CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant William Gibbons pled no contest to domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)/count 1); making criminal threats (§ 422/count 2), a misdemeanor; disobeying a domestic relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)/count 3), a misdemeanor; and battery (§ 242/count 4), a misdemeanor. Gibbons also admitted a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) in count 1. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Plaintiffs, an elderly woman and her granddaughter, the latter in her capacity as trustee of the grandmother’s trust, brought this action for an accounting of the trust during the period defendant acted as trustee, and for damages allegedly arising out of defendant’s mismanagement of the grandmother’s and the trust’s financial affairs. The trial court found defendant liable to plaintiffs on theories of undue influence and financial elder abuse, as well as breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligence. Defendant appeals, challenging only the invalidation of a $1 million alleged gift to defendant and his wife. We conclude the trial court properly determined neither the statute of limitations nor laches barred the claim, and substantial evidence supports the finding of undue influence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Christopher Scott Ridge (appellant) challenges the jury’s determination extending his involuntary civil commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) for an additional year. Finding the determination supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm.

Respondent, A.G., filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to appellant, M.G., in December 2015. The court entered a status only judgment of dissolution in June 2016, and in December 2016, a judgment on reserved issues. The judgment granted A.G. sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ two daughters and ordered no visitation for M.G. M.G. appealed, contending the court erred in denying him joint custody and visitation.

Defendant Matthew Early Robinson robbed a business owner and employee at gunpoint. While fleeing from law enforcement in his car, defendant crashed and was severely injured. Defendant claims to have suffered amnesia, preventing him from remembering anything about the charged crimes.
Defendant appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 ; counts 1 and 2). The jury also found true as to both counts, enhancements that defendant personally used a firearm (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8); 12022.53, subd. (b).) The court dismissed count 3, grand theft of a firearm (§ 487, subd. (d)(2)), and count 4, receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). Defendant was sentenced to 12 years in prison.

Cindy Marie Ceballos killed Christalina I. by repeatedly stabbing her with a knife. A jury convicted Ceballos of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found a knife-use allegation to be true (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced Ceballos to a prison term of 26 years to life.
Ceballos contends her conviction should be reversed because (1) the jury's finding that she committed murder with premeditation and deliberation is not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) her attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to ask the court to give a pinpoint instruct on third party provocation. We reject these contentions and affirm.

Justin Hernandez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a one-year sentence enhancement for service of a prior prison term for a conviction of a felony that was reclassified as a misdemeanor while his appeal of the judgment imposing the enhancement was pending. We initially denied the petition, but the Supreme Court of California granted review and transferred the matter back to us for reconsideration after it decided People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks). We vacated our denial order and ordered the People to show cause why Hernandez should not be granted relief. The People have conceded the challenged enhancement must be stricken under Buycks. We agree and order the enhancement stricken.

Defendant Samuel Duran pleaded guilty to three counts of attempted murder of police officers. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (f), 187, subd. (a).) Defendant also admitted a firearm enhancement. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. He further contends the matter should be remanded to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm use enhancement, pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (h) (Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) eff. January 1, 2018 (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1-2)). The People concede section 12022.53, subdivision (h), applies retroactively, but argue it would be futile to remand the matter.

D.R. (mother) appeals from an April 2018 order terminating her parental rights to her four-year-old son, B.R. The order frees B.R. to be adopted by his guardians, who had petitioned the court to terminate mother’s parental rights pursuant to Probate Code section 1516.5. That section authorizes termination of parental rights for children in probate guardianships when the guardianship has continued for at least two years and the court finds adoption by the guardian would benefit the child.

D.R. (mother) appeals from an April 2018 order terminating her parental rights to her four-year-old son, B.R. The order frees B.R. to be adopted by his guardians, who had petitioned the court to terminate mother’s parental rights pursuant to Probate Code section 1516.5. That section authorizes termination of parental rights for children in probate guardianships when the guardianship has continued for at least two years and the court finds adoption by the guardian would benefit the child.

Mother Elizabeth C. (mother) appeals from an order dismissing a juvenile dependency petition after a contested jurisdictional hearing. Mother contends the dismissal was not supported by the evidence and is contrary to her son J.K.’s welfare. We do not reach these arguments, however, because we conclude that mother lacks standing to challenge the juvenile court’s decision and accordingly dismiss the appeal.

Michael Posner (Michael) appeals a superior court order denying his motion to terminate or reduce his monthly spousal support obligation to his ex-wife Marilyn Posner (Marilyn). We conclude, among other things, that the court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Lee Larson (defendant) pleaded no contest to first degree residential burglary. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred when it denied his suppression motion and when it ordered him to pay the cost of his defense without first finding he had the ability to pay.
We hold that the facts found by the trial court on the motion to suppress were supported by substantial evidence and, based on those facts, the trial court correctly concluded the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity. We therefore affirm the denial of the suppression motion. We further hold that the order requiring defendant to pay the cost of his defense must be reversed and remanded with instructions to determine whether defendant had the ability to pay.

Plaintiff David Grant sued his former employer AssistMed, alleging AssistMed breached the loan, stock option, expense reimbursement, and severance pay provisions of an employment agreement between the parties. Grant now appeals from the superior court’s judgment, after a court trial, in favor of AssistMed. On appeal, Grant: (A) challenges the court’s interpretation of the terms in that agreement regarding a loan AssistMed was to provide Grant for a down payment on a home and moving expenses; and (B) argues the court erred in granting AssistMed’s motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 because Grant “presented substantial evidence that AssistMed breached [the employment agreement].”