CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Ruben Kiko Hernandez of three counts of possession of
firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)) and one count of possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). It found true that Hernandez committed the four offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).)

In August 2017, a jury convicted defendant Michael James Taylor of: (1) willful cruelty of a dependent adult (count 1, Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1)) and (2) assault with means likely to cause great bodily injury (count 2, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). Taylor admitted that he sustained a previous prison prior conviction (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and a "strike" prior conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12). The court sentenced defendant to nine years in state prison.
On appeal, Taylor argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the "dependent adult" element of count 1, and that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury with a clear, constitutional definition of "dependent adult." As we explain, we disagree and thus affirm his judgment of conviction.

After defendant Leslie Ray Benjamin, Jr., pleaded guilty to sexually molesting the minor victim, the trial court imposed a 10-year state prison sentence whose terms and conditions included a no-contact order with no duration or limit specified. The court did not cite any statute or give any reasons to justify the order. The parties agree that the applicable statute, Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) (hereafter “section 136.2(i)(1)”), leaves it to the court’s discretion whether to make a no-contact order and limits any such order to a maximum of 10 years.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 30, 2015, the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services, now called the Sacramento County Department of Child, Family and Adult Services (the Department), filed a petition alleging mother had failed to protect minor (then 10 months old). (§ 300, subd. (b).) Minor was detained the same day. According to the petition, mother and father Ji. W. (father) had a history of engaging in domestic violence in minor’s presence, including an incident earlier that month where father had pushed, hit, and choked mother. Mother also had untreated anger management issues, including fighting with her extended family. In March 2015, mother had a physical altercation with the maternal great-grandmother and the maternal great-aunt.

I.C. (Mother) appeals from the jurisdictional findings made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). She argues section 300, subdivision (a), by its terms, requires that a finding of substantial risk of serious harm be based on prior injury to the children. She also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the findings under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) that the children came under those subdivisions because of domestic violence. Finally, she asserts the juvenile court should have ordered informal supervision instead of declaring the children to be dependents of the court. We affirm the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders.

Defendant Damon Mitchell appeals the trial court’s order extending his involuntary commitment as a mentally disordered offender. Mitchell contends—and the People properly concede—that he was not advised of and did not personally waive his right to a jury trial. We agree and reverse.

Plaintiff and appellant Laurel Forrest filed this slip and fall action against defendants and respondents George Town Plaza LLC and Cal Select Properties, Inc. (collectively defendants), seeking damages for injuries that occurred on defendants’ property.
Plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to disqualify defense counsel, or alternatively for discovery sanctions, based on defense counsel’s alleged abuse of the discovery process. The motion was denied and the case proceeded to a bifurcated jury trial on the issue of liability only. The jury found in favor of defendants. After plaintiff’s posttrial motions attacking the judgment were denied, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal challenging the judgment and the denial of her motion to disqualify.
We conclude the notice of appeal is untimely as to the motion to disqualify and dismiss the appeal in part on that basis. We otherwise affirm.

Defendant Laura Shipley appeals from a judgment of conviction for second degree robbery. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior crimes, and claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to strike a prior conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). Defendant demonstrates no error under the appropriate standards of review. We affirm.

Brian Lindquist (Lindquist), a tenant, sued his landlord (Arthur L. Herman Family Trust) and related family members and entities (Arthur L. Herman, Leesl Herman, and Arthur L. Herman Family LLC), as well as the property’s manager (Bradley Jakobsen and Jakobsen Management) (collectively, Herman) for breach of contract, nuisance, negligence, and conversion. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Herman on all of Lindquist’s claims.
On appeal, Lindquist raises eleven separate challenges to the judgment, including claims of improperly excluded evidence, improperly admitted evidence, and allegedly flawed jury instructions. As discussed in more detail below, we are not persuaded by any of Lindquist’s arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Elise Michelle Perrow appeals from her judgment of conviction on one count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), three counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)), and one count of violating a domestic violence protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)). On appeal, Perrow challenges certain aspects of her sentencing, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to strike an on-bail enhancement, improperly imposed a domestic violence fund fee, and issued an unauthorized sentence in ordering her not to own or possess any deadly or dangerous weapons. We affirm the conviction, and remand the matter to the trial court.

Defendant Shawn Allan Fletcher appeals from a conviction on one count of attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664). While a Metro bus was stopped at a bus stop, defendant removed a bicycle from the rack on the front of the bus and rode away on it while being chased, and ultimately caught, by the bicycle’s owner. At trial, defendant claimed he purchased the bicycle for $74 from an unknown man who got off the bus and offered to sell the bicycle to the people standing at and around the bus stop.
Defendant contends the court made numerous errors during the trial which were individually and cumulatively prejudicial. First, defendant contends the court erred in denying his request to represent himself after the conclusion of the defense case. We agree the court erred in denying the request solely because it was untimely. And because the court did not undertake the review prescribed by the Supreme Court in People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 (Windham), we are unable to assess

Defendant C.A. challenges the “electronic search” conditions imposed as conditions of his probation in case numbers 17-JW-0111 and 17-JW-0598, following his admission, in case No. 0111 to one count of bringing or possessing weapons on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1)) and misdemeanor exhibiting a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)), and in case No. 0598 to injuring a girlfriend (§ 273, subd. (a)). He also contends that at the dispositional hearing for the two cases, the juvenile court failed to state the maximum confinement time, a point the Attorney General does not dispute. We conclude defendant forfeited his challenges to the probation conditions by failure to object in the juvenile court and also reject his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We therefore affirm, but order the juvenile court to specify the maximum confinement time.

Kelman Garcia DeLeon (defendant) appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to committing a hit and run with injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)) and the trial court placed him on probation for three years. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Yolanda Owens appeals an order awarding $8,148.47 in costs to defendant Michael Bynum following entry of judgement in his favor. She contends the court erred by awarding costs without a showing by Bynum that he was personally liable to pay those costs. Alternatively, she contends the court failed to properly apportion the costs between Bynum and two nonprevailing defendants. We find no error and shall affirm the order.