CA Unpub Decisions

Noureddine Elasali appeals from a judgment of dismissal of his personal injury action following settlement contending the court erred in granting his former attorney's motion to be relieved as counsel and in "ignoring" an oral motion to disqualify the judge and a request for change of venue. He also asks this court to enforce his version of the settlement agreement. Elasali did not meet his burden to show reversible error on any issue. We cannot consider the judicial disqualification issue because the exclusive remedy for such a challenge is by way of petition for writ of mandate. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.

When a juvenile court terminates its dependency jurisdiction over a child, it may issue an “order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child,” and that order becomes part of an ongoing or new family law case and “continue[s] until modified or terminated by” the family court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4.) However, such a so-called “exit order” cannot restrict the family court’s authority to modify or terminate the order. (In re Cole Y. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1455-1457 (Cole Y.); In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 972-973 (John W.).) When a juvenile court’s oral recitation of an exit order’s terms is internally inconsistent and could be construed as impermissibly restricting the family court, but the written exit order’s terms itself clearly do not, which is controlling? In this circumstance, we hold that the written order controls. And because the written order here is valid, we affirm.

In this juvenile dependency case, K.F. (mother) gave birth to Nathan F. (Nathan) in 2002, and the next year disappeared from his life. In 2016, the juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over Nathan because his father’s failing health made it impossible for him to continue to care for then-13-year-old Nathan. The day after the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction and named Nathan’s half sister as his guardian, mother filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (and a follow-on petition) claiming that she never received notice of the proceedings and seeking to restart the dependency proceedings. The juvenile court denied the petitions, and mother appeals one of the denials. We conclude that the efforts to locate mother complied with due process, and that the juvenile court did not err in denying mother’s petitions to reopen this case.

A Delaware corporation retained a law firm to conduct due diligence and provide legal advice regarding its acquisition of a Japanese holding company that owned the stock of several subsidiary corporations. The acquisition agreement contained a clause under which the Japanese parent company selling the Japanese holding company agreed to indemnify the “Buyer” and its “Affiliates” for the “cost to correct any violations” of the environmental laws by the holding company “or its Subsidiaries.” To reduce tax liability for the acquisition, the Delaware corporation created its own Japanese subsidiary and assigned its rights to buy the Japanese holding company to its new subsidiary. The deal went through. Many years later, the Delaware corporation sued the law firm for malpractice.

This case presents a challenging question: Where the parties agree there was a prejudicial error below, and the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by entering judgment, must this court nonetheless dismiss the appeal because the defendant has not obtained a certificate of probable cause required by Penal Code section 1237.5?
During pretrial proceedings, the trial court declared a doubt as to the competency of defendant John Firestone-Kelly, and suspended all proceedings under section 1368, subdivision (c). Once the trial court has declared a doubt as to a defendant’s competency and suspended proceedings, the trial court is required to hold a competency hearing; this requirement may not be waived. Any further proceedings, other than a competency hearing, are in excess of the court’s jurisdiction.

Defendants and appellants Ernest Lamont Williams, Thomas Woodson, and Anthony Boochee, appeal from the judgments entered against them after a jury convicted Williams and Boochee of first degree murder with special circumstances and of conspiracy. Woodson appeals from his conviction of second degree murder, with true findings on gang and firearm enhancements. Woodson contends that his conviction was unsupported by substantial evidence. In addition to challenging several evidentiary rulings, all defendants contend that the gang enhancement allegation was unsupported by substantial evidence and that the gang and gang-related firearm enhancements should be stricken. Defendants also seek remand for resentencing under the amended firearm enhancement statute.

Plaintiff Cory L. Brookshire (plaintiff) appeals from the trial court’s order awarding him attorney fees after he prevailed in his action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability against defendants and respondents HPG Management, Inc. and Yucca Investments, Inc. (collectively, defendants). The trial court found that the applicable lease agreements limited plaintiff ’s fee recovery to $1,600 and that plaintiff had not established the elements entitling him to statutory fees under Civil Code section 1942.4. On appeal, plaintiff argues that under section 1717 he was entitled to reasonable attorney fees not limited by any contractual cap, and that he proved the elements of section 1942.4 at trial. Plaintiff ’s arguments lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Father Michael B., Sr. appeals an order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to his son, Michael B., Jr. He argues the court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). We conclude there was no error, and we affirm.

The City of Oakley (City) initiated abatement proceedings seeking to demolish an industrial building owned by Michael Rasooly. Rasooly sought a writ of mandate in superior court, challenging the City’s abatement order. While that matter was pending, the City initiated a second administrative abatement action on the same property. Rasooly amended his mandamus complaint to challenge the second action. The City filed a motion for judgment on the basis that Rasooly had failed to pursue his administrative remedy. The trial court granted the motion. We affirm.

Plaintiff Lucia Gomez (Gomez) was injured and her mother, Ann Gomez (decedent), was killed when the car Gomez was driving was hit by a car driven by Manuel Ramos. Five days before the accident, Ramos was able to purchase his car from a dealership and obtain automobile liability insurance coverage through defendant Alliance United Insurance Company (Alliance) despite having no driver’s license. Gomez sued Alliance for common law negligence and wrongful death, alleging that Alliance breached a duty of care to her by issuing a policy of insurance to Ramos even though Alliance knew he was unlicensed. The trial court concluded that Alliance did not have a common law duty of care to determine that Ramos was licensed before issuing him a policy, and Alliance’s demurrer to the third amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend. Gomez appeals from the judgment in favor of Alliance. We affirm.

Appellants Badria Elnaggar and Eman Elamin have returned to this court after we affirmed orders granting an anti-SLAPP motion and sustaining a demurrer in favor of two groups of respondents in 2016. Ignoring the holdings of our 2016 opinion, appellants continued the litigation by filing another complaint that was virtually identical to the one dismissed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP motion and by continuing to name as defendants parties that we had held were out of the case. In addition, they asked to transfer the case back to Los Angeles Superior Court. Having had enough, one group of respondents filed a motion to have appellants declared vexatious litigants, a motion the trial court granted.

Daniel Cohen and his mother, Diana Cohen, were convicted of murdering the property manager for the apartment they lived in and were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. They contend their convictions should be reversed because law enforcement obtained evidence through violations of their constitutional rights. They also contend they received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgments.

Badria Elnaggar and Eman Elamin appeal from an order, issued in 2017, denying their motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), to vacate a judgment entered in 2010. They contended the judgment was void because it did not match the verdict rendered in their 2010 jury trial and because their counsel had entered into an unauthorized stipulation with the court and opposing counsel regarding a response to a note the jury had sent to the court during deliberations.
We affirm the order. Appellants have misunderstood the difference between a verdict and a judgment. The judgment as entered took into account the section 998 offers to compromise extended on behalf of the respondent, Suhaila Elmohtaseb, before the 2010 trial. The jury had no responsibility to consider these offers. As for the stipulation, appellants’ counsel had the authority to enter into it without their consent, so even if he failed to obtain consent, his failure does not render the judgm

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Wesley Barthum Arnot, of misdemeanor resisting a peace officer, a lesser included offense of the felony charge of resisting an executive officer. The court placed defendant on informal, summary probation for three years with a term that defendant be banned from possessing a gun “during the course of his probation[.]” On February 16, 2018, the court denied defendant’s request that the court remove the conditions of his probation requiring that he submit to searches and be prohibited from possessing a firearm.
After defendant filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent him.