CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Albert Therrien, III (defendant) appeals his judgment of conviction of vehicular manslaughter and hit-and-run driving. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. On August 28, 2018, we notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to have considered. That time has elapsed, and defendant has submitted no brief or letter. We have reviewed the entire record, and finding no arguable issues, affirm the judgment. Defendant was charged by information in count 1 with felony vehicular manslaughter in violation of Penal Code section 192, subdivision (c)(1), and in count 2, with misdemeanor hit-and-run driving resulting in property damage, in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a).

Appellant Vicente T. (Father), the father of Israel and Isabel T., appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order. The court asserted that the children fell under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), but found no substantial risk of serious harm to the children from the parents’ actions, and at the dispositional phase, returned the children to the custody of the parents, finding that the parents did not constitute “any kind of risk to the children.” Father contends the court’s findings do not support the assertion of jurisdiction. We agree and reverse the jurisdictional order.

In the underlying action, appellant D. Wong & Associates, LLC (DWA) sought to recover unpaid rent under a commercial lease from respondent U.S. Security Associates, Inc. (U.S. Security). Following a bench trial, the court found that U.S. Security owed no rent, entered a judgment in favor of U.S. Security, and issued an award of attorney fees to U.S. Security. We reject DWA’s challenges to the judgment and fee award, and thus affirm.

Defendant and appellant Stephen Eugene Clark (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction of multiple felonies including attempted murder, aggravated assault, burglary, and torture. He contends that the sentence imposed on the burglary conviction must be stayed; that the facts underlying the determination of whether or not to stay the burglary sentence should have been made by the jury; that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on battery with serious bodily injury as a lesser included offense of torture; and that the conviction of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury must be stricken as a lesser included offense of torture. Finding no merit to defendant’s contentions, we affirm the judgment.

Steven and Noriko Tepper (the Teppers) brought this action against the architect and an electrical engineer on a theater remodeling project. They contend that batteries installed in an office emitted toxic gases that damaged Steven Tepper’s lungs. The trial court granted both defendants summary judgment under the “completed and accepted” doctrine. The doctrine releases design professionals from liability for patent defects once the construction is completed and accepted by the building’s owner. The trial court also granted the engineer summary judgment on the ground that he owed no duty to the Teppers. We reverse. The defendants failed to show the defect was patent as a matter of law, and the engineer failed to show it owed no duty to the Teppers.

In the underlying action, appellant Melissa Case asserted claims for breach of insurance contract and bad faith against respondent State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. (State Farm), and requested an award of punitive damages. The trial court granted summary adjudication in State Farm’s favor on each claim and on the request for punitive damages. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Raymond Earl Jackson, Jr. (defendant) appeals from his murder conviction, contending that the audio portion of a video of the murder should have been excluded as irrelevant and as inadmissible testimonial hearsay based on the United States Constitution; that the trial court erred in failing to give certain sua sponte jury instructions; that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument; that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the alleged misconduct; that permitting the court reporter to read a response to a jury question in the jury room violated defendant’s constitutional rights to a public trial and to be present with counsel; and that the cumulative effect of all such errors requires reversal. Finding no merit to defendant’s contentions, we affirm the judgment.

After his warrantless arrest in the front yard of his home, appellant Philip Markowitz filed this action against respondents, the City of Los Angeles and several officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). An ensuing jury trial resulted in a defense verdict. On appeal, appellant claims that the jury’s verdict was predicated on a finding that his arrest was lawful, but that the evidence compelled a contrary finding. He further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting respondents to impeach his expert witness with information from the expert’s disciplinary record and by allowing his counsel only 45 minutes for closing argument. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

After his warrantless arrest in the front yard of his home, appellant Philip Markowitz filed this action against respondents, the City of Los Angeles and several officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). An ensuing jury trial resulted in a defense verdict. On appeal, appellant claims that the jury’s verdict was predicated on a finding that his arrest was lawful, but that the evidence compelled a contrary finding. He further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting respondents to impeach his expert witness with information from the expert’s disciplinary record and by allowing his counsel only 45 minutes for closing argument. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

David Lashley Holmes (Holmes) entered a plea of no contest to 12 counts of burglary. He later moved to withdraw his plea, which the trial court denied. Holmes appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw. We affirm.

Plaintiff Arthur Kurrus sought an assumption and modification of the mortgage on his Healdsburg home after divorcing his ex-wife, the borrower, who had defaulted on the loan. Nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated, and defendant Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), the loan servicer, denied Kurrus’s application for an assumption and modification. He then brought this lawsuit, asserting numerous causes of action against SPS based on its handling of the application. On appeal, he seeks to reverse a judgment entered after the trial court sustained SPS’s demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm.

Self-represented litigant Michael Tiner appeals a judgment confirming a contractual arbitration award and denying his petition to vacate that award (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1286.2, 1287.6). We modify the total monetary amount of the judgment to conform with the arbitration award. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant Joseph Robert Mason pleaded no contest to one felony count of elder abuse (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1)) and one misdemeanor count of inflicting corporal injury on a child (§ 273d, subd. (a)) pursuant to a plea agreement. The trial court suspended sentence and placed Mason on formal probation for three years, conditioned on a 244 day jail term, which was deemed served.

After a court trial, appellant B.W. was found to be gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). The court reappointed respondent Public Guardian for Santa Clara County as conservator of the person and estate of appellant. On appeal, appellant contends that the court committed several errors, and that the matter should be remanded for a new trial. While the appeal was pending, appellant’s one-year conservatorship expired. In response to our request for supplemental briefing, the parties agree that the appeal is now moot, although appellant requests that this court nevertheless address each of the issues he raises on appeal. For reasons that we will explain, we will dismiss the appeal.