CA Unpub Decisions

Mother and Father in this proceeding had a son born in June 2012 (Son). An October 2018 order regarding child custody and visitation states that the parents shall have joint physical custody under a three-night/four-night schedule. The order also sets forth a custody schedule for holidays and special occasions. Item 5.08 of the order provides that the parents and any third party shall not use any form of physical discipline (corporal punishment) when disciplining Son.
The statement of facts provided in Mother’s amended opening brief refers to the prohibition against corporal punishment and states:
“On December 25, 2020, [Father] used corporal punishment against [Son]. (1RT 20). [Son] suffered injuries and bruising from the use of corporal punishment by [Father]….
“[Father] contends that [Son’s] brother … was in [sic] the individual who caused the injuries sustained by [Son] on December 25, 2020. (2RT 318) [Mother] disputes [Father’s] contention.”

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Thomas L. Bender, Judge.
Munger Tolles & Olson, Jordan D. Segall and Lloyd S. Marshall; University of California at Irvine School of Law, Susan E. Seager and Jack Lerner for Petitioner and Appellant.
Regina A. Garza, County Counsel, and Christopher B. Dorian, for Respondent Madera County Department of Social Services/Child Welfare Services.
Beth A. Sears, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent T.S.
In this proceeding, G.T. appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying his petition to obtain the juvenile case file of T.S., a deceased child whose parents have been charged with his murder, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, subdivision (a)(2).

Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 1), vandalism in violation of section 594, subdivision (b)(1) (count 2), and burglary in violation of section 460, subdivision (b) (count 3). A jury convicted defendant of assault with a deadly weapon (count 1) and found him not guilty of vandalism and burglary (counts 2 & 3).
At defendant’s original sentencing hearing, the trial court declined to exercise its discretion to grant his motion—made pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero)—to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction under section 1385. The court denied defendant’s Romero motion based on defendant’s “overall record.” The court noted defendant’s criminal conduct had “slow[ed] down recently,” but the court was not inclined to exercise its discretion to strike the strike given defendant’s “past performance on probation and the level of his criminal conduc

On October 17, 2001, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Fresno County case No. F662794-7 charging defendant count 1, first degree residential robbery (Pen. Code, § 211); count 2, first degree burglary with a nonparticipant present (§ 459); count 3, assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); count 4, false imprisonment by violence (§ 236); count 5, carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)); count 6, unlawful driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); and count 7, arson of the victim’s 1997 Jeep Cherokee vehicle (§ 451, subd. (d)).
Defendant was also charged with count 8, possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); and count 9, misdemeanor possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b)).

Defendant, who was 58 years old when he testified, had 13 biological children—ranging from three to 42 years old—with eight different women. Four of the children in his family, not all his biological children, testified that he molested them. One of them, Jane Doe, was his biological daughter. When she was eight years old, she moved to California with her mother and two half-siblings and began living with defendant. Doe had cerebral palsy and required help with bathing and dressing until she was 11 years old. From the time Doe was eight years old until she was 12 years old, defendant touched her breasts, vagina, and buttocks, and threatened to kill her or her family if she told anyone. He touched her in different rooms of their various residences, including in the bathroom when he was helping her shower and dress, which he continued to do even after Doe was able to shower and dress herself.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Randy L. Edwards, Judge.
Keith Fagundes, District Attorney, and Louis D. Torch, Assistant District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
During a traffic stop, a police officer detained Aaron Sung Min Yim (defendant) and conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle. The search yielded a firearm, cocaine, and a quantity of marijuana exceeding the legal limit for personal possession. The officer believed he had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the odor of marijuana therein and on defendant.
Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the fruits of the search under Penal Code section 1538.5. The magistrate ruled there was probable cause to search based on the odor of marijuana and defendant’s admission of having “recently” smoked marijuana.

The Kern County District Attorney charged Orozco with committing five crimes: aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205; Count 1), first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a); Count 2), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); Counts 3 & 4), and attempted aggravated mayhem (§§ 664 & 205; Count 5). The aggravated mayhem charge included an allegation Orozco was armed with a “deadly or dangerous” weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
Evidence
Late one night, Orozco entered his ex-girlfriend’s home, unannounced, through the kitchen window. He went to his ex’s bedroom where he found her asleep alongside her new boyfriend, the victim.
The ex-girlfriend woke up to find Orozco at the head of the bed, “standing over [the victim].” Orozco appeared surprised and asked, “[S]o that’s who you are sleeping with right now?” He then pulled the victim to the floor and savagely attacked him until he gouged out one eye.

