CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant Juan Molina, Jr., asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. He responded, raising trial issues, not restitution issues. Our review of the entire record reveals no arguable issues on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

In August 2017, a joint contested hearing was held for appellant J.W. and his codefendant, C.H. The evidence established that appellant and other juveniles vandalized a trucking company in Tulare County. These juveniles were also responsible for starting a fire on a neighboring lot. The fire burned an abandoned grape vineyard, along with weeds and grass. Following the hearing, the juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the following four counts had been proven as to both minors: (1) felony arson of a structure or forest land (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c); count 1); (2) felony vandalism over $400 (§ 594, subd. (a); count 2); (3) misdemeanor tampering with fire protection equipment (§ 148.4, subd. (a)(1); count 3); and (4) misdemeanor petty theft. Appellant was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation under the supervision of the probation officer. Appellant was released to the custody of his parents.

Charles Cota (defendant) stands convicted, following a jury trial, of assault with a deadly weapon, in the commission of which he personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7; count 1), battery with serious bodily injury, in the commission of which he personally used a deadly weapon (§§ 243, subd. (d), 12022, subd. (b)(1); count 2), and child abuse under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death, in the commission of which he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 273a, subd. (a), 12022.7; count 3). Following a bifurcated court trial, he was found to have previously been convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) that was also a strike (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)), and to have served six prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to a total unstayed term of 25 years in prison, and ordered to pay restitution and various fees, fines, and assessments.

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. State of California (2018) 5 Cal.5th 428 (National), which reversed our opinion in this case and remanded with instructions that we “affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the Attorney General’s motion for judgment on the pleadings” (id. at p. 436), we do so here. As more fully explained below, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff and appellant William McCullough brought an action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act; Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq., commonly known as the "lemon law," hereafter the Act) against defendant and respondent FCA US LLC (Chrysler). Following a bench trial, McCullough obtained a $17,163.83 damages verdict and was declared the prevailing party. He thereafter sought $125,055 in attorney fees ($83,370 in lodestar fees plus a 1.5 percent multiplier) but the trial court awarded $18,685 in attorney fees. McCullough appeals from the postjudgment attorney fee order, contending the court improperly focused on the proportionality of the fees to the damages recovered, producing a biased result; ignored applicable authority; and abused its discretion in reducing the award by 78 percent from his $83,370 request.

A jury convicted Gerardo Chris Candelaria of one count of aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205). Candelaria was sentenced to an indeterminate term of seven years to life in prison.
Candelaria appeals contending the trial court erred in refusing to give a special (pinpoint) jury instruction regarding the mental state required for aggravated mayhem (a specific intent crime) as compared to simple mayhem (a general intent crime). We will find the trial court properly refused to give the special instruction since the subject was fully covered by other jury instructions. Even if the court erred, which it did not do, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Clinton Grosse of continuous sexual abuse of his stepdaughter E.D. The trial court sentenced him to six years in prison.
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in (1) allowing the People to amend the information after defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing; (2) excluding the testimony of defendant’s daughters; (3) admitting evidence of E.D.’s out-of-court statements as fresh complaints; (4) instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 318, which allowed the jury to consider fresh complaint evidence for the truth of the matter asserted; and (5) excluding approximately six minutes from the video recording of E.D.’s police interview. Defendant further contends the prosecutor (6) committed misconduct by making certain remarks during her rebuttal closing argument.
Finding no prejudicial error, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Andrew Hollis of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true a special circumstance allegation that he committed the murder of his wife (D.H.) while committing the felony arson (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(H), 451, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Hollis to life without the possibility of parole.
Hollis contends his conviction should be reversed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding second degree murder. Even if the court did so err, the jury's true finding on the special circumstance allegation that Hollis committed arson with an intent to kill renders any error harmless. He cannot show a different result was reasonably probable because the true special circumstance finding necessarily means Hollis committed felony murder rather than a lesser form of homicide. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.

Appellant was convicted in 2009 of 12 counts of second degree robbery (§ 211) and one count of attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664/211), with findings that he personally used a firearm in 12 of the crimes. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) Appellant received an aggregate sentence of 60 years, 4 months. This Court affirmed the judgment in a non-published opinion dated July 21, 2010.
On March 13, 2018, appellant filed a motion in the superior court requesting resentencing in accordance with Senate Bill
No. 620, which amended section 12022.53 to give the trial court authority to strike, in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385, a firearm enhancement allegation found to be true.
(§ 12022.53, subd. (h).) The superior court denied the motion on March 15, 2018, on the ground that Senate Bill No. 620 “does not provide an independent right to resentencing.” Neither appellant nor the People were represented by counsel at the hearing.

This appeal follows the juvenile court’s order terminating defendant and appellant T.W.’s (mother) parental rights to her two year-old daughter L.W. and ordering adoption as L.W.’s permanent plan. Mother argues the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption existed and, therefore, the juvenile court erred in ordering adoption as L.W.’s permanent plan. Mother also appeals from the juvenile court’s order summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. As explained below, we affirm both orders.

Gary Salzman appeals from a judgment entered in favor of his former attorney, Gary Moll, in this action for breach of fiduciary duty and other causes of action. After entering default against Moll and affording Salzman an opportunity to present evidence supporting his request for judgment, the trial court found Salzman was not entitled to recover damages against Moll. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jose Trinidad Ramirez (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction of murder. Defendant contends that the judgment should be reversed because his trial counsel failed to render constitutionally effective assistance; the “jailhouse informer ‘system’” should not be countenanced; the gang expert relied on case-specific hearsay; a mistrial should have been granted due to an alleged comment regarding defendant’s silence; the trial court should have excused a juror for bias; and the cumulative effect of all these errors was prejudicial. We reject many of defendant’s contentions as unsupported by sufficiently developed arguments to be cognizable on appeal. We find the remaining contentions to be without merit, and thus affirm the judgment.

The issue before us is whether nightclubs in Los Angeles County have the absolute right to present constitutionally-protected artistic expression (specifically, nude dancing) at all hours of the day and night.

J.G. appeals from an order declaring her a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) J.G. was charged with being unlawfully under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)) and public intoxication (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (f)). She contends she was not given sufficient notice of the charges against her and there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction. J.G. further argues the court erred in imposing an electronic search condition which is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and is unconstitutionally overbroad.
We disagree and affirm the juvenile court’s disposition order.