CA Unpub Decisions

The facts are complicated, and the following is a greatly abbreviated version. Additional facts are provided in the relevant discussion sections, below.
This case arises from a series of transactions related to real property located at 9020 Bradshaw Road in Elk Grove, which we refer to simply as “the property.” The property encompassed approximately five acres and had two houses on it. Monna Sue Ayers owned the property and lived in one of the houses until her death in 2019.
Ayers held the property in her trust, and her son, Dewey Brazeal, Sr. was the trustee. Dewey died in September 2011. Sometime before he died, Dewey transferred the property from Ayers’ trust to himself, and then into his own trust.
After Dewey died, Carolyn Puschman, Ayers’ niece, became the successor trustee of Ayers’ trust, and Karen Brazeal, Dewey’s ex-wife, became the successor trustee of Dewey’s trust.
Puschman Petition

In July 2019, the Department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 on behalf of E.A. (born July 2018), alleging the child was endangered by physical abuse at the hands of his father, G.B. (Father), and by the parents’ history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and untreated mental and emotional problems. The juvenile court largely sustained the petition and ordered family reunification services. However, in October 2020, the court determined that Mother had not made sufficient progress and terminated reunification services. In August 2021, the court terminated parental rights over the child.

B. Facts Related to ICWA
At the inception of the proceedings, Father reported that he had no knowledge of any Indian ancestry. Mother, however, reported that she believed she may have “Ya[qu]i” ancestry. At a hearing in July 2019, the juvenile court ordered the Department to investigate Mother’s claim.

On October 12, 2011, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint against defendants the Regents of the University of California, Jeffrey Wang, M.D., Rahoul Basho, M.D., and Joshua Bales, M.D. for medical negligence. Summary judgment was entered in favor of defendants on November 1, 2012. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, but voluntarily dismissed it.

B. Plaintiff’s Second Action

On October 28, 2016, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against defendants for absence of informed consent, battery, negligence per se, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, product liability, and negligence, concerning the same surgery. Defendants demurred to the complaint on res judicata grounds, which was sustained without leave to amend. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed on appeal. (Morgan v. Wang, et al. (Oct. 11, 2018, B284748) [nonpub. opn.].)

In 2018, a jury found appellant Reginald Young guilty of felony murder, attempted robbery, and burglary of an inhabited building. The jury also found true allegations that appellant personally used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code sections 12022.53 and 12022.5.
We affirmed appellant’s convictions on appeal, but ordered several corrections to the abstract of judgment, sentencing minute order, and appellant’s award of conduct credits. (People v. Young (April 5, 2021, B294537) [nonpub. opn.].) Appellant also argued that we should remand the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancements imposed under sections 12022.53 and 12022.5, or, alternatively, impose lesser, uncharged enhancements. We declined to do so, concluding that the court did not have such discretion.
Appellant petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court.

January 29 Incident
In 2020, Karina Fuller and her mother lived in a two-story apartment building on Newell Road in East Palo Alto. The building has an indoor lobby with a staircase to the second floor. Cook, Sr. lived upstairs from the Fullers, and his balcony was directly above theirs.
On the evening of January 29, Karina and her mother were in their apartment when they heard a sudden commotion upstairs. There was loud banging and yelling. Karina heard Cook, Sr. yell for help, and she called 911. While she was on the phone, Karina heard a loud thud and “saw a dark figure” on the balcony of their apartment. Karina’s mother also heard a “boom” and saw that a “guy jumped onto our balcony.” She thought she saw a gun in the man’s hand, and she became very scared. Karina grabbed her mother, and they hid in a bedroom. Karina told the 911 operator that someone had jumped on her balcony and she was barricading herself in her room.