Following a retrial, appellant Douglas Ray Stankewitz was convicted by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), robbery (§ 211), and kidnapping (§ 207), all with the personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5). In addition, the jury found true special circumstances alleging that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery and a kidnapping (former § 190.2, subd. (c)(3)(i), (ii).) The jury returned a verdict of death.
In 1990, Stankewitz’s guilt, the special circumstance findings, and the penalty verdict were affirmed following an automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court. (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 80.)
In 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted, in part, a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Stankewitz, reversing his death sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his capital murder trial. (Stankewitz v. Wong (E.D. Cal. 2009) 659 F.Supp.2d 1103.)

There was little dispute regarding the facts that (A) defendant was a gang member; (B) defendant was in the victim’s house on July 25, 2015; (C) defendant engaged in intercourse with the victim; (D) the victim orally copulated defendant; (E) defendant’s associates in the gang stole the victim’s television while defendant and the victim were engaged in intercourse; (F) defendant stopped engaging in intercourse with the victim when her house alarm sounded a warning chirp due to one of defendant’s associates opening a door; and (G) defendant and his gang associates sold the victim’s television, laptop, and cell phone on July 25, 2015.

In an information filed in March 2016, defendant and appellant David DeLeon Lara was charged with the murder of John Doe in 2011. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1.) Defendant was only 16 years old at the time of the murder. It was further alleged that defendant personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the murder (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)), and intentionally killed John Doe under the special circumstance of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). Defendant was tried as an adult. In February 2019, a jury convicted defendant of first degree premeditated murder (§ 189, subd. (a)) and found the firearm and special circumstance allegations true.
Before the jury was empaneled, defendant waived his right to a jury trial on a gang allegation on the murder charge, and the court bifurcated the gang allegation to be heard at a later bench trial.

On October 7, 2018, Peavy’s girlfriend, Diane N., caught him driving with another woman. She followed Peavy’s car until he parked in front of a police station. Exiting her car she yelled, “[H]e fucking over me! Every time I turn around he’s with a different woman!” She shoved and grabbed Peavy’s left shoulder. A police officer witnessed the melee and arrested Diane for domestic battery. According to the police report, Peavy had “no visible or reported injuries” and he declined to press charges.
B. Summary of Peavy’s Medical Treatment
Three days later on October 10, Peavy sought medical attention at a hospital emergency room—but not for a left shoulder injury from a battery. Rather, he complained of right shoulder pain from being tased earlier that day. Based on a “clinical history” of “electrical injury to his right shoulder,” a physician excused him from work for seven days.

On October 7, 2018, Peavy’s girlfriend, Diane N., caught him driving with another woman. She followed Peavy’s car until he parked in front of a police station. Exiting her car she yelled, “[H]e fucking over me! Every time I turn around he’s with a different woman!” She shoved and grabbed Peavy’s left shoulder. A police officer witnessed the melee and arrested Diane for domestic battery. According to the police report, Peavy had “no visible or reported injuries” and he declined to press charges.
B. Summary of Peavy’s Medical Treatment
Three days later on October 10, Peavy sought medical attention at a hospital emergency room—but not for a left shoulder injury from a battery. Rather, he complained of right shoulder pain from being tased earlier that day. Based on a “clinical history” of “electrical injury to his right shoulder,” a physician excused him from work for seven days.

Due to the limited scope of issues presented on appeal, a full recital of the facts is unnecessary. It suffices to say that after the victim broke out the rear window of defendant’s car, defendant drove his car into the victim, causing injuries that resulted in the amputation of the victim’s leg.
The People filed a complaint charging defendant with mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The complaint also alleged defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the assault. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)
On September 9, 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon and admitted he inflicted great bodily injury in exchange for a sentence of seven years. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) The remaining charge was dismissed pursuant to a Harvey waiver. The same day, the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison.

Due to the limited scope of issues presented on appeal, a full recital of the facts is unnecessary. It suffices to say that after the victim broke out the rear window of defendant’s car, defendant drove his car into the victim, causing injuries that resulted in the amputation of the victim’s leg.
The People filed a complaint charging defendant with mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and assault with a deadly weapon. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The complaint also alleged defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the assault. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)
On September 9, 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon and admitted he inflicted great bodily injury in exchange for a sentence of seven years. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) The remaining charge was dismissed pursuant to a Harvey waiver. The same day, the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison.