CA Unpub Decisions

Defendants Riverbed Technology, Inc. and Riverbed Technology Limited appeal an adverse judgment, following a bench trial, holding them liable for breach of an agreement under which they purchased a software company, Zeus Technology Limited (Zeus), from its shareholders, plaintiffs Scottish Equity Partners LLP and others (collectively plaintiffs). Under the agreement, Riverbed agreed to pay for the company a base price of $110 million, which it paid, plus an additional contingent sum based on first-year revenues as defined in complex contractual provisions. The controversy centers on whether the proceeds from Riverbed’s license to another company, Juniper Networks (Juniper), during the first year following the purchase, of the source code to one of Zeus’s primary products, the “Zeus Traffic Manager,” qualifies for inclusion in the earn-out formula.

When she was a few weeks away from dying of cancer, and was taking large amounts of pain medication, decedent Brenda Keith Rein (Brenda) executed a trust, pour-over will and related documents that purported to transfer her property to a trust naming her adult children as beneficiaries and to “disinherit” her husband of almost 20 years. The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact in a bench proceeding, found that Brenda lacked the requisite testamentary capacity and invalidated the will and trust. We agree that the provisions of Probate Code sections 810 to 812, rather than section 6100.5 apply with regards to the trust, and conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling. We reject the remaining contentions of appellant Pamela M. Keith (Pamela) and affirm the judgment.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant Crystal C. (the minor) on appeal. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), setting forth the facts of the case, raising no issues, and requesting that we independently review the entire record. We provided the minor 30 days to file written argument on her own behalf; no supplemental response has been received.
We have examined the entire record and appointed appellate counsel’s Wende/Anders brief; we find no reasonably arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.

Larry Wade Garza (petitioner) seeks permission to file a belated notice of appeal by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to challenge his conviction for transportation, etc., of a controlled substance pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a), with a three-year enhancement pursuant to section 11370.2, subdivision (c).

Brittany Navarra (defendant) stands convicted, following a jury trial, of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), first degree burglary (§ 459; count 2), and conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The jury further found true a lying-in-wait special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) with respect to count 1. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) and ordered to pay various fees, fines, and assessments.

Defendant Maurice Higgs appeals his convictions for multiple sex offenses committed against his stepdaughter. He raises instructional and sentencing error; we direct correction of the abstract of judgment and affirm the judgment.

Pooyan Eslambolipour appeals from the judgments entered after he pled no contest in three cases and, pursuant to a negotiated sentence, was sentenced to eight years state prison. The procedural history is as follows:
On October 18, 2017, appellant pled no contest in case number 16F-08756 to two counts of selling, transporting or offering to sell heroin and methadone (counts 1 & 2; Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and possession of Alprazolam for sale (count 3; § 11357, subd. (b)(1)). That same day, appellant pled no contest in case number 17F-01276 to possession of heroin for sale (§ 11351) and admitted suffering a 2012 conviction for possession of a controlled substance for sale (§ 11370.2, subd. (a)).

Mother A.B.’s four children, ranging in age from five to 16, were detained following a domestic violence incident between mother and father L.M. The family has an extensive history with the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department), with two prior dependencies in 2005 and 2013, based on domestic violence between the parents, physical abuse by father, inappropriate discipline by mother, and the parents’ substance abuse.
The juvenile court denied reunification services to both parents, and set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to select a permanent plan for the children. Meanwhile, the children were placed with their maternal grandfather G.B., where they thrived. Mother filed a section 388 petition alleging a change in circumstances, based on her completion of four domestic violence counseling sessions, and completion of a program to address her alcoholism. Mother’s petition was summarily denied.

The juvenile court found that Father and Mother had a history of engaging in “violent altercations” that placed their daughter, Amari P., currently seven years old, at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The court declared Amari a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and ordered the removal of Amari from the custody of Father and Mother.

William Cooper Adams appeals after he pled guilty to grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)) and conspiracy to commit petty theft (§§ 182, subd. (a), 484). Appellant also admitted, and the trial court found true, allegations as to both counts that appellant had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)) and had served five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b); hereainafter § 667.5(b)). Appellant was sentenced to 11 years in state prison. He contends, and the People concede, that two of his section 667.5(b) prison priors must be stricken because the felony convictions upon which they are premised were subsequently reduced to misdemeanors pursuant to Proposition 47. We shall order the two subject one-year enhancements stricken and affirm the judgment as so modified.

T.M. (mother) contends that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that jurisdiction over then four-year-old Chase was necessary because mother left Chase with his maternal great aunt (MGA), with whom he had been living since birth, without making a plan for his ongoing care. We agree that there was no substantial evidence that mother’s placement of Chase in MGA’s care placed Chase at substantial risk of serious past or future harm, and thus reverse.

Piqued when his mother and stepfather served him with an eviction notice, Louis Gerald Merriken threatened to torch the family home, poured gasoline in the garage and battered his mother’s car. He was convicted by a jury of making criminal threats; attempting to burn a structure; and vandalism with over $400 in damage. (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 455, 594, subd. (b)(1).) Substantial evidence supports the verdict. The court properly imposed consecutive sentences, totaling four years and four months, for distinct offenses committed with multiple intents and victims. We affirm.

Bobby Louis Bell (defendant) appeals from an order denying his petition to be resentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, added by Proposition 36 (the Reform Act). (Pen. Code, § 1170.126.) His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, raising no issues. On August 2, 2018, defendant was notified by his appointed counsel of his right to file a supplemental brief and to request the court to have present counsel relieved if he so desires. Over 30 days have elapsed, and defendant has submitted no brief or letter. We have reviewed the entire record, and finding no arguable issues, affirm the judgment.

Appellant Juan Antonio Robles appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for the recall of his indeterminate life sentence under Proposition 36. The trial court found that he was ineligible for resentencing because he was armed during the commission of his offense. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1170.126, subd. (e)(2), 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii).) Appellant contends that his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon does not bar him from relief under Proposition 36. We disagree and affirm.