CA Unpub Decisions

“Defendant and Arthur Robertson, the victim, had quarreled over a narcotics transaction. Defendant lay in wait for the victim and as the victim drove by, fired at him twice with a shotgun, severely wounding him.” (People v. Griffin (Apr. 26, 1994, C016151) [nonpub. opn.].) In 1993, defendant was found guilty of attempted murder in the first degree (§§ 664, 187), shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021). The attempted murder charge included several enhancements: personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5), infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7), felony committed while on bail (§ 12022.1), prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (a)). Defendant appealed his conviction, which we affirmed. (People v. Griffin, supra, C016151.)
In September 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95.

Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, a court may restrain a person to prevent a recurrence of domestic violence upon reasonable proof of past acts of abuse. (§ 6300.) Section 6345 addresses the duration and renewal of a domestic violence restraining order. When initially issued, the order “may have a duration of not more than five years” and is subject to termination or modification by order of the court based on the parties’ stipulation or a motion of a party. (§ 6345, subd. (a).) The domestic violence restraining order “may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party.” (§ Id., subd. (a).)

Prior to the current dependency proceedings, DCFS received two referrals involving mother and father. In May 2016, someone reported that father verbally abused mother and staff in a doctor’s office. Mother acknowledged that “the father constantly yells and screams in the presence of” P.E. but denied any physical abuse. In June 2016, a neighbor reported that mother had a swollen eye and mother’s lip was bleeding. Mother explained that “she was walking backwards and fell forward and injured herself.”
In June 2017, at the commencement of the current dependency proceedings, P.E. was 21 months old. K.E. was born in May 2018, during the dependency proceedings.
The current dependency proceedings commenced when maternal grandmother reported that mother and father have a history of domestic violence and mother returned home with either one or two black eyes. Maternal grandmother also reported that she had a restraining order against father.

Alnasser formed Sumaya369 in 2016. She hired Serdy as an independent contractor to register and maintain Sumaya369’s website. Alnasser and Serdy worked closely over the next three years, eventually growing Sumaya369 into a business with more than $7 million in annual revenue.
Alnasser and Serdy’s relationship began to deteriorate in late 2019. The two disagreed about Sumaya369 funds and the compensation due to Serdy. There were also disagreements about the Sumaya369 website and whether Serdy changed passwords associated with it. Their disagreements came to a head in March 2020 when Alnasser fired Serdy.
After her firing, Serdy sued Appellants in state court to enforce the contract. Alnasser then sued Serdy in federal court, asserting claims for computer fraud, trade secrets violations, racketeering, copyright violations, and conversion. In the weeks that followed she filed copyright and trademark applications.

Burlesque Enterprise, Inc. (Burlesque) appeals from the trial court’s judgment following an order denying Burlesque’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.
Burlesque argues the trial court erred in denying its petition. It contends the decision of the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles (the Board) and the City of Los Angeles (collectively, the City) to revoke and confiscate, without any hearing, the Police Commission Permit (permit) necessary for Burlesque’s adult entertainment business violated its due process rights. Burlesque also argues that the City is estopped from revoking its permit because the City had granted and renewed its permit since 2008. Finally, Burlesque argues that if section 1094.5 was not the correct vehicle to seek judicial review of the City’s actions, we should construe its petition as one for a traditional writ of mandate under section 1085.

In December 2019, DCFS received a referral alleging general neglect and physical abuse of minor by mother. During an interview with a DCFS social worker, mother provided the partial name of minor’s father (father), stating that he had two last names but that she only remembered one. She provided father’s age but not his birthdate. Mother did not provide any contact information for father. The social worker “completed a CWS/CMS search”; there were “no hits” for father’s name.
Detention and Dependency Petition
Minor was detained from mother in January 2020 and placed with a nonrelated extended family member. Shortly thereafter, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition seeking the juvenile court’s exercise of dependency jurisdiction.
Detention Hearing
On January 22, 2020, mother filed a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020) form indicating that she may have Indian ancestry through her father (maternal grandfather).

