CA Unpub Decisions

Cross-complainant and appellant, Brett La Cues, is one of several attorneys who represented a group of plaintiffs in a construction defect lawsuit (the underlying action). The underlying action settled in 2015. La Cues alleges his former clients and their other attorneys are now attempting to dispossess him of his interest in the underlying settlement funds. They are allegedly attempting this through several means, including threats to La Cues’s safety and financial well-being, but also through the prosecution of a malpractice complaint against La Cues.

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate a 2006 guilty plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5. The motion was filed in September 2017; thus, no transcript of the original plea or sentencing was available, however, the written change of plea form was available. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the appellant had failed to establish a factual basis to vacate the conviction.

Kay appeals. He contends the evidence does not support his conviction because he was unlawfully detained at the time of the offense. He also requests that this court review the trial court's in camera assessment of peace officer personnel records for error. (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).) We conclude Kay was not unlawfully detained and the court did not err in its assessment of the personnel records. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Michael Edward Swim filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We conclude the trial court erred in imposing various fines and fees, and shall modify the judgment to impose the proper amounts. We affirm the judgment as so modified.

A juvenile court found true allegations that J.U. committed second degree robbery and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and declared him a ward of the court. J.U. appealed, and his appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.

Defendant Lisa May-Chi Lee appeals from the denial of her motion to vacate the judgment and order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)). Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff Taiwanese American Seniors Association of Southern California following summary adjudication and plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of the remaining claims. Defendant argues it was an abuse of discretion to deny her section 473(b) motion. She asserts she was unable to oppose the summary adjudication motion because her previous attorney abandoned her 12 days before the opposition was due, and she was unable to find a new attorney before the hearing. Further, defendant contends the summary adjudication order was erroneous because she presented triable issues of fact on the fraudulent transfer claim. Plaintiff contends that defendant’s appeal is untimely. We conclude the appeal was timely filed but find no error. Thus, we affirm the order.

Charlotte P. (mother), mother of minors Lauren C. and Miles C., appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court terminating dependency jurisdiction with a family law order granting primary physical custody of the children to their father, Christopher C. (father), with monitored visitation for mother. Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering that her visitation be monitored, contending that the court failed to consider all of the evidence. Having reviewed the record, we conclude the juvenile court properly considered all the evidence and did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Carlos Reyes of shooting at an occupied vehicle (count 1), assault with a firearm (count 2), and discharging a firearm with gross negligence (count 3), and found true that defendant personally used a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant on count 2 to a 14 year prison term, which included the 4-year high term for assault with a firearm and 10 year high-term for the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The trial court imposed prison terms on counts 1 and 3, but stayed the sentences on those counts pursuant to section 654.

In the underlying action, Marty and Marie Marteney prevailed on their personal injury and loss of consortium claims against appellant Elementis Chemicals, Inc. (Elementis). While Elementis’s appeal from the judgment on those claims was pending, Marty Marteney died, and respondents became parties to the action in order to assert wrongful death claims against Elementis. After a jury found that respondents were entitled to damages, the trial court determined Elementis’s liability for damages in light of prior settlements (Code Civ.Proc., § 877), and rendered a judgment in respondents’ favor. Elementis contends the court lacked jurisdiction to enter that judgment, and erred in valuing the settlement credits to which Elementis was entitled. We reject those contentions and affirm.

This case is before us a second time on direct appeal after we vacated Dewone Smith’s sentence for custodial possession of a weapon, resisting an executive officer, and battery by gassing (Smith threw a mixture of feces and urine at officers). In 2010, the trial court sentenced Smith to 150 years to life for those crimes, committed in 2007. We issued our first opinion in 2012, in which we affirmed the trial court’s judgment, but vacated Smith’s sentence. The Supreme Court granted review and issued an opinion in 2013. After the Supreme Court issued its opinion and remittitur to us, we issued our own remittitur to the trial court on August 30, 2013.

Appellant Geoffrey S. Bueno appeals from the judgment of conviction of two counts of second degree robbery and one count of possession of a controlled substance. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting one of the robbery convictions and the exclusion of evidence that one of the victims had a prior domestic violence conviction. He also complains that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during closing arguments. Finally, appellant asserts his sentence is unauthorized because the trial court imposed a penalty assessment in conjunction with the Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 laboratory fee.

A jury convicted defendant of three counts of lewd conduct with a child. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior molestation of another child. He also argues the court failed to grant him good conduct credit. We affirm the trial court’s admission of the prior molestation, but modify the judgment to award defendant conduct credit for presentence confinement.

Lane Bauldry appeals from an order denying his request to divide a community property asset that was not previously adjudicated by a judgment in this marital dissolution case. (Fam. Code, § 2556). The trial court denied Bauldry’s request because it found that the asset in question, a 401k retirement account held in the name of Bauldry’s former wife, Mona Daggett, had already been adjudicated by the court. We affirm.

Dion Andre Davis II appeals from a judgment of conviction on eleven criminal counts, issued after a jury trial, for his role in a Lake County home invasion and its aftermath. He argues that the trial court erred in discharging a juror for good cause during deliberations; the prosecution committed a Brady violation by withholding evidence regarding a detective’s misconduct in investigating the case; we should stay under Penal Code section 654 his count 5 sentences for assault with a semiautomatic firearm and the attendant great bodily injury (GBI) and firearm enhancements or, in the alternative, stay the GBI sentence (after initially arguing we should reverse this finding for lack of evidence); the court miscalculated or made a clerical error regarding the sentences imposed for counts 5 and 12; and we should remand to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancements under sections 12022.5 and 12022.53.