the city are generally not enforceable obligations. Novato, both in its municipal capacity and as successor agency of the RDA, filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging DOF’s determination. The trial court entered judgment in favor of

This case started when a water heater leaked from the inside of a second-floor apartment at the Mountainback Condominiums in Mammoth Lakes. Water found its way down to the first floor, where appellants Bob and Julie Bakas owned a condominium unit. Based on the resulting damage, the Bakases sued the Mountainback Condominium Owners Association (Mountainback). The Bakases did not allege the water heater failure in the upper floor apartment was the cause of their damages. Instead, they alleged Mountainback failed to properly maintain the common area plumbing in the building where the units were where the water leak occurred. This failure to maintain the common plumbing allegedly caused the water leak.

Defendant Dennis Jones appeals from the trial court’s order denying his Penal Code section 1170.18 petition for resentencing on a prior prison term enhancement. He contends that the enhancement became invalid once the prior felony underlying conviction that forms the prison prior was reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18. We originally held the prison prior remained valid. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review and ultimately transferred the case with directions for this court to vacate our prior decision and to reconsider the cause in light of the recently decided People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks). Applying Buycks, we conclude the prison prior is invalid.

This case involves rival claims to the death benefits under an insurance policy on the life of Oscar Litton. One of the claimants, Litton’s minor son, sued the insurer (through his guardian ad litem) for breach of contract, declaratory relief, reformation and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The minor alleges the insurer acted in bad faith by failing to honor Litton’s request to change the beneficiary of his policy from his ex-wife to the minor. The insurer filed a cross-complaint in interpleader.
The trial court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the interpleader action and on the minor’s first amended complaint and denied the minor’s motion for summary adjudication on his reformation cause of action.

D.T. appeals from a disposition order entered after the juvenile court sustained a petition for attempted second degree robbery (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211), ordered a five to seven month camp placement, and determined that the maximum term of confinement on the petition and three prior sustained petitions was four years eight months. Appellant was given 45 days predisposition credits. We modify the judgment to reflect that the aggregated maximum term of confinement is four years and that appellant is entitled to 51 days additional predisposition credits. The judgment, as modified is affirmed. (Pen. Code, § 1260.)

On December 19, 1975, a jury found appellant Larry E. Gomes guilty of second degree burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459, for a daytime burglary of a residence.
On October 12, 2017, appellant filed a petition, pursuant to section 1170.18, requesting the court to resentence him to a misdemeanor because the amount in question was less than $950 and that his offense qualified for reduction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition and denied it on the ground that section 1170.18 was not applicable because the appellant had burgled a residence rather than a business which rendered his conviction ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. In his notice of appeal, appellant complained that the court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing on the petition and erred in failing to find that his offense qualified for resentencing under Proposition 47.

Defendant and appellant Gabriel Cervantes Valencia contends his case should be remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 to strike, or to decline to strike, the firearm enhancement imposed at his sentencing. The Attorney General agrees. Accordingly, we vacate Cervantes Valencia’s sentence and remand the case to the trial court.

Defendant J.W. appeals from a juvenile court order declaring him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 following the sustaining of a petition filed October 31, 2017, charging him with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). Appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to exclude both an unreliable identification made as the result of an impermissibly suggestive field show–up, and his admission following an unlawful arrest. We affirm.

Carson Barenborg was dancing on a makeshift raised platform at a fraternity party near the University of Southern California (USC) when another partygoer bumped into her, causing her to fall to the ground and suffer serious injuries. Barenborg, who was not a USC student, sued USC and others for negligence, alleging that the university had a duty to protect her from an unreasonable risk of harm and breached that duty by failing to prevent or shut down the party. The trial court denied USC’s motion for summary judgment. USC filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate challenging the denial.
USC contends that it had no duty to protect members of the public from the conduct of a third party at an off-campus fraternity party. We agree and grant the petition.