CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Larry Darnell Fuller appeals from a conviction, following a jury trial, of one count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) with the special circumstance that the victim was killed to prevent his testimony (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10)) and one count of an ex-felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true that defendant personally and intentionally used a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)). On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior crime to determine motive and (2) testimony that he was restrained at his preliminary hearing was prejudicial, or alternatively, his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony.

Ronald Mazzaferro and his son, Joshua Mazzaferri, appealed from orders quieting title to a property that was once an asset of a family trust for which Mazzaferro’s mother is trustee, but was transferred years ago to the present owners, Mazzaferro’s daughter and son in law, respondents Gina and William Parisi. The trial court additionally found Mazzaferro liable for slander of title to the Parisi property and three other properties held by the trust or sold by the trust to third parties, and enjoined him from recording any instruments against the Parisi property without court approval. Mazzaferro had previously been enjoined from further encumbering the other properties.

Appellant and debtor Charles Janeke entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy. He believed bankruptcy protection was required, in part, due to the “shenanigans” of one of his creditors, respondent Juliette Allen and the Allen Family Trust (collectively, Allen). A plan of reorganization was amended multiple times and confirmed by the bankruptcy court. The plan required Janeke to refinance the loan on his main asset, a multi-unit apartment building, and to make certain payments to his creditors, including Allen. Allen took actions which Janeke believed hindered his efforts to obtain a refinance loan at a reasonable rate. He therefore stopped paying Allen the amounts required under the confirmed plan. Janeke sued Allen, seeking damages for her interference, under theories of fraud and slander of title, among others. Allen cross-complained for the payments due her under the confirmed plan.
Allen obtained summary judgment on both Janeke’s complaint and her cross-complaint. Janeke appe

Plaintiff Kamal Bilal (plaintiff) held a minority interest in Westco Petroleum Distributors, Inc. (WPD), a gasoline distribution company. Plaintiff sued the majority shareholders, defendants Antone Nino (Antone) and Nasrin Shakeri Nino (Nasrin), initially alleging they wrongly excluded him from participating in WPD’s management and executed unauthorized transactions that injured both plaintiff and WPD. A later amended complaint filed by plaintiff, however, alleged injury only to himself and omitted any allegations that defendant injured WPD. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the amended complaint without leave to amend, concluding plaintiff’s prior pleadings revealed the gist of the action sought redress for injury to WPD, making it a shareholder derivative action, but plaintiff had not complied with statutory requirements to bring such an action. We consider whether the trial court properly applied the sham pleading doctrine to disregard plaintiff’s allegations of indi

Anthony Castro Rodriguez appeals from an order denying his petition under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, to reclassify his felony conviction for petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction (Pen. Code, § 666) as a misdemeanor. The trial court denied the petition on the ground Rodriguez currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under section 1170.18, subdivisions (b) and (c).
Rodriguez argues that the trial court’s denial of his petition was an abuse of discretion and violated his due process and equal protection rights. He also argues the trial court erred in failing to rule on his petition under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act, for recall of his sentence and resentencing as a second strike offender. We affirm.

A jury convicted Edgar Santana of two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code §§ 187, subd. (a); 189) with multiple murder special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found true that as to one count, Santana personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) The jury found as to both counts: a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), (e)-(i)); the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)); and Santana was a minor at least 14 years of age and the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Welf. & Inst. Code § 707, subd. (d)(2)(B) & (C)(ii)).

Appellant Leighton Lee Perry, who represented himself in the trial court and continues to do so on appeal, appeals from a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of respondent First American Title Company’s (First American) demurrer to his third amended complaint without leave to amend. We affirm.
This case has its origins in Perry’s sale of residential property located in Martinez. After failing to stave off foreclosure through a “wrongful foreclosure” action, Perry found a buyer, and the parties opened escrow with First American. The buyer specified “review/approval of preliminary title report” was a contingency of sale.

Rewis Yonan appeals from the denial of a civil harassment restraining order (CRO). His principal claim is that the trial court misinterpreted Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 and erroneously concluded he had to show a “course of conduct” of harassing behavior and that a CRO cannot be granted on the basis of a single incident. He further claims that, interpreted correctly, he established his right to a CRO under section 527.6 by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.

Truong Le appeals from an order denying his petition for a writ of mandate, which sought relief from the mandatory registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Pen. Code, §§ 290 to 290.024). Le contends the trial court erred in concluding that he was required to register as a sex offender in California based on his 1994 conviction in Minnesota for criminal sexual conduct in the second degree (Minn. Stat., § 609.343). We affirm.

In 2017, the City and County of San Francisco (City) amended section 41.20 of the San Francisco Administrative Code to require the rental of residential single room occupancy units (SROs) for terms of at least 32 days, when protections under the City’s rent control ordinance arise. Previously, SROs could be rented for periods between seven and 31 days. Plaintiffs San Francisco SRO Hotel Coalition (Coalition), Hotel des Arts, LLC and Brent Haas brought this action for administrative mandate, seeking, among other things, the invalidation of the 2017 Amendments as an unlawful taking under article 1, section 19 of the California Constitution. We reverse the superior court’s order denying plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the 2017 Amendments on the ground that plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail. We remand the case for a determination of the balance of hardships.

E.B. (minor) appeals from a juvenile court order denying her request to expunge her DNA sample from the state database following a reduction of her conviction to an infraction under Proposition 64 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361.8). We affirm.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from an order denying cross-motions for contractual attorney fees and denying a motion to tax costs. The probate court ruled “there was no prevailing party in this action” and denied both motions for fees and denied appellant Colette Savage’s motion to tax. We affirm, but not for the reasons identified by the probate court, which included that it did not set aside the two promissory notes at issue on any of the grounds asserted by Colette, and that defendant Mark Savage could have avoided nearly all fees had he made a competent evidentiary showing at the outset of the proceeding that the two notes in dispute “had in fact been cancelled.”

Former husband and wife Raymond Jerome Lami (Jerry) and Janice Lami (Janice) both appealed after the trial court divided marital property and issued a judgment of dissolution. Jerry argues that the trial court erred in dividing assets and obligations by relying on an order issued in a previous dissolution-of-marriage proceeding between the parties. Janice argues that the trial court incorrectly determined the parties’ date of separation, but she acknowledges that we need not reach the issue if we reject Jerry’s arguments. Because we reject Jerry’s arguments, we affirm the judgment and do not resolve Janice’s claim.

Defendant Oscar Antonio Ayala was convicted by a jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) for killing Reina Figueroa. Defendant and Reina, who were both married to other people, had been in an extramarital relationship for about 15 years at the time of Reina’s death. On appeal, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence he premeditated and deliberated the killing, so his conviction should be reduced to second degree murder. We agree with defendant. Only circumstantial evidence was presented to show defendant premeditated and deliberated, and we do not believe a reasonable jury could have inferred defendant had the requisite mental state to commit first degree murder based on such limited evidence. Thus, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter with directions to reduce defendant’s conviction to second degree murder and to resentence defendant accordingly.