CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Jesse Devlin Quiming appeals after a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664/192, subd. (a)) and found true allegations that defendant personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) as to both counts and personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the attempted voluntary manslaughter (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court found true allegations that defendant had a strike prior (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and it sentenced defendant to a prison term of 56 years to life.

Defendant Michael Scott Leslie appeals from an order denying his motion to compel arbitration. The court found Leslie waived his right to arbitrate. We conclude substantial evidence supports the finding because: (1) Leslie unreasonably delayed seeking arbitration; (2) Leslie undertook actions inconsistent with a right to arbitrate; and (3) plaintiff Serene Rosenberg suffered prejudice from the delay. We therefore affirm the order denying the motion to compel arbitration.

Appointed counsel for defendant Tony Moreno asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and
we received no communication from defendant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

Appellant John Wash (John) contends the trial court erred when it denied his petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 for a workplace violence restraining order against his brother’s widow. The trial court concluded the applicable standard of proof required clear and convincing evidence and found John failed to meet this burden of proof.
The standard of appellate review plays a significant role in the outcome of this matter. That standard of review is tailored specifically to the trial court’s determination that an appellant failed to carry his or her burden of proof. A failure-of-proof determination will be upheld by the reviewing court unless the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. As explained below, John’s evidence was not of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to establish the statutory elements for obtaining a restraining order.

At the conclusion of a jury trial on March 17, 2016, defendant Christopher Andrew Magnani was convicted of one count of continuous sexual abuse of a minor under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a)). Defendant filed a motion for new trial on the ground he had newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied the motion on August 16, 2016. On September 6, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of six years, with 224 days of custody credits.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. Defendant further contends his counsel was ineffective, the trial court improperly placed the burden on defendant to show his counsel was ineffective, and the trial court’s finding that defendant suffered no prejudice due to his counsel’s alleged substandard representation was unreasonable. We affirm the judgment.

Victim R.S. was shot in the leg while listening to music in his apartment, and defendant Johnny Timmons was identified as the suspect. Several days later, sheriff’s deputies executed a search warrant at defendant’s residence and located a loaded .38-caliber revolver and a tin can containing .32- and .38-caliber ammunition.

Appellant Roy Ornelas was convicted of six counts of committing forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b)(1) and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years under section 288.5. The trial court sentenced Ornelas to an aggregate determinate term of 36 years in prison. Ornelas was ordered to serve the middle term of six years for each of the six counts of committing forcible lewd and lascivious acts to be served consecutively. The court imposed an additional eight months for a violation of probation in a separate case to be served consecutively. The court dismissed the continuous sexual abuse conviction pursuant to People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 245 (Johnson).

At the conclusion of a jury trial, defendant Stephanie Banks was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2), and obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The jury also found true enhancements alleging that Banks personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) on the victim in counts 1 and 2, and personally used a weapon in count 2 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that Banks had a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a prior strike within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)), both based on a prior conviction for robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (b)).

In 2013, appellant Felix Corral Ruiz II was tried before a jury with his codefendant, Joe Valdez Dominguez. Before the trial completed, appellant negotiated a plea agreement for a sentence of 35 years in state prison. The parties agreed he would waive his right to appeal. No agreement or discussion occurred on the record regarding how the 35 years would be calculated.

Plaintiff and respondent, Industrial Catering, Inc. (Industrial Catering), prevailed in this unlawful detainer case after a jury trial. The tenants, defendants and appellants, Henry Aguila and Rigo Gutierrez, charge the trial court with numerous errors, but we need reach only one of their arguments. We agree with them that the three-day notice to pay rent or quit vastly overstated the amount of delinquent rent. This was fatal to Industrial Catering’s cause of action, and we must therefore reverse.

In 1994, a group of four males — including defendant Travis Lee Hawkins (then aged 16) and defendant Ashley Gallegos (then aged 17) —participated in a kidnapping and carjacking that culminated in a fatal shooting. Neither Hawkins nor Gallegos was the actual killer; based on the evidence, reasonable minds could differ as to whether they had the intent to kill, but a jury evidently found that they did.

Defendant and a shotgun-wielding accomplice committed a “room invasion” robbery (the victims were renting one bedroom of a house). Both victims identified both perpetrators, to the police as well as at trial. After the jury returned its verdict, however, one of the victims contacted the prosecution and said that she had been mistaken in her identification of defendant’s accomplice — although she was still certain of her identification of defendant.

Defendant and appellant William Christopher Scherer was found with methamphetamine in his possession for the purposes of sale and transportation. Pursuant to a plea to the court, defendant pleaded guilty to selling and transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)). In return, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions, including 180 days in county jail to be served on work release and payment of various fines and fees.

At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in dependency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j), the juvenile court issued orders in the cases of dependents G.D., J.H., K.D., Jr. (Junior), and M.D., making true findings on the dependency petitions filed by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) and placing the children with their mother, L.H. (Mother). The court granted K.D. (Father) weekly supervised visits with G.D., J.H., and M.D., but denied visitation with Junior, finding visitation with Father would be detrimental to Junior.