CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs, Petra Martinez and Stanley Atkinson, sued The Bank of New York Mellon and several related entities for wrongful foreclosure. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend and entered judgment for defendants. Since the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jeffrey Michael Tway pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender. The trial court imposed a two-year prison term. While Tway was released on parole, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations Division of Adult Parole Operations (the Department) filed a petition to revoke his parole. The Department alleged that Tway had violated two parole conditions: using methamphetamine and disabling his GPS tracking device. The court found the allegations to be true, revoked Tway’s parole, and committed him to county jail for 180 days.
Tway argues that the trial court erred by failing to sustain his demurrer to the revocation petition, there was insufficient evidence to support a “willful” GPS parole violation, and the court abused its discretion by imposing a 180-day jail term.
We disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant George Luis Maldonado of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1), possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350; count 4), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377; count 5), a misdemeanor, hit and run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a); count 6), and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subdivision (a)(1); counts 2 & 3). In a separate proceeding, the jury found true a personal use of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5) in count 1, a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), a serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), and allegations that Maldonado had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(c)).
On appeal, Maldonado contends the matter should be remanded to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion whether to strike his firearm enhancement. We find merit to this contention and remand that matter to the trial c

A jury convicted appellant George Luis Maldonado of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1), possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350; count 4), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377; count 5), a misdemeanor, hit and run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a); count 6), and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subdivision (a)(1); counts 2 & 3). In a separate proceeding, the jury found true a personal use of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5) in count 1, a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), a serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), and allegations that Maldonado had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(c)).
On appeal, Maldonado contends the matter should be remanded to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion whether to strike his firearm enhancement. We find merit to this contention and remand that matter to the trial c

In 2016, a jury trial commenced regarding two charges filed against respondent Todd Christopher Hunter: (1) recklessly causing a fire of forest land, a felony (Pen. Code, § 452, subd. (c); count I) and (2) unlawfully removing a shopping cart from a retail establishment, a misdemeanor (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22435.2, subd. (a); count II). At the end of the prosecution’s case, respondent’s counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 (the motion) regarding the arson charged in count I. The trial court did not rule on the motion until after the case was submitted to the jury, which began deliberations. The court then denied the motion. Later that same day, however, the court revisited the issue, changed its mind, and granted the motion. The jurors were discharged. Respondent entered a guilty plea for the misdemeanor shopping cart theft (count II), and he was sentenced to credit for time served.

Appellant Rodney Frazier appeals following the reinstatement of his prior sentence after a further Brady hearing conducted by the trial court. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

In June 2012, appellant Nicolas Andres Alcala fired multiple shots at a person outside a bar in Huron, California. Appellant’s shots missed the intended victim but struck Pedro Aispuro, resulting in his death. A jury found appellant not guilty of first degree murder, but guilty of the lesser-included charge of second degree murder. Regarding the intended victim, appellant was convicted of attempted murder, but the jury did not find that the attempt was willful, deliberate or premeditated. Firearm enhancements were found true in both counts. In a bifurcated trial, the court found true that appellant committed these crimes to benefit a criminal street gang. In count 1, appellant was sentenced to 15 years to life for the murder, plus a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. In count 2, he received seven years for the attempted murder, a consecutive 10 years for the gang enhancement, plus a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement.

Appellant Robert P. Smith III challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint primarily challenging inadequate dental care. Respondents State of California, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), and 11 individually named defendants, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, raising procedural defects with the complaint. The motion was granted, and Smith was provided 30 days to file an amended complaint. He failed to do so. Over six months passed and respondents failed to move to dismiss based on Smith’s failure to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the court sua sponte set a motion to dismiss for failure to file an amended complaint. After briefing and argument, the court found that Smith’s failure to file an amended complaint was not justified and dismissed the complaint.

The juvenile court denied petitioner, K.N. (Mother), reunification services as to G.N. (Minor) born in January 2018 pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) (reunification services as to previous minors terminated) and (b)(11) (parental rights as to previous minors terminated). In this petition, Mother contends the juvenile court erred in ruling that Mother failed to make reasonable efforts to treat the problems which led to removal of Minor and that the court erred in ruling reunification services were not in Minor’s best interests. The petition is denied.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Dennis Griffin Pease, of the first degree murder of Willard Eichler. The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison. He advances two primary arguments on appeal: (1) the court should have dismissed this case because it violated the bar against multiple prosecutions under Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 (Kellett); and (2) the court violated his constitutional rights by removing a deliberating juror and replacing her with an alternate. We reject both arguments and affirm. An earlier prosecution of defendant for felon in possession of a firearm did not bar this murder prosecution because the offenses arose from different courses of conduct. Furthermore, the court properly discharged the deliberating juror for her inability or unwillingness to follow jury instructions.

When defendant Michael Rogers caused a disturbance in a fast food restaurant and refused the manager's requests to leave, two police officers forcibly removed him. Rogers physically resisted the officers, one of whom sustained injuries as a result. Rogers was charged with one count of felony battery with injury on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)), and two counts of resisting an executive officer (§ 69, subd. (a); hereafter, § 69(a)). The jury found Rogers guilty of a lesser-included misdemeanor battery offense, and guilty of both resisting counts. The trial court sentenced Rogers to a total prison term of five years four months, which included consecutive terms on the resisting convictions, and a concurrent term on the battery conviction.

A complaint filed in the Yolo County Superior Court charged defendant John Henry Lee with first degree robbery and domestic violence and alleged two prison priors.
Defendant pled no contest to robbery in return for dismissal of the remaining counts and enhancements. The prosecutor stated the factual basis for the plea as follows: “On May 4th, 2015, the victim came home, she saw the father of her son, which is the defendant, sleeping in her bed. They got into an argument, which turned physical, and he took her purse, which had her money and her work tips, keys, and money . . . , and left with it, and she did not get that back. [¶] He did so with the intent to permanently deprive her of the money.”

This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
A complaint filed on July 15, 2016, charged defendant Orrin Tyler Colbourn with carrying a dirk or dagger, a felony (Pen. Code, § 21310), and alleged that defendant had three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and committed the offense while on bail (§ 12022.1).
After trial counsel declared a doubt about defendant’s competency (§ 1368), the trial court suspended proceedings and appointed a psychologist to interview him. Defendant was committed to Napa State Hospital until May 24, 2017, when the court declared him competent to stand trial.

Defendant Jaime Ramos was 19 and a half years old when he participated in an armed robbery of a bank in Stockton that resulted in a high-speed police chase, the death of three people, and serious injuries to two other people. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, he pleaded guilty to first degree murder under a felony-murder theory (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), and attempted murder of a peace officer (§ 664/187). He also admitted a special circumstance allegation: that the murder was committed while he was engaged in the commission of a robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) The trial court sentenced him to the stipulated sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).