CA Unpub Decisions

On October 16, 2017, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed an amended information charging defendant and appellant Steven Martin Sanchez, Jr., with one count of battery with serious bodily injury against David Dawson (Dawson). (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d).) A second count charged defendant with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).)
Over defendant’s objection, a great bodily injury enhancement was attached to both counts after the preliminary hearing. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).)
At trial, the trial court did not allow some impeachment of Dawson and limited the scope of the testimony of a defense witness. 9-1-1 calls were played over defense counsel’s objection.

Dario and Deanna Pini and their companies, Alamar II, LLC and D.L.P. Properties (collectively Pini), appeal a postjudgment order denying Pini’s motion to enforce a stipulated judgment. Pini contends the trial court erred in denying the motion because the terms of the stipulated judgment required the City of Santa Barbara (the City) to resolve all past and future claims against Pini through a special master process. We conclude the City was not barred from filing these consolidated lawsuits.

Arseniy Dubnyakov appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of resisting an officer, driving under the influence of alcohol, and fleeing a pursuing officer. Appellant challenges his sentence under Penal Code section 654. He argues that the charges of resisting an officer and driving under the influence were based on the same conduct, and therefore the trial court should have stayed the sentence on one of those counts. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant Aitaj Sanducci challenges the issuance of a one-year restraining order protecting respondent Manoella Narain. Because there is substantial evidence to support the issuance of the order, we affirm.

A jury convicted Erick Hernandez of second degree murder. Hernandez admitted a prior strike conviction, and he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 36 years to life in state prison. Hernandez contends the trial court erred in declining to strike the prior conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). He also contends the court erred in the calculation of his custody credits. We modify the judgment to correct the award of custody credits and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Appellant Dimas Rodriguez appeals from the order revoking his probation and sentencing him to three years in state prison. The trial court revoked Rodriguez’s probation based on findings that he possessed a firearm while on probation and failed to report for mandatory drug testing. Rodriguez contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed a firearm and (2) the court erroneously imposed a prison sentence based solely on his failure to report for drug testing. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Rodriguez possessed a firearm, and therefore need not resolve the second issue. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jeffrey Samuel Briones appeals from the trial court’s award of restitution to two victims of his crimes. Briones did construction, painting, electrical, and other work on the victims’ homes even though he did not have a contractor’s license. As to one of the two restitution awards, we find forfeiture and, in any event, no abuse of discretion. As to the second award, we reverse and remand for the court to reconsider the proper amount of restitution. The court and the parties believed they were bound by a previously governing appellate decision, but in fact that case had been reversed. We also strike the $10 crime prevention fine, as the parties agree it was unauthorized.

Following his arrest on a felony charge of committing domestic violence and a probation violation hearing, Lawrence Gray, Jr.’s probation was terminated; and he was ordered to serve a previously imposed five-year state prison sentence for possession of a controlled substance for sale. On appeal Gray contends, and the Attorney General agrees, it was error for the court to terminate his probation without first ordering and reviewing a current probation report. Gray argues the error requires automatic reversal and remand for a new probation hearing and, in any event, under the circumstances here the error cannot be considered harmless. The Attorney General, on the other hand, argues failing to obtain a current probation report was harmless in this case. We affirm.

Raul Martinez appeals his conviction for misdemeanor indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 314), claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.

Leonardo Salmeron was convicted of kidnapping to commit robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)) and second degree robbery (§ 211). He challenges his robbery conviction on the ground that the trial court failed to give an instruction sua sponte on attempted robbery as a lesser included offense of robbery. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Ebony Walker was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol causing great bodily injury, evading police, and hit-and-run driving. She appealed. We have conducted an independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), and conclude that no arguable issues exist. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted Celestino Olivares of one count of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years. On appeal, Olivares contends the trial court erred in permitting testimony from an expert on child sexual abuse, in giving a flawed limiting instruction related to the expert testimony, and in failing to give a corpus delicti instruction. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Leon W. Watts III appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgment following its grant of a motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Darryl Fujihara and Seacliff Recovery Center (Seacliff) (collectively appellants) appeal from the trial court’s order awarding attorney fees to respondents Russell S. Balisok, Russell Balisok & Associates (collectively Balisok), and Gianna Breliant (collectively respondents) following the grant in part of respondents’ special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, the so-called “anti-SLAPP statute”). We reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the award in light of the factors to be considered when a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion is partially successful.