CA Unpub Decisions

Minor M.C. appeals from the juvenile court’s order placing him on probation with various terms and conditions for assaulting his stepmother, E.R., a dependent adult. M.C. contends the court erred in imposing a probation condition requiring him to, in all but a few limited circumstances, stay away from the City and County of San Francisco. The prosecution concedes—and we agree—this “stay away” condition is overbroad. We therefore reverse the juvenile court’s order and remand the matter for the juvenile court to modify this condition so that it is more narrowly drawn to reflect minor’s individual history and circumstances. In all other regards, we affirm the order.

This matter returns to our court after our remand in City of Brisbane v. California State Board of Equalization [nonpub. opn.] (Brisbane)). In 2009, the City of Brisbane filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court alleging that the State Board of Equalization (SBE) should have imposed local sales tax, rather than local use tax, on transactions involving an Internet retailer headquartered in Brisbane. (Brisbane, supra, at p. 1.) The trial court (Hon. A. James Robertson, II) awarded Brisbane partial retroactive relief, and SBE appealed. (Id. at p. 2.) We remanded the matter for the trial court to determine whether title passed in California for any of the transactions at issue in the appeal. If title in all the transactions at issue passed outside California, then under our holding in City of South San Francisco v. Board of Equalization (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 707, 711-712, the transactions were properly subject to local use tax, and judgment was to be entered for SB

Probate Code section 632 provides, “If the creating instrument expressly directs that a power of appointment be exercised by an instrument that makes a specific reference to the power or to the instrument that created the power, the power can be exercised only by an instrument containing the required reference.”
Here, a trust created by his father granted decedent Timothy Eimers (Timothy) a power of appointment to distribute his interest in the trust with the proviso that Timothy exercise the power of appointment “by will specifically referring to and exercising this power of appointment.” The question on appeal is whether Timothy effectively exercised this power of appointment through his holographic will, in which he wrote he was leaving his “shares of” the trust to appellants Charles J. Saletta and Caryn Saletta, but he did not specifically refer to his “power of appointment.”

Diana Bentley appeals from a judgment dissolving her marriage to Alexander Bentley following a trial held in her absence. She challenges the denial of a motion to reconsider issues decided at trial, the denial of permanent spousal support, and the imposition of sanctions under Family Code section 271. For the reasons stated here, we find no error in the trial court conducting the trial in appellant’s absence. But we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it set permanent support at zero without considering all factors enumerated in Family Code section 4320. We also conclude the trial court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions under Family Code section 271 for discovery violations already sanctioned and for not appearing with counsel at scheduling conferences. We will therefore reverse the judgment with directions to reconsider spousal support and sanctions applying the proper legal standards.

Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula terminated Beverly Avery for poor performance following a disciplinary probation and suspension. Avery sued the hospital for wrongful termination, alleging disability discrimination and related claims, and the hospital prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. Avery argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence, failing to construe evidence in her favor, and finding no material facts in dispute. She argues that the court misapplied the law related to her claim of failure to accommodate, and incorrectly analyzed her retaliation claim. For the reasons stated here, we will uphold the judgment as to the causes of action for retaliation, age discrimination, and defamation. We will reverse the judgment on the remaining causes of action because we conclude that triable issues exist as to whether Avery’s disability was a substantial factor motivating her termination and whether the hospital failed to accommodate her disability.

Appellant Timmothy Kenneth John Walker pled no contest to one count of sexual battery by restraint (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (a)) and was sentenced to a three-year prison term. On appeal, Walker contends the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) denied him a grant of probation; and (2) failed to order a report pursuant to section 288.1. We affirm.

On May 16, 2017, a jury convicted appellant Anthony Tony Smith of unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)/count 1); receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)/count 2); and possession of burglary tools (§ 466/count 3). The jury also found true three prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that Smith had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
On June 21, 2017, the court sentenced Smith to an aggregate prison term of nine years, a doubled upper term of six years on count 1 and three one-year prior prison term enhancements.

Appellant Daniel Sandoval Vargas stands convicted of attempted murder, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of ammunition by a felon. Firearm enhancements pursuant to Penal Code sections 12022.5, subdivision (a), and 12022.53, subdivision (c), were found true. Vargas admitted four prior prison term enhancements pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). Vargas was sentenced on May 17, 2017.
Vargas contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the lesser offense of assault with a firearm. He also contends the case must be remanded for the trial court to consider exercising its discretion on the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement after the passage of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB No. 620). We affirm.

Rickie Silguero Coronado was committed to the custody of the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term after a jury found he was a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act. On appeal, he argues the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting expert witnesses to testify to case-specific facts that constitute inadmissible hearsay under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). Coronado also challenges testimony regarding the effect of his actions on his victims and the admission of certain documents and portions of documents. Finally, in supplemental briefing and a related request for judicial notice, he states that the parole term on his underlying conviction was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 3000, subdivision (a)(4) as a result of his adjudication as a sexually violent predator, and contends that this stay violates his constitutional rights.

Defendant Victor Alexander Marquez was just four months shy of his 18th birthday when he brutally murdered Maria Juarez by stabbing and slashing her 19 times during an attempted robbery. Judge Gerald F. Sevier presided over defendant’s trial and sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for special circumstance murder. While defendant’s original appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller). Miller held that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violated the federal Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In defendant’s first appeal, we recognized California does not provide for mandatory LWOP sentences for minors convicted of murder, and the sentencing court understood this aspect of its statutory sentencing discretion.

Petitioner Benjamin Sandoval Mejia challenges the validity of an amended bail order via this petition for writ of habeas corpus. In an informal response, the People concede that he is entitled to the requested relief. Given this concession, this court may grant relief without issuance of an order to show cause. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740, fn. 7.) Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted.

Petitioner M.T. (father) has filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, claiming the juvenile court erred in finding Riverside County Children and Family Services (Department) provided reasonable services. For the reasons set forth below, we deny father’s writ petition.

This is defendant and appellant Zuri S. K. Young’s third appeal in this matter, attempting to recall his indeterminate 25-year-to-life sentence. Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the order denying defendant’s petition for recall of sentence.

The court denied defendant and appellant, Leodegario Gutierrez’s, motion for compassionate release pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 4146. After defendant filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 setting forth a statement of the facts and a statement of the case. The appeal is dismissed.