Defendant Abel Rodriguez, Jr., and his cousin, Pedro Alvarez, were charged with one murder and two attempted murders in connection with a drive-by shooting committed in Modesto in 2009. In 2019, Alvarez testified for the prosecution in exchange for a plea offer of voluntary manslaughter with a gang enhancement. (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
The jury convicted defendant on count I of the murder of Guillermo Gomez, with findings that the murder was premeditated and committed by discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a).) On counts II and III, the jury convicted defendant of the premeditated attempted murders of Gabriel N. and Luis C. (§§ 664/187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a).) On all three counts, the jury found the firearm enhancement and the gang enhancement allegations true.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea, defendant and appellant S.E. (minor) admitted as true an allegation in the petition that he committed attempted murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187.) He also admitted that he personally used and discharged a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (c).) The parties stipulated that minor would be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). A trial court committed him to DJJ in accordance with the agreement. Minor subsequently petitioned the court to set aside his DJJ commitment and commit him to the Gateway to Arise program instead. The court denied minor’s request to change the commitment.
Minor filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

On October 27, 2020, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the child, who was two months old at the time. The petition alleged that he came within section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). The petition included allegations that mother had unresolved health issues, a substance abuse history, and a criminal history. It also alleged that she had a history with the Los Angeles and San Bernardino County’s Child Protective Services and received reunification services as to four of her other children from December 2014 to November 2018; she failed to reunify with those children, her parental rights were terminated, and a permanent plan of adoption was implemented.

In February 2017, mother’s son, M.S., was adjudged a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (g), due in part to mother physically abusing him. Mother made substantive progress in her reunification services, and on January 22, 2018, M.S. was returned to her under family maintenance services. On May 2, 2018, M.S. was discharged as a dependent of the court. During that case, mother gave birth to Na.B., who was adjudged a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), due in part to being at risk of similar abuse. Mother received reunification services, and Na.B. was returned to her care under family maintenance services. Na.B. was discharged as a dependent on January 22, 2018.
Current Dependency Case
On December 16, 2019, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of Ne.B., who was three months old at the time.

A juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that defendant and appellant K.D. (minor) committed attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211, count 1), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), count 2), and criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a), count 3). On May 10, 2021, a juvenile court found counts 1 and 3 true and found count 2 not true. On May 24, 2021, the court declared minor a ward of the court and placed him in the custody of his guardian, to be maintained in her home on terms of probation. The court found the maximum period for physical confinement to be three years eight months.

A juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that defendant and appellant K.D. (minor) committed attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211, count 1), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4), count 2), and criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a), count 3). On May 10, 2021, a juvenile court found counts 1 and 3 true and found count 2 not true. On May 24, 2021, the court declared minor a ward of the court and placed him in the custody of his guardian, to be maintained in her home on terms of probation. The court found the maximum period for physical confinement to be three years eight months.

One night in September 2020, a police officer conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle defendant was driving. After lying to the officer about his name and admitting that he did not have a driver’s license, defendant later admitted his true name and claimed he provided a false name because he thought there was a warrant for his arrest. During a search, the officer found defendant had a knife, the possession of which defendant admitted he knew was unlawful. The officer also found over seven grams of a substance that appeared to be heroin, but which defendant said was “ ‘fake heroin’ ” that he intended to sell as real heroin.
The People charged defendant with carrying a dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 21310 -- count 1), misdemeanor giving false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a) -- count 2), and misdemeanor possession for distribution of an imitation controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 109575 -- count 3).

The parties were married in December 1991. A judgment dissolving their marriage was entered in September 2016. Included in that judgment was a marital settlement agreement, in which respondent agreed to “take assignment of his son’s Student Loan” debt in the approximate amount of $30,000. The parties agreed to a mutual waiver of spousal support, and respondent agreed to pay to appellant an “equalizing payment” totaling $1,850.
In March 2019, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that respondent was “solely responsible for the student loans in the amount of $34,604.19 . . . [and] for expenses incurred to repair damage and for maintenance of the home in the amount of $2,293.05.” The court also ruled that appellant was “entitled to reimbursement for payment of the mortgage arrears in the amount of $3,441.00 and $797.05 for arrears on the second mortgage.” The court awarded appellant attorney’s fees totaling $5,000.

In brief, according to the probation report, in September 2020 Appellant turned left at a red light, caused a crash involving two other cars, and fled the scene. The occupants of the other cars were injured. Hours later, Appellant contacted the police and claimed he entered the intersection to turn when the light turned green. He left the scene because his license had been revoked and he thought he would go to jail.
In April 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded no contest to leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)) and the remaining charges—driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)) and failure to stop at a red light (Veh. Code, § 21453, subd. (a))—were dismissed with a Harvey waiver. The plea agreement specified that Appellant would be placed on two years’ formal probation and “assess[ed] for treatment/treatment if appropriate.”