CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court denied defendant Steven Mark Williams’s Penal Code section 1170.126 petition for resentencing. Defendant contends, and the People concede, that the trial court applied the wrong standard in denying the petition. We agree with the parties and reverse with directions.

A jury found Alvaro Morales guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), possession of a firearm by a violent felon (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1)), possession of a short-barreled shotgun (§ 33210), and carrying a concealed firearm (§ 25400, subd. (a)(2)). The trial court sentenced him to seven years in state prison.
In December 2016, an Oxnard police officer saw Morales take a sawed-off shotgun out of his pants and place it under a car parked in the driveway of his mother’s house. Police entered the house, took Morales into custody, and retrieved the shotgun.
We appointed counsel to represent Morales in this appeal. After counsel examined the record, he filed an opening brief that raises no arguable issues. On August 27, 2018, we advised Morales by mail that he had 30 days within which to submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. We have not received a response.

Alejandro H. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing his son, Aaron H., from his custody. During the pendency of this appeal the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over Aaron and granted Laura G. (Mother) sole physical and legal custody. Father has not appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction and it is final. We thus dismiss Father’s appeal because it is moot.

Plaintiff Esther Liu appeals from the trial court’s orders compelling arbitration of her dispute with Premier Financial Alliance, Inc. (PFA), and denying her motion for an order requiring PFA to pay the arbitration costs. She argues that the arbitration clause in the parties’ contract did not apply to her complaint because PFA had already terminated the agreement. She also contends the trial court considered the wrong factors in denying her motion for arbitration costs. We find no error and affirm.

This lawsuit involves a dispute between members of the rock band, RATT. Robert Blotzer appeals from an order denying his motion to disqualify Warren DeMartini’s counsel, Grant A. Carlson and his law firm, Friedman, Enriquez & Carlson (FEC). More than a decade before DeMartini filed this action against Blotzer, Kyle P. Kelley represented DeMartini, Blotzer, and WBS, Inc.―the owner of RATT’s intellectual property―in a lawsuit filed by RATT band member Stephen Pearcy. At the time, Kelley had his own law practice, through which he represented Blotzer et al., and also was designated “of counsel” to FEC. Kelley severed his ties with FEC in 2012 and moved to Texas in 2014. Carlson and FEC filed this action on behalf of DeMartini in September 2015.

The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on the inadequacy of damages. We affirm.

The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on the inadequacy of damages. We affirm.

After a three-defendant trial, a jury convicted Jaime Mendez Castaneda of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), convicted Castaneda, Walter Maradiaga, and Byron Zamora of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and found true that Zamora personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). All three defendants appeal. We strike the protective orders naming the defendants, vacate Maradiaga’s sentence and remand for resentencing, and otherwise affirm the judgments.

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute) provides a mechanism to resolve, at an early stage of litigation, lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for redress of grievances. The anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to bring a special motion to strike a claim, or portions of a claim, targeted at protected speech or conduct. Once the defendant shows its actions are protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, the plaintiff must then produce prima facie evidence supporting its claim, i.e., must demonstrate a reasonable probability of success. If the plaintiff fails, the claim will be dismissed.

J.W., the paternal grandfather (grandfather) of two-year-old I.W., appeals an order denying his petition for modification pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 requesting that his grandson be placed with him. He contends the court erred in failing to apply the section 361.3 relative placement preference in considering his petition.
In a consolidated appeal, mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights and selecting adoption as the child’s permanent plan. She also contends the court erred in denying grandfather’s request for placement and argues that the error was prejudicial because placement with the grandfather would have precluded the need for termination of her parental rights.

In this juvenile dependency proceeding, J.B., mother of L.P., appeals from a December 11, 2017 order following the dispositional hearing and a January 22, 2018 order following an interim review. J.B. also petitions for extraordinary review of a June 6, 2018 order following the six-month review in which the court terminated mother’s reunification services and scheduled a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to determine the child’s permanent placement. Pending our resolution of the petition, we granted mother’s request to temporarily stay the section 366.26 hearing. Lake County Department of Social Services (agency) opposes both the appeals and the petition. On our own motion, we have consolidated the appeals and writ proceeding.

Minor M.D. was arrested for attempted assault on a peace officer and resisting arrest. At a jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the attempted assault charge not true but the resisting arrest charge true. M.D. contends the finding on the resisting arrest charge is unsupported by substantial evidence because his arrest was unlawful and his resistance was not willful. We disagree, and we affirm.

Nancy Le appeals from a superior court order she asserts denied her community property interest in a house held in joint tenancy with her soon-to-be ex-husband Jerry Johnson. Le contends the court erred in finding that Johnson inherited the house as his sole and separate property. She also contends the court incorrectly disregarded a declaration Johnson executed during their marriage in which he promised to give her his inheritance even in the event of divorce. We affirm.

On November 8, 2016, 71 percent of voters in Santa Clara County approved a transactions and use tax (sales tax) measure proposed by the Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority (hereafter VTA) called Measure B. On January 9, 2017, appellant Cheriel Jensen filed a complaint with three causes of action seeking to invalidate the measure. Jensen’s first two causes of action alleged Measure B was unlawful, because it did not specify the purposes for which the tax proceeds would be used and it did not contain a requirement that the tax proceeds be used only for those specified purposes. She further requested declaratory or injunctive relief. Lastly, she claimed VTA failed to respond to her public records request made under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.). VTA demurred to all three causes of action. Following a hearing, the trial court sustained VTA’s demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of VTA.