CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Brenda Fanny Martinez was convicted of second degree murder by use of a deadly weapon after she beat the victim to death with a baseball bat. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 16 years to life in prison. On appeal, she contends her conviction must be reversed because the trial court erred prejudicially by: (1) unduly restricting the testimony of her psychiatric expert; (2) failing to properly instruct the jury on implied malice; (3) refusing to instruct in involuntary manslaughter; and (4) failing to instruct that mental illness evidence is admissible to determine credibility. We conclude the abstract of judgment requires a minor correction. We otherwise affirm.

Appellant Gregory Dickerson was convicted of two counts of selling cocaine base in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a), with accompanying true findings on two prior conviction enhancements. At trial, the judge allowed the prosecution to refuse a proposed stipulation from Dickerson as to the knowledge element of the crime and instead to put before the jury as proof of that element evidence of the circumstances surrounding one of the prior convictions. Dickerson now argues the trial court erred in admitting this evidence and by failing to strike the two enhancements. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior conviction and therefore affirm the convictions. We have no occasion to address the substance of Dickerson’s second line of argument as we shall strike the enhancements pursuant to Senate Bill No. 180.

Defendant Warren Sloan was convicted by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), along with an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court found Sloan had sustained a prior strike conviction and sentenced him to 52 years to life in prison. On appeal, Sloan argues (1) the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on alleged misconduct by the prosecutor and a prosecution witness, (2) portions of the testimony of a different prosecution witness were improperly admitted, and (3) the court erred by admitting evidence of tattoos on Sloan’s arms. We affirm.

Defendant Joseph Benjamin Gunning pleaded guilty to felony vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)(1)) and misdemeanor flight from a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1, subd. (a)). He also admitted that he had a prior felony conviction that qualified as a “strike” (Pen. Code. §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). At sentencing, the trial court dismissed the prior strike allegation (see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497), placed Gunning on probation for a term of three years, and ordered him to serve one year in the county jail.

Defendant Johnny Chonbura Lee twice touched an eight-year-old girl’s vagina underneath her underwear. The girl was the daughter of a family friend. When the girl’s mother confronted defendant, he admitted the offenses. Defendant was arrested and charged by felony complaint with two counts of lewd act on a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).

Defendant Ravi Kumak Singh pleaded no contest to twenty counts, including multiple counts of robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of ammunition by a felon, battery causing great bodily injury, and participating in a criminal street gang. He admitted numerous enhancements. The trial court imposed a total term of 36 years. This sentence included terms totaling 13 years four months based on numerous firearm enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b).

Defendant appeals from a criminal judgment entered pursuant to a no contest plea. According to the notice of appeal filed by trial counsel, the appeal is “based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea.” Appointed counsel filed an opening brief summarizing the case but raising no issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf. Defendant has not done so.

Alchemie Productive, LLC (Alchemie) sued International Kickboxing Muay Thai Federation California (IKF) and its president, Steve Fossum, for defamation and other related torts, arising out of IKF’s public statements that Alchemie’s product was neither safe nor sanitary. IKF and Fossum filed a special motion to strike Alchemie’s complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. (All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted.)
The trial court granted the special motion to strike in part and denied it in part. The court found that the third cause of action, for interference with existing business relationships, did not arise from protected activity, and denied the motion as to the third cause of action. With respect to the remaining causes of action, the court found they all arose from protected activity. The court then found th

Valerie B. Boston appeals from a judgment after the trial court held a bench trial and entered judgment in favor of her daughter, Rosey Barry, as trustee of her grandmother’s (Boston’s mother’s) trust, the Rosalyn Binning Recoverable Trust (the Trust). Boston’s appellate briefs are undecipherable and violate the California Rules of Court in many respects. Consequently, Barry filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, in addition to her respondent’s brief. As we explain below, none of Boston’s contentions, as best we can discern them, have any merit, and we affirm the judgment. We deny Barry’s motion to dismiss Boston’s appeal.

Summer F. is the mother of three-year-old M.S. On March 6, 2018, the juvenile court terminated her parental rights as to M.S. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) and she appealed. After reviewing the juvenile court record, Summer’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on Summer’s behalf. This court granted Summer leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)

Appointed counsel for defendant Curtis Lee Killian asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. He responded, contending he is innocent of the crimes and was forced to plead under the circumstances. Our review of the entire record reveals no arguable issues on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

In this consolidated appeal, appellant Maria C. appeals the trial court’s entry of a joint domestic violence restraining order as it relates to her and a later custody order involving the children of Maria and her ex-husband Luis C. Luis has not cross-appealed and did not file any briefing in opposition. With respect to the restraining order entered against her, Maria argues the trial court failed to enter detailed findings of fact in support of the restraining order as required by Family Code section 6305 and otherwise abused its discretion in granting the order. With respect to the custody order, Maria argues the court failed to consider or apply any of the required presumptions against joint or sole custody that are triggered by a domestic violence finding or otherwise properly factor the domestic violence findings into the determination of the best interests of the children. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse both the domestic violence restraining order against Mar

Defendant Nestor Aguilera entered into a plea agreement, admitting one count of rape of a victim under 14 years, defendant being older than the victim by more than seven years (Pen. Code, §§ 269, subd. (a)(1), 261, subd. (a)(2); count 7) and lewd and lascivious conduct on a victim under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); count 24). Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant received a stipulated sentence of 15 years-to-life on count 7 and a consecutive sentence of three years on count 24. The remaining counts were dismissed.

Defendant James Francis Ripley pled guilty to conspiracy to bring controlled substances into a correctional facility. (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1); 4573, subd. (a).) On appeal, defendant contends the trial court did not honor the terms of his plea agreement by failing to impose a county jail sentence concurrent to his existing state prison sentence. The People contend defendant’s appeal is barred because defendant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause pursuant to section 1237.5. We conclude defendant was not required to obtain a certificate of probable cause because his appeal does not attack the validity of his plea. We also agree the trial court did not honor the terms of the plea agreement, and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.