CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal from a domestic violence restraining order entered against Tanya K.’s ex-boyfriend, Christopher M. Tanya initially obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Christopher, and the trial court set a hearing in accordance with Family Code sections 242 and 6200 et seq. to determine whether to issue a more “permanent” domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against him. Christopher (through his counsel) asked the court to continue that hearing for various reasons, including his invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court denied his request for a continuance, and the hearing went forward in December 2016. After hearing the evidence, the court issued a DVRO that (1) prevents Christopher from having any contact with Tanya until September 2019, (2) awarded custody of their minor child to Tanya, and (3) granted Christopher limited supervised visitation rights. The issue on appeal is whether the court abused its dis

This is the second appeal in this case, which involves a number of gang-related felonies that occurred when defendant Dylan William Salazar was 17 years old. In our prior opinion, we reversed Salazar’s first degree murder conviction and the sentencing allegations attached to that count, as well as his conviction for active gang participation (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (a)). (People v. Salazar (Feb. 10, 2015, G048144 [nonpub. opn.] (Salazar I).) On remand, the first degree murder conviction was reduced to second degree, and the prosecution declined to retry the gang participation count. Salazar was sentenced to 40 years to life.
Initially, Salazar raised three issues on this second appeal. His key argument was that he was retroactively entitled to a hearing to determine whether he should be treated as a juvenile or an adult (a transfer hearing) under the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). He argued that Proposition 57 applied be

Appellant Jacob William Brown pled no contest to possession of a slungshot (Pen. Code, § 22210; count 1) and admitted a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). On appeal, Brown contends: (1) the court erred in finding a factual basis for his plea; and (2) the “slungshot statute” is vague as applied to him. We affirm.

As part of a plea bargain, appellant Joshua Roy Durand pled no contest in case No. 2060984 to assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)/count 2); in case No. 1494470 to first degree burglary (§ 459/count 1); in case No. 1495264 to unlawful use or transfer of personal identifying information (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1)/count 1); in case No. 4001228 to second degree burglary (§ 459/count 1); in case No. 2063113 to two counts of second degree burglary (counts 1 & 2) and carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (§ 21310); and in case No. 4001199 to receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)/count 1) and unauthorized use of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)/count 2).
On appeal, Durand contends the court erred in its award of presentence custody credit. We affirm.

In 2016, appellant Sheila Tuck pleaded no contest to one count of felony possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a); count 1). She was placed on three years’ formal probation and ordered to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290. Her only claim on appeal is an equal protection challenge to her mandatory registration. We find no constitutional violation and affirm.

Defendant Albert Lopez contended on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in imposing penalty assessments attached to a criminal laboratory analysis fee (lab fee) and a drug program fee (program fee), and (2) the order prohibiting him from owning or possessing a concealable weapon is unauthorized. We struck the concealable weapon prohibition, ordered the abstract of judgment amended in two regards, and affirmed as modified.
After we filed our opinion, the Supreme Court granted review and held the case pending resolution of People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100 (Ruiz). After deciding Ruiz, the court remanded this case to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the matter in light of Ruiz. We have reconsidered our opinion and find it to be consistent with the holding and analysis in Ruiz. We will again strike the concealable weapon prohibition, order the abstract of judgment amended in two regards, and affirm as modified.

On November 19, 2013, appellant Jeffery Randall Phariss was sentenced to a split term that included mandatory supervision. While on mandatory supervision, Phariss committed a new offense for which he was sentenced on March 9, 2016. That same day, a hearing on violation of mandatory supervision was conducted. Phariss contends the trial court was required to impose an aggregate sentence for the offense for which he was on mandatory supervision and the new offense. Consequently, he contends the trial court erred in imposing a Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement on the new offense, when it had been imposed in the case for which he was on mandatory supervision. He also contends that a prior felony conviction subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor on May 6, 2015 can no longer support a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement appended to the offense for which he was convicted in 2013.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Defendant Jose Carlos Lopez contended on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing penalty assessments attached to a criminal laboratory analysis fee (lab fee) and a drug program fee (program fee). In response to defendant’s letter, the trial court struck the lab fee penalty assessment, and defendant asked that we, likewise, strike the program fee penalty assessment. Disagreeing with defendant’s view of the law, we reinstated the lab fee penalty assessment and affirmed the judgment as modified.
After we filed our opinion, the Supreme Court granted review and held the case pending resolution of People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100 (Ruiz). After deciding Ruiz, the court remanded this case to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the matter in light of Ruiz. We have reconsidered our opinion and find it to be consistent with the holding and analysis in Ruiz. We will again reinstate the lab fee penalty assessment and affirm the judgment as modified.

On August 16, 2017, a complaint charged defendant and appellant Jose Rubio with driving or taking a vehicle without consent under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (count 1). The complaint also alleged that defendant suffered a prior strike conviction in case No. FVI013254 under Penal Code sections 67, subdivisions (b) through (i), and 1170.12. The complaint further alleged that defendant suffered a prior prison term enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On October 13, 2017, defendant pled guilty to count 1 (driving a stolen automobile) and admitted the strike prior. In exchange for his plea, the parties agreed that defendant would receive a stipulated sentence of 16 months, doubled because of the strike, for a total term of 32 months. On November 30, 2017, defendant requested that sentencing be continued to December 29, 2017, so that the trial court could consider the California Supreme Court’s pending opinion regarding whether a driving or tak

Joseph Colin Crowder engaged in a crime spree over several days in October 2016 that resulted in the filing of an information charging him with 15 crimes. Crowder pleaded guilty to five crimes: first degree robbery of an inhabited dwelling with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1); count 2); two counts of unlawfully taking a vehicle while being previously convicted of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, §§ 10851, subd. (a), § 666.5, subd. (a); counts 5 & 13); carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a); count 10), and evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 15). He admitted certain enhancement allegations as to counts 2, 5, and 13. He also admitted to a prior strike allegation and one prison prior allegation. In exchange for his plea, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and allegations in the information and that Crowder would serve 20 years in prison.

Ramos was sentenced to a term of four years eight months in state prison. The court also issued a 10-year protective order as to all three victims pursuant to section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1).
Ramos appeals challenging only the issuance of the postjudgment protective order. Ramos acknowledges he did not object to the order in the trial court but contends the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the order. We will find the crimes committed in this case involved domestic violence within the meaning of section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), thus the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the protective order. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment and order.

This appeal comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. In a recently filed opinion, we dismissed the appeal of defendant Reginald Chavis, Sr. from an order dismissing his request to recall his sentence, on the ground that the order appealed from was nonappealable. (People v. Reginald Chavis, Sr. (July 20, 2018, C086212) [nonpub. opn.] (Chavis).) In this appeal, he seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to reconsider its previous order. We shall dismiss the appeal.

Appointed counsel for defendant John Ramos asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Robert Daniel Perry (an inmate) guilty of battery on a noninmate, two counts of possession of a deadly weapon by an inmate, and deterring correctional officers with force. The trial court dismissed one of the convictions for possession of a deadly weapon by an inmate and found true allegations that defendant was previously convicted of five serious or violent felonies. The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life on each of his three convictions.