CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Ismael Luevano is an identified gang member. In one incident, defendant stabbed the victim because the victim stopped being involved in gang activity. Approximately two weeks later, during an officer pursuit, defendant stuck his body out of a vehicle and fired a shotgun at the officer. Following several requests to represent himself and requests to appoint counsel, defendant eventually pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2) and assault with a firearm upon a peace officer or firefighter (§ 245, subd. (d)(1); count 4). Defendant also admitted that in the commission of count 4, he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, to wit, a shotgun, within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c). In return, the remaining charges and enhancement allegations were dismissed, and defendant was sentenced to a total term of 26 years in state prison with 1,079 days of credit for time served.

Martha Jimenez was injured when she slipped on a patch of liquid on the floor of a supermarket owned and operated by Stater Bros. Markets (Stater). Stater filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by its expert’s declaration to the effect that Stater conducted reasonable inspections by sweeping the floor once an hour. In opposition, Jimenez submitted her expert’s declaration to the effect that Stater’s inspections were not conducted in a reasonable manner, and also that the flooring material where she fell was unreasonably slippery when wet. The trial court sustained Stater’s evidentiary objections to the bulk of the declaration of Jimenez’s expert and granted the motion.

A jury found defendant and appellant, Solomon Kelly, guilty as charged of one count of attempted second degree robbery of two victims, J.C. and F.H. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211.) Defendant was sentenced to two years in prison, but his sentence was deemed served and he was released on parole because his preimprisonment credits equaled or exceeded the sentence imposed. The criminal proceedings were delayed due to defendant’s hospitalization and involuntary treatment with antipsychotic medication in order to restore his mental competency.

Yu Chaio Tan (Tan) sued Hangar 18 Indoor Climbing Gym, LLC and Hangar 18 Upland Inc. (collectively, Hangar 18) for negligence and premises liability. Hangar 18 moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion. Tan contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Eric Haulcy of felony driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 1) and driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 2). As to both counts the jury found true allegations that Haulcy personally inflicted great bodily injury on three people (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and caused bodily injury or death to multiple victims (Veh. Code, § 23558). Haulcy admitted a strike prior (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), a serious felony prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)) and two prison priors (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
The court sentenced Haulcy to a determinate term of 22 years in prison.

Petitioner Anderson P. Thurston is the defendant in a criminal action. The respondent superior court revoked petitioner’s right to represent himself in the action. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate compelling the respondent court to reinstate his right to represent himself. We shall issue a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to allow petitioner to represent himself.

Appointed counsel for defendant L. Amir Anthony Varick Amma asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

In 2012, we affirmed a judgment against Jason Romero which sentenced him to 50 years to life for first degree murder under an aiding and abetting theory. In 2014, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158–159 (Chiu), that an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In 2016, Romero filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking reversal of his conviction under Chiu. In 2017, the court held in In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216 (Martinez) that Chiu error requires reversal unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid theory in convicting the defendant of first degree murder. The high court returned the matter for us to reconsider Romero’s conviction in light of Chiu and Martinez.

The jury found defendant and appellant Fermin Barrales guilty of assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury in two counts (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) [counts 1 & 2]), and found that Barrales personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in both counts (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The jury hung as to two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) [counts 3 & 4]), and as to the allegation as to all four counts that Barrales personally used a deadly weapon—“brass knuckles with a knife”—in the commission of the crimes within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court declared a mistrial with respect to those counts and allegations.

Mary P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings that she failed to protect her three children from the domestic violence, mental and emotional problems, and drug use of Enrique C. (Father). However, Mother does not challenge the jurisdictional findings as to Father, and he has not appealed. We dismiss Mother’s appeal because there is no justiciable controversy for which we can grant any effective relief.

A jury convicted defendant Israel Gutierrez of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years eight months in state prison. On appeal, defendant argues it was an abuse of discretion to admit his jail telephone conversations into evidence. We find no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Marlin Martin appeals an order denying him a transfer hearing pursuant to Proposition 57, the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016.” (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303-304 [Proposition 57 applies to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time of enactment].) We conditionally reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. (Lara, at p. 310, People v. Vela (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1102.)

Kamau Sanders appeals from his convictions for making criminal threats, assault with a deadly weapon, and petty theft. We reject his contentions that: there was insufficient evidence to support the criminal threats and assault convictions; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats; the court erred by striking evidence that he was intoxicated and by not instructing on intoxication as a defense; and a proper waiver of rights was not taken before he admitted the truth of certain prior conviction allegations.
We agree with Sanders that: the court erred by imposing concurrent sentences for the assault and criminal threats counts and should have stayed sentence on one of them instead; the court erred by twice imposing a five-year sentence enhancement; and his custody credits were not properly calculated. We will modify the abstract of judgment to correct these errors and affirm the judgment as modified.

Plaintiff Kathleen Coleman appeals from a judgment following an order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Plaintiff sued defendant Aneeta Sagar for negligence following an automobile accident. Plaintiff offered to compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Defendant faxed a notice of acceptance that purported to contain defense counsel’s signature. Plaintiff then attempted to withdraw the section 998 offer.
Defendant moved to enforce the settlement agreement under sections 664.6 and 998. Plaintiff opposed, arguing defendant’s counsel had failed to sign the acceptance, which contained the notation: “Dictated but not read.” Plaintiff also argued acceptance was equivocal because the notice of acceptance suggested additional terms. The trial court ruled that defense counsel had electronically signed the acceptance, pursuant to the Uniform Electronic Transactions Ac (UETA) , and the acceptance was unequivocal.