CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Miguel Angel Moreno (Moreno) was charged via information with attempted murder with malice aforethought (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1) and manufacturing, importing, keeping for sale, giving, or receiving a large-capacity magazine (id., § 32310, subd. (a); count 2).

After a juvenile was adjudicated liable for one crime and pled to two others, the juvenile court ordered him into the camp community placement program. The court correctly calculated the maximum period of confinement to be five years and eight months in the minute order but misstated the maximum period as six years when orally explaining the disposition. The juvenile appeals. Because the juvenile court’s minute order is correct and because the maximum period of confinement need not be stated orally (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731, subd. (c); In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 496-498 (Julian R.)), any remand to correct the juvenile court’s superfluous oral misstatement would be an idle act. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Reginald Lydell Bowdry appeals from an order denying his petition for recall of sentence and resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126). He contends the trial court erred in finding he was ineligible for resentencing based on a factual finding that he was armed during the commission of his third strike offense. We affirm.

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant Louie Driver (defendant) in a three-count information with attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), mayhem (§ 203), and assault with a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 245, subd. (a)(1). In connection with the assault charge, the district attorney alleged defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim of the crime, Phillip Flowers (Flowers).

Jessica Sandford, appearing in propria persona, appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against her pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). Jessica contends the DVRO, which was issued in a marital dissolution proceeding between herself and respondent Douglas Sandford, must be reversed because (1) she was not properly served with documents Douglas submitted in support of the order; and (2) the trial judge who issued the order “abused his position as a judicial officer.” We affirm.

T.T. (father) appeals dependency jurisdictional and dispositional orders relating to his children, R.T and Ri.T. Because father has challenged only one of two grounds for jurisdiction, and the juvenile court has since terminated jurisdiction, no effective relief can be granted. We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot.

Antonio A. (father) argues that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over his two children. We reject this argument, and affirm.

Carla A. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order exerting dependency jurisdiction over her 15-year-old son, Timothy M. She argues that the juvenile court’s finding that she placed Timothy at substantial risk of serious bodily injury by allowing him to live with his drug-using father and by offering to have him move in with her despite her own drug use is not supported by substantial evidence. We decline to reach the merits of mother’s challenge because a finding in mother’s favor would not deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction over Timothy (due to the unappealed findings involving father) and because mother articulates no further effect of letting stand the juvenile court’s findings beyond asserting that the “findings could be prejudicial to [m]other if she happened to be involved in future child dependency or family law proceedings.” Mother’s challenge fails on the merits as well. For these reasons, we affirm.

After a jury awarded a plaintiff $1.5 million in damages for two defendants’ malicious prosecution of a prior lawsuit, the plaintiff filed a declaratory relief action seeking a declaration that her judgment liens had priority over defendants’ attorney’s liens. The defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim under our anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). The trial court denied the motion on the ground that plaintiff’s declaratory relief action did not constitute “protected activity” subject to the anti-SLAPP law. We agree that the plaintiff’s primary declaratory relief claim was not protected activity but disagree that her subsidiary claim was either unprotected or meritorious. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

A jury found Travion Marqurse Williams (Williams) guilty of second degree robbery and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 2). In addition, the jury found gang (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 186.22, subd. (b)(4)) and firearm allegations asserted against Williams to be true. The trial court sentenced Williams to 35 years to life in state prison.
On appeal, Williams does not challenge the robbery conviction; in fact, he concedes that the People’s case on that count was “airtight.” Instead, he argues that his conviction on the shooting count should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to establish that he shot at the victim’s car. In addition, Williams contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer failed to move to (a) sever his trial from that of his codefendant, Michael Allotey (Allotey), and/or (b) bifurcate the gang enhancement charges from the robbery and shooting counts.

Appellant Next Century Associates, LLC (Next Century) seeks a property tax refund for the 2009-2010 tax year. It purchased the Century Plaza Hotel, and the real property on which it is located, in mid-2008, for $366.5 million. As of January 1, 2009, the property’s corrected enrolled assessed value, which we will refer to as the enrolled value, was $367,612,305. But, Next Century contends it was entitled to a reduction in the assessed value because the “global economic meltdown” of late 2008 caused the property’s market value to drop significantly between the date of purchase and January 1, 2009.

Defendant Heriberto Cortez appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of multiple counts of sexually abusing his minor daughter. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on his Marsden motion to replace appointed counsel. He contends his statements to the police were inadmissible because a detective tricked him into waiving his Miranda rights by softening him up with ingratiating conversation before advising him of those rights, and then coerced him into confessing through implied promises of leniency. He further contends that the trial court failed to instruct the jury orally on the elements of the charged and lesser offenses.

A jury convicted defendant Lloyd Carr of first degree residential robbery, first degree burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon. In a bifurcated trial, the court found true allegations that Carr had certain prior convictions, including two strike priors. The court sentenced him under the “Three Strikes” law to a total term of 36 years to life.
On appeal, Carr challenges several aspects of his sentence and the associated proceedings. Specifically, Carr argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s true finding regarding three of the prior convictions alleged; (2) the court erred by refusing to strike one or more prior convictions under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero); (3) the court should have stayed the sentence on the burglary count pursuant to section 654; (4) the restitution amount should be reassessed if Carr’s burglary sentence is stayed; and (5) Carr was denied a fair hearing before an unbi

Defendants Bernard Mitchell (Mitchell) and Anthony Reed Watts (Watts) (collectively, defendants) each stand convicted of six counts of second degree robbery and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm for their roles in robbing two banks. On appeal, they challenge one of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings; Watts challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; both defendants challenge the substitution of the trial judge prior to closing argument; both defendants allege prosecutorial misconduct; and one or both defendants raise a number of sentencing issues. None of these arguments warrants disturbing defendants’ underlying convictions.