CA Unpub Decisions

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Linda Sun, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
M.A. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings on Welfare and Institutions Code sections 342 and 387 petitions. Father solely contends the juvenile court erred by finding the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) adequately investigated the children’s possible Indian ancestry, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state statutes. Father initially indicated he might have Apache ancestry. As a result, the juvenile court ordered the Department to conduct further inquiry and send notices to the Apach

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Melvin D. Sandvig, Judge. Dismissed.
Ross K. Reghabi, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant in L.A. Super. Ct. No. LC105208 and Plaintiff and Appellant in L.A. Super. Ct. No. LC106094.
Miller Barondess, Christopher D. Beatty, Minh-Van T. Do, and Bernadette M. Bolan, for Plaintiffs and Respondents in L.A. Super. Ct. No. LC105208 and Defendants and Respondents in L.A. Super. Ct. No. LC106094.
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Khosro Reghabi (also known as Ross Reghabi) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of Hamid Mirshojae, Woodland Hills Medical Clinic I, and Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II against Reghabi and the Reghabi Law Group on two complaints consolidated in the trial court. After the trial court entered judgment and Mirshojae began judgment enforcement efforts, Reghabi violated court orders over the course of 16 months, ultimately resulting in a trial court order finding Reghabi in contempt of court for viol

APPEAL from orders and judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael P. Vicencia, Judge. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
The Homampour Law Firm, Arash Homampour, Corey Arzoumanian, Nareen Touloumdjian; Law Offices of David H. Greenberg, David H. Greenberg, Emily A. Ruby; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Stuart B. Esner and Kevin K. Nguyen for Plaintiffs and Appellants Shanisha Courtney, Raymond Courtney and Martel Courtney.
Polsinelli, David K. Schultz; Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, Philip R. Cosgrove and Ryan E. Cosgrove for Defendant and Appellant Daimler Trucks North America LLC.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Reversed.
Derek K. Kowata, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Idan Ivri and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In 1981, petitioner and appellant Donald Matthews pleaded guilty to one count of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 15 years to life. In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, which is now Penal Code section 1172.6 (section 1172.6). Section 1172.6 allows a petitioner to obtain retroactive relief based on recent changes in the murder law. The resentencing court denied Matthews’ petition at the prima facie stage and, in July 2020, this court affirmed the resentenci

We are in the midst of an unprecedented global pandemic, requiring trial courts to implement safety measures to mitigate the potential spread of the COVID-19 virus. In this matter, as a precautionary measure, the trial court required everyone, including the witnesses, to wear masks. Defendant contends the trial court’s denial of his motion to require witnesses, as an alternative to opaque masks, to wear a clear face mask or a transparent face shield, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Defendant also contends he is entitled to resentencing under Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567). We conclude defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment were not violated. However, the matter shall be remanded for resentencing.

An 81-year-old woman died six months after she was severely beaten and brutally sexually assaulted. Through DNA evidence, defendant Jonathan Jackson was implicated in the crimes. A jury convicted Jackson of first degree felony murder, rape, kidnapping to commit rape, and forcible penetration by a foreign object. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Jackson raises numerous claims of error, including the exclusion of an exculpatory statement made by the victim before she died, insufficient evidence regarding the cause of death, insufficient evidence of separate acts of sexual penetration, prosecutorial misconduct, and imposition of a parole revocation fine. Jackson contends the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial and due process. Additionally, he challenges the constitutionality of the felony-murder special-circumstances law. With the exception of the parole revocation fine, which the People agree must be stricken, we a

A jury convicted defendant Michael Santos Arias of felony evasion of a peace officer and misdemeanor trespass, resisting a peace officer, leaving the scene of an accident, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced Arias to the upper term of three years in prison for his felony evasion conviction and concurrent county jail terms for each of the four misdemeanor convictions.
On appeal, Arias claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for trespass. In addition, he asserts the enactment of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), which amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2022, requires that the matter be remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Finally, he requests that the abstract of judgment and the sentencing minute order be modified to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment.
For the reasons explained below, we reject Arias’s challenge to his trespass conviction

