CA Unpub Decisions

D.R. (Mother) filed a petition to terminate J.R.’s (Father) parental rights to their child, C.R., under Family Code section 7822. Father appeals the trial court’s order granting Mother’s petition, claiming he overcame the presumption he intended to abandon C.R. His contention lacks merit, and we affirm the order.

A jury convicted Gilberto Jesus Pena of five counts, including street terrorism, and found true gang and other enhancements. Pena appealed. In People v. Pena (Aug. 29, 2017, G053303) [nonpub. opn.] (Pena), this court held there was insufficient evidence the alleged gang was a criminal street gang as statutorily defined. We reversed the conviction for street terrorism (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)), and the street terrorism enhancements (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). We remanded the case for resentencing. (Pena, supra, G053303.) At the resentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Pena to serve a total of 25 years to life in prison with a minimum of seven years. Pena appeals from this judgment. We appointed counsel to represent Pena on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against her client but advised the court she found no issues to argue on Pena’s behalf.

Plaintiff Julie Aldridge appeals from a judgment following an order sustaining a demurrer filed by defendant Pedro Perez-Estrada without leave to amend. Perez-Estrada’s demurrer argued: (1) the operative complaint which named him as a Doe defendant did not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint and was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) the negligence cause of action against him fell outside the scope of the prelitigation claim Aldridge had filed with the County of Orange (County) under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). The court agreed the operative complaint did not relate back and was barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, the court did not rule on the alternative argument that the negligence cause of action was outside the scope of the prelitigation claim.

Richard Cohen appeals from the trial court’s order denying in part and granting in part his special motion to strike Jean-Lauren Pouliot’s complaint. Cohen argues the trial court erred by denying his special motion to strike two of Pouliot’s claims because Pouliot did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on those claims. We disagree and affirm the order.

Dr. Cynthia A. Cork, Fountain Valley Regional Hospital and Medical Center (Hospital), and Hospital employees (collectively referred to in the singular as Cork, unless the context requires otherwise) appeal from the trial court’s order denying in part and granting in part their special motion to strike Dr. Veeraiah Chundu (Chundu) and OC Neonatal Group, Inc.’s (Group) (collectively referred to in the singular as Chundu, unless the context requires otherwise) complaint. Cork argues the trial court erred when it concluded their claims did not arise from protected activity. We disagree and affirm the order.

Bonnie J. Kepple (Bonnie) appeals from a judgment in the dissolution of her marriage to Todd W. Kepple (Todd). She limits her challenge to two aspects of the court’s judgment. First, she contends the court erred in denying an award of mandatory child care costs incident to employment. Second, she claims the court should have ordered Todd to undergo random drug testing.
The court did not err. While an award of child care costs incident to employment is mandatory, there was insufficient evidence these costs were being incurred for the care of the minor children. Likewise, the only relevant evidence on the drug testing issue was the testimony and recommendation of a child custody evaluator. The court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly finding the evidence was insufficient to support a drug testing order. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant G.P. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding she inflicted serious physical harm on her now 18-year-old daughter, G.R., within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Mother contends she exercised reasonable parental discipline, which was warranted under the circumstances, and the court’s finding must be vacated. We affirm.

Defendant Henry Junior Turpin, Sr., was convicted by no contest plea of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. On appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to dismiss his prior felony “strike” conviction allegation. We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Jason Alan Bacot of possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1). In separate proceedings, Bacot pled no contest to being a felon in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2) and the court found true three prior conviction enhancements (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)).
On appeal, Bacot contends: (1) his prior conviction enhancements must be dismissed because of a recent change in the law; and (2) the trial court erred when it imposed a split sentence and probation in the same case. We agree with both contentions, modify the judgment accordingly, and remand for resentencing.

At the conclusion of a contested hearing on May 17, 2017, a jury found appellant Marissa S. gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. The trial court placed Marissa S. under a conservatorship with the Kern County Public Guardian (guardian or conservator) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(A), and 5358 of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS). The court ordered the termination of the conservatorship on April 25, 2018. Marissa S. contends the trial court improperly relied on testimonial hearsay evidence of an examining physician that her husband was done trying to help or care for her. The conservator responds Marissa S.’s conservatorship is only for one year, terminated on April 25, 2018, and the appeal is now moot. We agree this case is moot, necessitating dismissal of the appeal.

Jesse Perez III (defendant), who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses of which he was convicted as an adult, appeals following resentencing. He contends he is entitled to have his convictions and sentence vacated, and the matter remanded to the juvenile court for a juvenile fitness/transfer hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.) He further contends the indeterminate abstract of judgment must be corrected to state the amount of fines imposed by the trial court. We agree with both claims.

Elijah Mathew Evans’s appeal relates to two separate criminal cases filed against him in the Tulare County Superior Court: Case Nos. VCF274860 and VCF335926. In VCF335926, Evans appeals (1) his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm; (2) the true finding on a prior conviction allegation attached to that conviction; and (3) his sentence on the felon in possession conviction. We affirm his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm and the sentence for that conviction. However, we strike the true finding on the prior conviction allegation attached to the felon in possession conviction and remand the matter for resentencing on that count. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Regarding VCF274860, that case is relevant to this appeal only because the court found a probation violation there, based on the felon in possession conviction in VCF335926. Since we have affirmed the felon in possession conviction in VCF335926.

Appellant Jesus Roberto Gardea was convicted by a jury of one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4) and one count of misdemeanor battery, a violation of section 243, subdivision (a). He was sentenced to an aggregate term of ten years, based on the second strike term of eight years, plus two consecutive one-year terms for two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Gardea contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the section 245, subdivision (a)(4) conviction. He also contends that his prior strike conviction subsequently was reduced to a misdemeanor and therefore, can no longer be used to enhance his sentence.
We affirm the section 245, subdivision (a)(4) conviction, but agree that under People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks), one of the prior prison term enhancements must be stricken since the underlying felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor.

Appellant Benjamin Mendoza pled no contest in case No. BF149024A to possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). In case No. BF153404A, he pled no contest to maintaining a place for selling, giving away or using methamphetamine (§ 11366).
On September 15, 2015, Mendoza’s appellate counsel filed a brief which asked this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Mendoza did not respond to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing.