CA Unpub Decisions

Simon and Shahrzad Cohen (collectively the Cohens) bought a house from Jamshid Lavi (Lavi). When the house sustained water damage, the Cohens sued Lavi. Lavi ultimately obtained summary judgment against the Cohens. Lavi then sued the Cohens and their attorneys for malicious prosecution, but the Cohens and their attorneys were successful in having Lavi’s complaint stricken. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Lavi now appeals the orders granting the Cohens and their attorneys’ special motion to strike and motion for attorney fees. We affirm the orders.

A deputy sheriff was fired after his superiors learned that he knew or should have known he was living with a convicted felon. The sheriff filed a petition for a writ of mandate to overturn his discharge, and the trial court denied the petition. The sheriff appeals. Because the trial court’s ruling was correct, we affirm.

In accordance with our prior notification to the parties that we might do so, we will direct issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177–180.) Petitioners’ right to relief is obvious, and no useful purpose would be served by issuance of an alternative writ, further briefing, and oral argument. (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1236–1237, 1240–1241; Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1240–1244.) In our order requesting briefing, we provided Palma notice.

A long-time county employee decided to retire, and in December 2012, he submitted his application for retirement to the county’s retirement authority. On January 1, 2013, the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013 (Pension Reform Act or PEPRA) took effect. Included in that measure is a provision that mandates the complete or partial forfeiture of pension benefits/payments if a public employee is convicted of “any felony under state or federal law for conduct arising out of or in the performance of his or her official duties.” (Gov. Code, § 7522.72, subd. (b)(1).) In February 2013, the employee was indicted for stealing from the county for more than a decade.

Tom Robinson, appearing in propia persona, appeals from the trial court’s order renewing a restraining order against him for five additional years. The renewed restraining order protects Raewyn Glasgow and Glasgow’s adult daughter, Tui Glasgow-Rademaker, from Robinson. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in renewing the order, so we affirm.

Defendant and appellant Ryan Deshane Givens pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and fleeing a pursuing officer while driving recklessly. The trial court sentenced him to 16 months in jail. Givens appeals. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Mahamodou Bayo was convicted at trial of assault with a deadly weapon, and the jury found a great bodily injury allegation to be true. The court sentenced defendant to the midterm of three years, with a consecutive three-year sentence on the great bodily injury enhancement. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by imposing the midterm, rather than a lesser term based on what defendant asserts are mitigating factors. We find no error and affirm.

Arash Shamsian and his wife Negar Omidakhsh filed this action alleging tort and other causes of action against two immigration consultants, Allison Lord and William A. Butcher, and their consulting agency, William A. Butcher Company, Inc., doing business as The Lord’s Immigration Consulting Agency, arising out of failed efforts to obtain a green card for Omidakhsh. After the defendants failed to respond to the complaint, Shamsian and Omidakhsh tried three times to obtain a default judgment. The court denied each request, finding they presented insufficient evidence of damages.
Shamsian and Omidakhsh appeal from the court’s order denying their third request for a default judgment and dismissing their complaint under rule 3.110(h) of the California Rules of Court for failing to timely obtain a default judgment. Because Shamsian and Omidakhsh proved they were entitled to damages as well as civil penalties under the Immigration Consultants Act, Business & Professions Code sectio

The jury found defendant and appellant Deangelo Stallworth guilty of domestic violence with a prior conviction in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1) (count 2). Stallworth admitted that he suffered two prior strikes (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d) & 1170.12, subd. (b)), and two prior convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and served two prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subd. (b).

Fiona Bulanadi and her husband, Robert Bulanadi, appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend demurrers to the first amended complaint by Fiona’s employer, Southern California Permanente Medical Group (Permanente Medical Group), several entities involved in the administration of Fiona’s workers’ compensation claim, a claims adjuster, Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., and Sedgwick’s employee, Fia Kyono. The trial court ruled the Workers’ Compensation Act barred all of the Bulanadis’ causes of action. We reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to overrule the demurrer to all causes of action other than fraud. As to that cause of action, we direct the trial court to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend to allow the Bulanadis to plead, if they can, fraud with the requisite specificity.

In this marital dissolution proceeding, respondent Sharon Jerris requested the family court enter a stipulated judgment that she and her then husband, appellant Martin Jerris, had signed to resolve the division of their property and debts. Martin, in turn, moved to set aside the stipulated judgment. Before signing the stipulated judgment, Martin had financial difficulties and needed cash. He wanted to transfer his interest in the couple’s residence to Sharon so that she could take out a loan on the house and pay him. The couple would then divorce. Martin transferred his property interest, but Sharon qualified to borrow only about $100,000, and the bank required her to pay down over $22,000 in debt from the proceeds. The parties signed the stipulated judgment after Sharon received the net proceeds from the loan. The stipulated judgment, drafted by Sharon’s attorney, provided (among other things) that Martin would receive payment of $45,000 and the couple’s residence would

Chrysostom Dominicus appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him on two counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years old or younger (Penal Code § 288.7, sub. (b)), one count of committing a lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)), and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)). After the trial court dismissed the continuous sexual abuse count in furtherance of justice (§ 1385), the court sentenced Dominicus on the remaining convictions to a total state prison term of 33 years to life.

Linda Reid appeals from a judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and enforcing a settlement agreement reached in mediation. She contends the agreement was invalidated by the disqualification of the judge pro tem, who was also the mediator, and was unenforceable because it was materially uncertain and contemplated execution of further agreements. She further claims the judgment is void because final declarations of disclosure were neither served nor mutually waived; the court improperly added provisions to the judgment that were not part of the agreement; the provisions of the judgment and settlement agreement waiving and terminating jurisdiction over spousal support violated public policy; and the court abused its discretion in denying a continuance. We affirm.

Megan Diane Levitt appeals from an order denying her motion for attorney’s fees and costs after respondent Brian Allen Alexander voluntarily dismissed his application for a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6). Levitt contends the court did not provide a rationale for its denial of her motion, the evidence did not support the ruling, and the court abused its discretion and erred as to the law. We will affirm.