Following a custody hearing, the trial court ordered appellant Heather Jensen to pay respondent Gregory Jensen’s attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, Heather argues the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the fees under Family Code section 2030, which is intended to equalize access to counsel for family court litigants by ordering one party to pay “whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees” for the other. (Fam. Code, § 2030.) She contends that because any disparity in access to financial resources to pay for counsel favored Gregory, the trial court was precluded from ordering her to pay his attorney’s fees under section 2030’s needs-based provision, and that her conduct in the custody proceeding did not justify the trial court’s award. We agree that the trial court abused its discretion and will reverse the order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2017, the trial court entered judgment dissolving Gregory and Heather’s marria

Convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, carjacking, reckless evasion, and forcibly resisting an officer, Joshua Bacci was sentenced to a total term of 33 years and 8 months in prison. On appeal, Bacci challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the jury’s finding of recklessness required for felony evasion (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included misdemeanor (Veh. Code, § 2800.1). Bacci also argues that Penal Code section 654 prohibits multiple punishments for his convictions for carjacking (§215, subd. (a)) and assault with a deadly weapon (§245, subd. (a)(1)), as well as his convictions for reckless evasion (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and forcibly resisting an officer (§ 69). Finally, Bacci argues that remand for resentencing is required because he is entitled to retroactive application of recent legislative changes effectuated by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) and Assembly Bill Nos. 124(2021-2

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Cheri T. Pham, Judge. Affirmed.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Cuong Viet Nguyen was convicted of murder in 2010. He was sentenced to 55 years to life in prison, but after a successful appeal, that sentence was reduced to 40 years.
Two years ago, appellant filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 seeking resentencing on his murder conviction. Section 1170.95 is the procedural mechanism for implementing legislative changes in California law which narrow the scope of vicarious liability for murder in two ways. First, the Legislature eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory for that crime by providing that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Second, it reined in the felony murder rule so

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Dennis J. Keough, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Deborah B. Morse, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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In this juvenile dependency appeal, S.S. (Father) challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order concerning his two-year-old son, D.B. As we explain below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
D.B. first came to the juvenile court’s attention based on concerns about substance abuse by and domestic violence between Father and B.N. (Mother). About one year after the initial detention hearing, shortly before the court ruled on jurisdiction, Mother passed away.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Aaron W. Heisler, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
RMO, Scott E. Rahn, Sean D. Muntz, David G. Greco, and Phillip J. Szachowicz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bunt & Shaver and David N. Shaver for Defendant and Respondent.

The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly interpreted the Rose Alida Bourgois revocable trust dated August 30, 1995, as amended on January 14, 1998 (the Trust). The court determined the sole beneficiary of the Trust, Marie Bourgois Smith (Marie), inherited all of the Trust’s assets when her mother Rose Bourgois (Rose or the Trustor) died, and that despite Marie’s failure before her own death to transfer the assets out of the Trust, they are part of her estate. We agree with the court’s interpretation of the Trust.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Christie Canales Norris, Judge.
Steven L. Bynum for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Jennifer E. Feige, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
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Curtis F. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)(1)), terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing on September 20, 2022, as to his now three-year-old son, S.V., and 23-month-old daughter, M.V. Curtis contends the juvenile court erred in not returning the children to his custody. We deny the petition.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Stephen J. Gallon, Judge. Affirmed.
Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Cesar Razo appeals from a conviction following a jury trial. For the reasons forth post, we affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 8, 2021, an information charged defendant with two counts of premeditated attempted murder under Penal Code sections 664 and 187 (counts 1 and 2), with allegations that he had personally inflicted great bodily injury under section 12022.7 and used a deadly weapon under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The information also alleged that defendant had previously sustained a prior serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and a prior strike conviction under sections 667, subdivision (c)(e)(1), and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1).