CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Rafael Ramirez appeals after the trial court denied his petition for writ of mandate seeking reversal of defendant California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) determination regarding his pension calculations. Finding no error, we affirm.

Ruth H. (mother) appeals from the findings and order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the court abused its discretion when it denied her request to have her six-year-old daughter, Bella M., testify. Mother sought to introduce Bella’s testimony in support of the parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant the People of the State of California (the People), by and through the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing a petition to commit respondent Timothy Bowman (Bowman) as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). We affirm the trial court’s order.

Office of the County Counsel, Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Assistant County Counsel, and Stephanie Jo Reagan, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court adjudicated then-four-year-old C.L. a dependent of the court and removed her from the custody of her mother K.S. (Mother) and father M.L. (Father). The court found (1) Mother’s marijuana use rendered her incapable of taking care of C.L.; (2) Mother engaged in sexual intercourse in front of C.L., which at least in part caused C.L. to engage in various sexualized behaviors; and (3) Father sexually abused C.L. Mother appeals from the jurisdiction and removal determinations even though she pled no contest to the marijuana allegation and Father does not challenge the determinations as to him. We are asked to decide (1) whether the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings are justiciable notwithstanding the uncontested marijuana use finding against Mother (and the finding ag

Appellant D.E. (appellant) maintains that the juvenile court erred in denying an oral request for genetic testing to determine if he is the child’s biological father, made at the selection and implementation hearing at which parental rights were terminated. He contends the juvenile court had a mandatory duty to determine biological paternity, and remand for that purpose is required. He also claims to have been prejudiced by the court’s denial of his request to determine paternity, because he may have been granted reunification services. We conclude that, although the court had a duty to make a paternity finding, no reversal is in order because appellant could not establish an entitlement to reunification services. Any error regarding the court’s failure to make a paternity finding was harmless; the results of a genetic test would not change the outcome of this case. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant Warren Chris James (defendant) appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing on the ground that he was ineligible for relief under Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126). We affirm the trial court’s order.

The jury found defendant and appellant Leondre Banner guilty of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1) [count 1]), willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a) [count 2]), and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246 [count 3]). As to counts 1–3, the jury found that the crimes were committed to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in commission of the offenses (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)(1)).

This is the second appeal in which we are asked to decide whether cross-complainants and appellants ConocoPhillips Company and Phillips 66 Company (collectively, ConocoPhillips) sufficiently stated a claim for breach of contract based on an alleged failure to defend and indemnify. ConocoPhillips and several others were named defendants in a complaint Felipe and Maria Mireles filed for injuries Felipe suffered as the result of a propane fire at a 76-branded gas station. ConocoPhillips, which owns the 76 brand and licenses it to other entities, filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnity from Pacific Convenience & Fuels, LLC (Pacific), Convenience Retailers, LLC (Convenience), Sam and Shireen Hirbod (the Hirbods), Apro, LLC (Apro), Suburban Propane, LP (Suburban), Field Energy Corporation (Field Energy), and Stephen Dakay (Dakay). The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings for Apro, and we consider whether certain contractual language that requires Apro to indemnify ConocoPhillip

The jury found defendant and appellant Armando Estrella guilty of elder abuse (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1) [count 1]), and battery causing serious bodily injury (id., § 243, subd. (d) [count 2]). It found true the special allegation that Estrella inflicted great bodily injury on a person 70 years of age or older in the commission of count 1. (Id., § 12022.7, subd. (c).)
Estrella was sentenced to the upper term of four years in prison in count 1. The trial court imposed a concurrent upper term sentence of four years in count 2, which it stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The court struck the great bodily injury enhancement in the interests of justice.
Estrella’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior conviction for elder abuse.
We affirm the judgment.

In an earlier opinion (People v. Asbury (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1222 (Asbury I)), we reversed defendant and appellant Diane C. Asbury’s conviction for second degree murder and remanded the case to the trial court, giving the prosecution the option either to retry Asbury for murder or to accept a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at p. 1232.) The prosecution chose the latter option, and the trial court resentenced Asbury to 21 years in prison. The court selected the high term of 11 years, plus a 10-year enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a) for personal use of a firearm in the offense.

The legal issues presented in this appeal are relatively straightforward, but they are made complicated by the multiple parties involved and the interrelated contracts at issue—of which there are several. Cross-complainants and appellants ConocoPhillips Company and Phillips 66 Company (collectively, ConocoPhillips) were two of several named defendants in a complaint Felipe and Maria Mireles filed for injuries Felipe suffered as a result of a propane fire at a 76-branded gas station. ConocoPhillips, which owns the 76 brand and licenses it to other entities, filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnity from Pacific Convenience & Fuels, LLC (Pacific), Convenience Retailers, LLC (Convenience), Sam and Shireen Hirbod (the Hirbods), Apro, LLC (Apro), Suburban Propane, LP (Suburban), Field Energy Corporation (Field Energy), and Stephen Dakay (Dakay).

This case arises out of communications surrounding a potential sale of real estate. Frida Dilonell (appellant) was the prospective buyer, and Suzanne Chandler (respondent) the seller. As part of her complaint appellant filed a petition to compel arbitration based on a purported contract between the parties. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that no agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties, and entered a judgment of dismissal. Appellant then filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663, which was denied. Appellant appeals from the judgment and the trial court’s subsequent award of attorney fees in favor of respondent.
We affirm the judgment, but reverse the attorney fee award due to respondent’s refusal to engage in mediation prior to the commencement of the litigation.

In or about 1996, the People charged appellant Daniel Oyarzabal with deliberate premeditated attempted murder with a deadly weapon, which carried a potential sentence of life imprisonment. In 1996, appellant pled guilty to one count of assault with a deadly weapon by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, and the trial court sentenced him to prison for two years. He asserts that as a result of his plea, he was deported to Mexico in 1999.
In 2016, appellant petitioned the trial court for writ of coram nobis to withdraw his plea on the grounds that his defense counsel at the time of his plea provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that appellant’s argument is not cognizable in a writ of coram nobis and affirm the trial court’s order denying writ relief.

Defendant and appellant Jose Trinidad Ramirez (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction of murder. Defendant contends that the judgment should be reversed because his trial counsel failed to render constitutionally effective assistance; the “jailhouse informer ‘system’” should not be countenanced; the gang expert relied on case-specific hearsay; a mistrial should have been granted due to an alleged comment regarding defendant’s silence; the trial court should have excused a juror for bias; and the cumulative effect of all these errors was prejudicial. We reject many of defendant’s contentions as unsupported by sufficiently developed arguments to be cognizable on appeal. We find the remaining contentions to be without merit, and thus affirm the judgment.