CA Unpub Decisions

Rashad Alexander, a member of a criminal street gang known as the Del Paso Heights Bloods (Heights), was sitting in the backseat of his car in the parking lot of a Sacramento strip mall in the early morning hours of March 12, 2011. A white car with four occupants, driven by defendant and appellant Abdul Rashid Tanko, a member of a rival gang known as the Strawberry Manor Gangsta Bloods (Manors), circled the parking lot. Moments later, defendants and appellants Herbert Antonio Alvarez, Arlonzo Jackson Banks, and Darnell Lee Williams, all members of Narf, a criminal street gang from Richmond, approached Alexander’s car. Following a brief exchange, guns were drawn and shots fired. When the dust settled, Alexander lay dead, having been shot 21 times.

Rashad Alexander, a member of a criminal street gang known as the Del Paso Heights Bloods (Heights), was sitting in the backseat of his car in the parking lot of a Sacramento strip mall in the early morning hours of March 12, 2011. A white car with four occupants, driven by defendant and appellant Abdul Rashid Tanko, a member of a rival gang known as the Strawberry Manor Gangsta Bloods (Manors), circled the parking lot. Moments later, defendants and appellants Herbert Antonio Alvarez, Arlonzo Jackson Banks, and Darnell Lee Williams, all members of Narf, a criminal street gang from Richmond, approached Alexander’s car. Following a brief exchange, guns were drawn and shots fired. When the dust settled, Alexander lay dead, having been shot 21 times.

In the early morning hours of June 15, 2010, several assailants attacked, robbed, and killed Fernando Vichez. During a jury trial, the evidence showed that defendant Fitima Laquish Goodman drove defendants Alexander Marquis Lewis, Laquwon Tyrece Warr and Jermaine Antonio Barnes to the scene of the crimes. While Goodman stayed in the truck, Lewis, Warr and Barnes left the truck and attacked Vichez, demanding money from him. Vichez’s wallet was taken, and Barnes shot Vichez, killing him.

Michael Hopper appeals from an order committing him to the California Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, §§ 2962, 2966, subd. (b).) He contends he did not meet the statutory criteria for commitment as an MDO because he did not receive at least 90 days of treatment within the year before his scheduled parole date. (Id. at subd. (c).) We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Cooper Lee Partner appeals an order after judgment denying his request for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 620, which amends Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h), to permit the court to strike or dismiss a firearm use enhancement required by that section in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385.
On May 25, 2005, Partner pleaded no contest to attempted murder (§§ 187/664 [count 1]), and admitted the allegation that he personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b), and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (b). Count 2, assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subdivision (a)(1)), was dismissed per plea negotiation.
With respect to count 1, the trial court imposed the upper term of 9 years, plus an additional 10 years pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b), plus 5 years under section 12022.7, subdivision (b), for a total sentence

Defendant and appellant S.G. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s finding that her daughter M.D. is a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), as well as the order removing M.D. from her physical custody. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) has conceded, by letter filed in this court, there is insufficient evidence to support dependency jurisdiction over M.D., who never resided with Mother and had limited contact with her. We accept the concession and hold jurisdiction and removal were unwarranted under the circumstances.

Minor B.R. appeals from a November 27, 2017 order of the juvenile court removing B.R. from the care of her maternal grandmother. As B.R. has been returned to her mother’s custody, we dismiss B.R.’s appeal as moot.
On July 31, 2015, when B.R. was seven months old, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition alleging under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that B.R.’s mother’s history of substance abuse, and her current use of methamphetamine, made mother incapable of providing regular care for B.R. B.R.’s father failed to protect B.R., and father and mother created a dangerous home environment in which drug paraphernalia was within B.R.’s access. At the July 31, 2015 detention hearing, the court ordered B.R. detained with her maternal grandmother (MGM). A first amended petition made the same allegations, and added that DCFS may seek an order that no reunification services be provided. On Octobe

Homer Ray Braziel appealed from an order denying his petition for recall of his sentence under the three strikes law pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126, part of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. We deemed his notice of appeal a petition for writ of mandate, issued an order to show cause why we should not order the trial court to vacate its order denying the petition, and then denied the petition. The Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674 (Johnson), which held that section 1170.126 “requires an inmate’s eligibility for resentencing to be evaluated on a count-by-count basis” and that “an inmate may obtain resentencing with respect to a Three Strikes sentence imposed for a felony that is neither serious nor violent, despite the fact that the inmate remains subject to a third strike sentence of 25 years to life.” (Johnson, at p. 688.) We reversed t

William Louis Beliveau appeals after a jury convicted him of anal or genital penetration of an unconscious person by use of a foreign object (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (d)(1)), and anal or genital penetration of an intoxicated person by use of a foreign object (id., subd. (e)). The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in state prison. Appellant contends the judgment must be reversed due to evidentiary and instructional error. We affirm.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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E.H. (mother) and J.H. (father) appeal from several orders of the juvenile court, relating to three children: daughter A.H. (born in 2003), and sons El.H. (born in 2010) and S.H. (born in 2012). Appellants show no error requiring reversal, and we affirm the orders.

Jeffrey Michael Lindquist appeals a judgment following conviction of infliction of corporal injury upon a spouse, dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, and misdemeanor child endangerment, with a finding of personal infliction of great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 136.1, subd. (b)(1), 273a, subd. (b), 12022.7, subd. (e).) We affirm.

Both parties appeal from the judgment after a jury convicted Johnny Curthus Murray of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422). The trial court found true allegations that Murray suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). It sentenced him to 16 months for making criminal threats, and a consecutive five years for one of the prior serious felony convictions.

Anthony Lamar Mitchell appeals from a victim restitution order entered following his conviction on a plea of no contest to attempted murder and other charges after Mitchell forced his ex-girlfriend into the backseat of her car and deliberately crashed it into several parked cars. Mitchell contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $17,598.10 in restitution to the owner of one of the damaged vehicles because the owner did not qualify as a “victim” under Penal Code section 1202.4. Because we do not read the restitution statute as narrowly as Mitchell does, we affirm.

Plaintiff Mark R. Leeds sued Reino & Iida, a Professional Corporation, and individual lawyers Donald Reino and Myles Iida, claiming that defendants breached an agreement to pay him 25 percent of attorney fees earned for workers’ compensation cases plaintiff referred to them. The trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment, reasoning that the fee splitting agreement was illegal under Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 2-200 (hereafter rule 2-200), because the parties had not obtained written client consent. We affirm.