CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant, Charles H., appeals from a final judgment in proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in which the San Francisco Superior Court found true an allegation of petty theft, a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 490.2, subd. (a)), declared appellant a ward of the court, and placed him on home probation.
The sole issue on appeal is the propriety of a condition of probation prohibiting appellant from possessing any weapons, including “anything that would reasonably be perceived by another person to be a weapon if they saw it in [his] hands” and no knives. Appellant claims the category of objects he is prohibited from possessing is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We shall reject the claim.

Keenan Properties, Inc. (“Keenan”) appeals from the judgment in an asbestos-related personal injury case. Frank C. Hart (“Mr. Hart”) and Cynthia Hart (“Mrs. Hart”) (collectively, “the Harts”) sued Keenan and other entities alleging Mr. Hart developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos-containing products. The jury found Keenan supplied pipes that exposed Mr. Hart to asbestos. This finding was based on a foreman’s testimony regarding invoices purporting to show Keenan supplied asbestos-cement pipes to a worksite in McKinleyville, California in the 1970s. We conclude this testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay, and there was no other evidence Keenan supplied the pipes. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment against Keenan.

J.V. (Minor), a ward of the juvenile court, appeals from a finding that she violated four probation conditions, and a disposition order that included she complete a 90-day home supervision program. She alleges the juvenile court admitted unreliable hearsay to prove she violated the condition to attend school regularly and there was no evidence in the record to prove the other three probation conditions were willfully violated. For reasons below, we affirm the order.

A jury convicted defendant Joseph Bontempo of the second degree murder of his wife. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced him to prison for 15 years to life. In this appeal, defendant contends that the jury should not have been instructed on second degree murder based on implied malice, that California’s “inherently dangerous act” theory of second degree murder is unconstitutionally vague, and that the court erred in refusing to give a “pinpoint” instruction regarding provocation. We shall affirm the judgment.

Two unwitting pawns in a bitter, protracted leadership dispute between rival factions of an Indian tribe, appellants Shawn Fernandez and Brian Auchenbach, took part in a paramilitary raid of the tribe’s casino offices in order to oust a competing tribal faction of possession. The two men believed they had been lawfully deputized as police officers for the tribe, had full legal authority to engage in the operation, and would not face any adverse legal consequences or criminal charges as a result. They believed this, because attorneys for the tribal faction that hired them as police officers assured them it was true.

Defendant Ricky Angelo Mendoza was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) with a gang murder special circumstances finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)). He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP), with an additional term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. On May 22, 2017, we affirmed the judgment against Mendoza. The facts of this case are set forth in our earlier opinion, which we incorporate by reference, and we will not repeat them here.

A jury convicted defendant Gerardo Aboytes Madriz, Jr. of premeditated attempted murder and shooting from a motor vehicle and found true associated firearm enhancement allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to 32 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant seeks reversal of his conviction on grounds he was denied his right to testify in his own defense and the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting his post arrest statement over his Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) objection. Alternatively, defendant requests that the case be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancements based on a recent amendment to Penal Code section 12022.53. We agree that defendant’s post arrest statement should have been excluded and that its admission was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse without reaching defendant’s other claims.

After partially prevailing on their petition for writ of mandate which alleged the County of Orange (County) violated provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.; CEQA), Protect Our Homes and Hills and others (collectively, Protect) sought to recover attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, as well as costs. County and real party in interest Yorba Linda Estates LLC, opposed the fees motion; Yorba Linda Estates also filed a motion to tax the costs. The court denied in part, and granted in part, both motions, resulting in an award to Protect of approximately $409,000 in attorney fees and $16,000 in costs.

Petitioners V.A. (Mother) and C.A. (Father) each filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging an order of the juvenile court denying them reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to their one-year-old daughter A.A. Both parents contend there was insufficient evidence to support the denial of reunification services under the bypass provisions. We find no error, and so deny both writ petitions.

Edward J. Singelyn appeals from the final judgment in a proceeding for dissolution of his marriage to Kelly D. Ozmon. He raises several challenges to the trial court’s division of property and debt. We will hold that, because he has not provided us with a complete record — and cannot, as he waived a court reporter — he cannot show error. Hence, we will affirm.

Appellant, K.C. (Husband), appeals from a permanent domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) granted against him under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA). Husband’s estranged wife, respondent, J.C. (Wife), requested the DVRO after Husband punched her in the arm. Husband contends he unintentionally punched Wife in the arm and therefore the evidence did not support issuance of a DVRO against him. Husband also argues the trial court failed to consider his absolute right to self-defense as a valid ground for denying the DVRO. We reject Husband’s arguments and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the DVRO. We therefore affirm the order.

After the foreclosure sale of her property, plaintiff and appellant, Joani Farrens, filed a verified complaint against defendants and respondents, OneWest Bank, FSB, now CIT Bank, N.A. (OneWest) and OWB REO, LLC (OWB) for (1) wrongful foreclosure, (2) quiet title, (3) violation of the California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (HBOR), and (4) unfair business practices. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Ms. Farrens later stipulated to dismiss the wrongful foreclosure and quiet title causes of action with prejudice after the trial court sustained a demurrer to those claims. Following the California Supreme Court’s decision in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 (Yvanova), Ms. Farrens attempted to revive her wrongful foreclosure claim by seeking leave to amend her complaint. The trial court denied Ms. Farrens’s motion for leave to amend her complaint because she had already stipulated to dismiss with prejudice her claims for wrongful foreclosure and quiet title.

Plaintiff and appellant Nathan D. LaMoure appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents The Bank of New York Mellon fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Securities (BONY) and Bank of America N.A., successor by merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (BAC). LaMoure filed suit against BONY insisting that he stored numerous pieces of art, valued at $25,000 or more (the Art), at Dale Grinager’s home located in Morongo Valley (the Home). BONY took possession of the Home after a foreclosure sale. The Art was missing.
LaMoure claims on appeal that there were triable issues of fact as to his causes of action of trespass and conversion. He also contends the trial court erred by failing to rule on his evidentiary objections.
We conclude the motion for summary judgment (the Motion) was properly granted.

Julian Dominguez and a codefendant were convicted of robbery among other charges after a jury trial. The codefendant's case is not before us.
Dominguez was convicted of one count of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). The jury found the gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) to be true. Dominguez admitted one serious felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); one strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The court sentenced Dominguez to a 16-year determinate term, consisting of the upper term of five years for robbery, doubled to 10 years based upon the strike prior. The court imposed a consecutive five-year term for the serious felony prior and a consecutive one-year term for one of the prison priors. The court stayed the term for one prison prior and stayed the 10-year term for the gang enhancement. The court imposed a restitution order of $1,450, which was later modified to $900.