CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Lauren Cazden appeals from the trial court’s order denying her post-judgment motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV motion) and for a new trial with regard to her negligence claim against defendant Josue Cisneros Espinoza. Finding that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict and no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm the order.

A jury convicted defendant Samuel Gomez of willful infliction of corporal injury upon a spouse or cohabitant and making criminal threats. (Penal Code, §§ 273.5, 422.) Gomez argues his judgment of conviction must be reversed because: (1) the trial court erred in concluding that certain statements the victim made to a police officer were admissible under the hearsay exception for prior consistent statements; (2) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to test whether there was blood on the knife that was allegedly used to commit the domestic abuse offense. We affirm.

As charged by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Dashawn Coleman with first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5), and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 6-8). Gang enhancements were found true as to all counts. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B).) As to counts 1 and 6 through 8, the jury found that defendant personally used a firearm. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) As to count 8, the jury found that defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) And as to all counts, the trial court found that defendant had suffered a prior conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (a)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)

As charged by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Dashawn Coleman with first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5), and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 6-8). Gang enhancements were found true as to all counts. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B).) As to counts 1 and 6 through 8, the jury found that defendant personally used a firearm. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) As to count 8, the jury found that defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) And as to all counts, the trial court found that defendant had suffered a prior conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (a)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)

Defendant and appellant Jesus Miguel Saenz appeals from his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, corporal injury to his girlfriend, and other crimes. Saenz contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to redact statements by Saenz that can be heard in the background during the victim’s 911 call for help before the recording was played for the jury. We find no error and affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Brad Stine and John Sullivan appeal from a judgment following an order granting summary judgment and summary adjudication of their breach of express and implied contract claims in favor of defendants and respondents Pure Flix Entertainment LLC and David A.R. White (collectively, Pureflix). Appellants contend triable issues of fact preclude a grant of summary judgment.

Minor Fatima L. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders in a proceeding initiated under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court sustained allegations that she committed three offenses, placed her on probation subject to certain terms and conditions, and ordered her to be placed in a suitable family or group home. Fatima’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief that does not raise any legal issues. Counsel requests that this court independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Fatima was informed of her right to file a supplemental brief and has not done so. Upon our independent review of the record pursuant to Wende, we conclude there are no arguable appellate issues requiring further briefing and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Shavar Gilliam appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his parole. On appeal, he contends the court misunderstood and misapplied the concept of unconsciousness resulting from involuntary intoxication, which violated his constitutional right to due process. Although we reject this contention, we nevertheless conclude the court’s finding that appellant was conscious was not supported by substantial evidence. Because the court therefore abused its discretion when it ordered appellant’s probation revoked, we will reverse that order.

Jose V. (Minor), a ward of the juvenile court, appeals a dispositional order which declared him a ward of the court and placed him on probation after he admitted to a felony count of rape of a drugged victim. Minor appeals three issues: (1) whether Minor’s counsel provided ineffective assistance when she failed to object to conditions involving warrantless electronic searches that could be unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent); (2) whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it delegated authority to probation officers and the Youth Services Center staff; and (3) whether seven of the probation conditions imposed by the court are facially unconstitutional for vagueness or overbreadth.

Mario Gutierrez appeals from a probate court order granting the petition filed by Cecilia Yesenia Gutierrez-Zamora, as successor trustee of the Maria Gutierrez Revocable Trust (the Trust). The order required Mario to quitclaim his one-third interest in real property located in Oakland, California (the Property) to the Trust. Under the terms of the Trust, as amended, the Property is to be sold and, after the payment of various expenses, the sale proceeds are to be distributed among Maria’s eight living children, including Cecilia and Mario.

Plaintiff Carlos Padilla III (Padilla) appeals from the order granting defendant Frank Jakubaitis’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which struck the defamation claim alleged against Jakubaitis from Padilla’s first amended complaint. (All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.) Padilla contends the trial court erred by granting the anti-SLAPP motion because (1) the motion was untimely; (2) Jakubaitis lacked standing to file the motion because he had filed a bankruptcy petition; and (3) Padilla carried his burden of proving a probability of prevailing on his defamation claim. We reject each of Padilla’s arguments and affirm the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion striking the defamation cause of action.

In this marital dissolution case, appellant Denise Thomas (wife) ostensibly appeals from a number of orders and rulings issued by the trial court concerning everything from alleged domestic violence to child custody and visitation, and from judicial disqualification to appointment of a guardian ad litem. As we explain, certain items from which she appeals are not appealable, and wife’s contentions concerning the remainder are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant A.C. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to her now one-year-old son, Xavier C., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the juvenile court erred in not complying with section 361.3, which requires the court and the county agency to give preferential consideration to the request of a relative for placement of a dependent child. David C. (father) joins, arguing reversal of the termination order as to mother requires reversal of the termination order as to him. We affirm.

In this contentious business dispute between physicians who were in a medical practice together that provided emergency room physician services, appellants Kevin R. Schmidt, D.O., Garrett B. Lee, M.D., and Thomas M. Reilly, M.D. (Drs. Schmidt, Lee and Reilly or appellants), appeal from the trial court’s denial of their petition to compel arbitration of the 14th and 15th causes of action of the first amended cross-complaint filed by respondent Raymond Zurcher, M.D. (Dr. Zurcher or respondent). The trial court denied the petition because, prior to the hearing, respondent dismissed the 14th and 15th causes of action. We affirm the trial court’s order as clearly correct.