CA Unpub Decisions

A.R. (mother) petitions this court for extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order setting a selection-and-implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for her son, one-year-old N.R. Mother claims that insufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that she received reasonable reunification services. In this abbreviated opinion, we deny the petition.

J.C. (Father) and B.K. (Mother) appeal from an order denying their petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating their parental rights as to their daughter V.C. (Minor). J.C. contends he was deprived of due process because (1) the court denied one of his petitions without a hearing; (2) the proceedings were continued multiple times; and (3) one judge heard testimony and then another judge made a ruling based on the transcripts. B.K. joins in J.C.’s arguments. We will affirm.

On February 22, 2018, appellant David Borup was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of three years and eight months, consisting of three years for possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) and eight months for failure to appear. (Pen. Code, § 1320, subd. (b).) We need not relate the facts pertaining to the initial charges as the appeal is limited to the sentence imposed and other matters occurring after appellant entered his original plea and was convicted and sentenced on the basis of that plea.
Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues and asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant was advised by counsel that a Wende brief would be filed in this case and that appellant could personally file a supplemental brief in this case within 30 days raising any issues that he wishes to call to the court’s attention. However, appellant filed no such bri

A jury convicted defendant Donald Scott Rainey of first degree burglary with another person present (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21)); theft from an elder (§ 368, subd. (d)); and embezzlement (§ 504a). Rainey contends on appeal that we must reverse his convictions because the offense of burglary does not extend to an entry with the intent to commit nonlarcenous theft, and because insufficient evidence supports all three counts. We reject Rainey’s interpretation of the burglary statute, and we conclude sufficient evidence supports his convictions for first degree burglary and theft from an elder.

On December 1, 2014, the trial court denied Appellant (“Wife”) Diana Q. Dong’s motion to set aside an order requiring her to, among other things, pay $100,000 in attorney fees and costs to Respondent (“Husband”) Olivier G. Garbe. Wife timely filed a notice of appeal from the order denying her motion to set aside. However, in her opening brief, Wife fails to make any legal or factual argument pertaining to the December 1, 2014 order denying her motion to set aside, addressing only the underlying attorney fee order from June 2014, which is not the subject of this appeal. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s December 1, 2014 order.

A jury convicted defendant Lynn Ai Quach of murder. (Pen. Code, § 187.) The jury also found true a firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1). On December 22, 2017, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life, plus a consecutive sentence of 20 years for the firearm enhancement.

Plaintiff Jennifer Loeffler (plaintiff) sued defendants RSM 8, LLC (RSM), Fieldstone California Partners, LLC (Fieldstone Partners), Fieldstone Residential Builders, LLC (Fieldstone Builders), and PCA Management Services, Inc (PCA; collectively defendants) alleging several causes of action arising out of plaintiff’s purchase of a new home from RSM. The action, including warranty and personal injury claims and a claim for disgorgement of the purchase price based on RSM’s lack of a contractor’s license, was arbitrated pursuant to a provision in the purchase and sales agreement. Except for one warranty claim, the arbitrator ruled in favor of defendants. The court confirmed the award and entered judgment.

Appellant Carlos R. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s denial of his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions and order terminating his parental rights to Wendy G. and C.M. Father previously appealed from the order denying reunification services and/or custody of Wendy, and in our unpublished opinion in case No. F076925 filed on September 5, 2018, we reversed the order and remanded the matter for the trial court to conduct a hearing pursuant to section 361.2.
Shortly after the order denying reunification services was issued, father’s section 388 petitions were heard and denied by the juvenile court and his parental rights were terminated as to both children. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

In December 2016, while Desmond V. was being housed in the Juvenile Detention Facility (detention facility) in Tulare County, he became involved in an altercation involving an assault of several probation officers and facility personnel in coordination with other juveniles housed in the facility. Desmond was charged with 12 counts alleging he committed assaults, personally inflicted great bodily injury, and committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The juvenile court found most of the allegations true except for two counts dismissed on the People’s motion and the allegations Desmond inflicted great bodily injury. As set forth more specifically below, Desmond challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support five counts and the related gang enhancement allegations. He also challenges gang enhancement allegations related to three counts.

Defendant and appellant, K.T. (mother), appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile dependency court found jurisdiction over her son, R.T., and daughter, C.T. (the twins), and ordered them removed from her care and placed with their father under family maintenance. Mother argues substantial evidence does not support the court taking jurisdiction over the twins. We conclude there was substantial evidence supporting the jurisdictional order and affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Michael Owen DeVaughn, was convicted of numerous financial and theft-related crimes in 2011, was sentenced to prison, and ordered to pay victim restitution in an as yet undetermined amount. He has previously appealed twice, his second appeal challenging the sentence imposed in absentia. While the second appeal was pending, the court conducted a restitution hearing, at which it ordered defendant to pay an aggregate sum of $373,500 to three victims. Defendant appeals.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a restitution hearing while his prior appeal was pending. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Floyd Roland Walker III of inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse/cohabitant. (Pen. Code , § 273.5, subd. (a).) The jury also found that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim, under circumstances involving domestic violence. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which a trial court denied. Subsequently, the court held a bifurcated hearing and found true the allegations that defendant had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), had one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). At the sentencing hearing, the court denied defendant’s motion dismiss the prior strike conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

Defendant Gilbert Wayne Layral was convicted of one count of lewd acts on M.C., a child under the age of 14, and one count of lewd acts on M.G., also a child under the age of 14. The court sentenced Layral to a determinate term of 10 years and an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison.
Layral argues that the judgment must be reversed due to juror misconduct. Toward the end of the deliberation process, one of the jurors mentioned that as a small child he had touched an older boy's penis at the older boy's request and that he still remembered the incident although it had occurred approximately 50 years earlier. The juror did not mention this during voir dire. The trial court found the juror's failure to disclose this incident was inadvertent.

A jury convicted Simone Bahou of evading a police officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), and resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence for five years and granted formal probation. The court ordered Bahou to serve 365 days in custody with credit for 161 days, and allowed Bahou to serve the balance of this term in a residential program for alcohol and drug treatment. As a condition of probation, Bahou agreed to submit to warrantless searches of his computers and recordable media. On appeal, Bahou contends this probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad and violates his Fourth Amendment rights. We conclude the challenged probation condition is not facially unconstitutional and Bahou has forfeited any as-applied challenge. We therefore affirm.