CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
Plaintiff Legendary Investors Group No. 1, LLC, appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendants and respondents Daniel J. Niemann, NPI Century City, LLC, and Neiman Properties, Inc., in Legendary’s action to enforce respondents’ construction loan guaranty. We affirm because the issue of Legendary’s standing to sue was properly raised and adversely determined against it by the jury. We also reverse and remand the separately appealed order granting Legendary’s motion to tax costs related to travel expenses incurred by respondents’ counsel.
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Jemar Welch, convicted of second-degree murder, appeals his conviction on the grounds of instructional error; insufficiency of the evidence; prosecutorial misconduct; and cumulative error; and he also requests resentencing due to a change in state law. We affirm the conviction and remand for resentencing.
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F & S Investment Properties (F & S) obtained a default judgment against Michael Ray Nguyen-Stevenson (Stevenson). Stevenson moved to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5. The court granted the motion and set aside the judgment on the condition that Stevenson file an answer within 15 days and pay to F & S $27,968.75 in attorney fees and costs. Stevenson appealed from this order and did not pay the conditional payment. The trial court thereafter vacated the order setting aside the judgment and reinstituted the default judgment. Stevenson also appealed from this order. We consolidated the appeals for purposes of argument and decision.
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Defendant and appellant Kelvin Jelks (defendant) was convicted of second degree robbery, and assault with a semiautomatic firearm. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the police’s photographic lineup violated his due process rights; (2) his statement made to a police officer at the hospital was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); (3) the trial court erred by denying his new trial motions based on ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) this court should conduct an independent review of the sealed transcript of the trial court’s in camera hearing conducted pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess); and (5) the matter should be remanded to the trial court to allow it to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancements. We affirm the convictions but reverse the sentence and remand for the trial court to determine whether to strike the firearm sentencing enhancements.
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Following a jury trial, Eliziel Jacobo Felix was found guilty of rape by force, violence, or fear (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found true the special kidnapping allegation (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(2)). The victim was his stepdaughter, T. Doe. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion or prejudicially erred by (1) denying his Marsden motion (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)), (2) denying a requested instruction regarding defendant’s belief that the alleged victim consented to sexual intercourse, (3) failing to instruct on several offenses characterized as lesser-included offenses of rape, (4) denying a defense request to instruct the jury on section 667.61, subdivision (e)(1) as a “lesser included enhancement,” and (5) denying his motion for a new trial. He also r |
A.O. petitions for relief from an order of the juvenile court, terminating her reunification services with her two children, A.B. and M.B, and scheduling a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. A.O. contends the juvenile court erred in concluding she had been provided with reasonable reunification services, arguing the services offered to her were inadequate as a matter of law to address her acknowledged mental health problems. We disagree and deny the petition.
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A jury convicted defendant Michael Joseph Zerschling of smuggling a controlled substance into a correctional facility (Pen. Code, § 4573 [count 1]); all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated), and possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a) [count 2]). Zerschling contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on count 1 and seeks independent review of the trial court’s Pitchess ruling (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment.
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A jury convicted defendant William Ernest Hagen of one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)). The jury also found true a deadly weapon enhancement as to the criminal threats count. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
For purposes of sentencing, the court dismissed defendant’s two prior strike convictions. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate state prison term of eight years as follows: (1) the middle term of three years for the assault with a deadly weapon count; (2) a concurrent term of two years for the criminal threats count, plus one year for the personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement; and (3) a mandatory consecutive five-year sentence for a prior serious felony conviction. Pursuant to section 2933.1, the court also awarded defendant 109 actual days of presentence custody credits and 16 days of conduct credits. |
Steinbrecher & Span, Robert S. Span, Geoffrey T. Stover; Paul Hastings, Elena R. Baca, Stephen L. Berry, Elena R. Baca, Ryan D. Derry, and Ankush Dhupar, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR), and the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) and their respective leaders appeal from the trial court’s order denying their special motion to strike four causes of action in the California Trucking Agency’s (CTA) complaint. The Labor Agencies argue the court erred by denying the special motion to strike because CTA’s claims arose from protected activity. We disagree and affirm the order. |
An information charged Andrew Herman Lopez with one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated), and one count of felony battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 2).
The information also alleged Lopez inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count 1 (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c), 667.5, subd. (c)); had been convicted of two prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and four prior “strikes” (§ 667, subd. (b)-(i)); and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). |
Plaintiff Jane Doe (Doe) appeals from a final judgment following the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant Walmart Stores, Inc. (Walmart). Walmart employee Doe alleged Walmart negligently hired, retained, and supervised a fellow Walmart employee who sexually assaulted her after work hours, and outside the workplace. She further alleged Walmart was negligent in not warning her of her coworker’s criminal history. Walmart moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to discover or warn Doe of her coworker’s past criminal conduct, and that any failure to discover and warn Doe of his criminal history did not cause the injuries she suffered when she was off work and not in the workplace. The trial court granted the motion, finding that Doe had failed to produce evidence showing a disputed material issue of fact on either duty or causation. We agree with the trial court’s conclusions and affirm the judgment.
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A jury convicted appellant Peter Palmero of possession of a sharp instrument by an inmate (Pen. Code, § 4502, subd. (a)/count 1). In a separate proceeding, the court found true a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that Palmero had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
On appeal, Palmero contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his possession of a sharp instrument conviction; and (2) the court erred when it stayed his prior prison term enhancement. We find merit to Palmero’s second contention and strike the enhancement. In all other respects, we affirm. |
A jury convicted appellant Paul Anthony Soto of possession of methamphetamine while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1); possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2); possession of ammunition by a felon (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 3); possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor (§ 11364; count 4); and possession of methamphetamine, a misdemeanor (§ 11377, subd. (a); count 5). !(CT: 197-207.)! In a separate proceeding, the court found true four prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that Soto had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
On appeal, Soto contends the court erred in imposing penalty assessments against the laboratory and drug program fees it ordered him to pay in count 1. He also requests that we to review the in camera proceedings related to his Pitchess motion. We ha |
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