CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Clinton Curtis Wilson appeals from convictions at the conclusion of a jury trial for first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and arson (§ 451, subd. (a)). The jury also found true an enhancement alleging that Wilson personally used a firearm in causing the victim’s death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced Wilson to a sentence of 25 years to life for murder, to a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life for the gun use enhancement, and to a consecutive term of seven years for arson.

R.G. appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to her 13-year-old son, A.G., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. R.G. contends that the juvenile court failed to fulfill its statutory duty to consider A.G.’s wishes because the court did not explicitly inquire whether A.G. objected to the termination of R.G.’s parental rights. R.G. also asserts that A.G.’s procedural due process rights were violated because the record “suggests” A.G. was not notified of his right to object, which would have deprived him of the opportunity to be heard.

Kenneth Lee Nicolas appeals from the judgment convicting him of three counts of sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)) and five counts of non-forcible lewd act upon a child 14 years of age or younger. (§ 288, subd. (a).) He argues his conviction must be reversed because the trial court erred (1) by dismissing a juror for bias during deliberations; and (2) by denying his motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Johnny R. is the father of now 22-month-old Joshua R. On April 26, 2018, the juvenile court terminated his parental rights as to Joshua (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) and he appealed. After reviewing the juvenile court record, Johnny’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on Johnny’s behalf. This court granted Johnny leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Johnny submitted a letter but does not allege the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights.
We conclude Johnny failed to address the termination proceedings or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the termination hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

Following a contested dispositional hearing in June 2018, the juvenile court denied petitioner Liz L. (mother) reunification services as to her now eight-month-old daughter, N.L., and set a Welfare and Institutions Code Section 366.26 hearing for October 10, 2018. Mother, in propria persona, filed a petition under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, requesting reunification services and placement. We conclude her petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452 and dismiss the petition.

Appointed counsel for defendant Jose Manuel Quintero asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Robert Joseph Grajiola asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Joel Diaz asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

In this family law case, appellant Bryan Binford (Bryan) claimed that his ex-wife, respondent Shawn Binford Jordan (Shawn), had willfully disobeyed a custody and visitation order that granted to Bryan supervised visitation every other Saturday with the parties’ three children. Bryan filed an affidavit in the trial court alleging contempt; an order to show cause was issued, and a hearing was held on the contempt charge. After Bryan presented his evidence at the hearing, the trial court found Shawn not guilty of contempt because Bryan had failed to present sufficient evidence, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that Shawn had willfully disobeyed the subject order. Bryan’s request at the contempt hearing for an award of need-based attorney fees was also denied, without prejudice. Bryan appeals from the trial court’s order adjudicating the contempt charges and denying attorney fees. We conclude that Bryan has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

A jury convicted appellant Rolando Cerda of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379/count 1), possession for sale of methamphetamine (§ 11378/count 2), misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (§ 11364/count 3), misdemeanor resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)/count 4), and misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (§ 11377, subd. (a)/count 5). In a separate proceeding, the court found true a prior conviction enhancement (§ 11370.2) in counts 1 and 2.
On February 23, 2017, the trial court sentenced Cerda to an aggregate local term of seven years: the upper term of four years on count 1 and a three-year prior conviction enhancement in that count, a stayed aggregate term of six years on count 2, a concurrent 90-day term on count 3, a concurrent 120-day term on count 4, and a stayed 120-day term on count 5.

Appointed counsel for defendant David Leon Dooley asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

Appellant Marquette Lashon Hudson was convicted by a jury of one count of mayhem in violation of Penal Code section 203. Afterwards, in a bifurcated trial, the court found true allegations that Hudson suffered a prior felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (d), and a prior felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced appellant to 21 years in state prison. Hudson’s sentence consisted of the following: the upper term of eight years for the single count of mayhem, doubled to 16 years as a result of the section 667, subdivision (d), enhancement, plus five years for the section 667, subdivision (a), enhancement.

Joe Tuzzolino II and Sheli Tuzzolino (collectively, Homeowners) sued American World Financial Group, Inc. (AWFG) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) for alleged irregularities related to a foreclosure. The trial court sustained Fannie Mae’s demurrer without leave to amend. Homeowners contend the trial court erred. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant, Agustin Alvarado, pled no contest to committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (count 10; Pen. Code, § 288a) and the continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (count 12; § 288.5). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 20 years. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the plea based on defense counsel’s purported prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel in telling defendant he would only serve 12 to 13 years of his sentence. We affirm