Mother J.R. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders over her children S.M. and P.R. Father J.M. appeals only from the orders regarding S.M. We affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and consistent with constitutional principles (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14 [“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263 [three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in reply to counsel’s arguments.

Eiman Shekarchi and April Heidarian (respondents) signed a retainer agreement with the law firm of Fischbach & Fischbach. Respondents subsequently filed suit against Fischbach & Fischbach and partner Joseph S. Fischbach (appellants) alleging legal malpractice. Appellants moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the parties’ retainer agreement. The trial court credited respondent’s version of the facts and denied the motion, finding that respondents met their burden of establishing that the agreement was unconscionable. Appellants appeal, contending that the parties’ valid arbitration agreement was not revocable due to procedural or substantive unconscionability. We find substantial evidence of unconscionability and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2017, respondents met with attorney Joseph S. Fischbach at his law firm, Fischbach & Fischbach.

West Coast Wound and Skin Care Inc. (WCW) hired Ani Mirzoyan as an administrative employee in November 2019. Before the commencement of Mirzoyan’s tenure at WCW, she and a representative of WCW executed an arbitration agreement covering claims or controversies arising out of her employment. Mirzoyan alleges WCW wrongfully terminated her in April 2020.
Mirzoyan filed suit against WCW, Lydia Alsa, and Anthony Saidiani, alleging a wrongful termination claim and various causes of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) and Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1102.6. WCW and Alsa (collectively, appellants) moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion upon finding the arbitration agreement unconscionable.

West Coast Wound and Skin Care Inc. (WCW) hired Ani Mirzoyan as an administrative employee in November 2019. Before the commencement of Mirzoyan’s tenure at WCW, she and a representative of WCW executed an arbitration agreement covering claims or controversies arising out of her employment. Mirzoyan alleges WCW wrongfully terminated her in April 2020.
Mirzoyan filed suit against WCW, Lydia Alsa, and Anthony Saidiani, alleging a wrongful termination claim and various causes of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) and Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1102.6. WCW and Alsa (collectively, appellants) moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion upon finding the arbitration agreement unconscionable.

Yoo and respondent Michael M. Namba (Namba) were married in 2006.
In August 2013, Namba became a cotrustee—along with his parents, Katsutoshi Namba and Chizuko Namba—of the Katsu Namba Family Trust (trust). As a cotrustee, Namba was entitled to trustee compensation. Namba chose not to be paid for his services as cotrustee.
Namba filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in December 2015. Yoo and Namba separated on May 1, 2016.
The family court entered a judgment of dissolution on March 5, 2019. The judgment incorporated a spousal support order stating: “[Namba] helps manage his parents [sic] trust and is entitled to be paid, but chooses not to be paid for his services.” The court considered this factor in determining spousal support.
On October 9, 2019, Yoo filed a request for order seeking the postjudgment

Birenbaum is a California resident, who has lived in Los Angeles continuously since 2006. He has “expertise in developing cross-infrastructure analytics and technology for big data application; . . . an understanding of blockchain technology; and . . . extensive experience working with power utilities and energy suppliers.”
At all relevant times, Burrell has been a resident of either Colorado or New Mexico. Burrell is the sole member and manager of BDI, a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Aspen, Colorado, and, previously, in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Neither Burrell nor BDI regularly conducts business in California.
B. Burrell meets Birenbaum in New Mexico
In 2017, Burrell and Kevin Washington (Washington) began exploring plans to build and operate a bitcoin mining facility (the project). They began buying bitcoin mining equipment from Joby Weeks (Weeks).

On October 10, 1980, seven juvenile members of the Avenues gang, including Maldonado, decided to rob a pizza delivery man to get money to go to a county fair. The plan initially was devised by Rudy Zamorano, Martha McRae, and Lisa Gandara. They then gathered with Maldonado, Manual Marin, Ralph Garcia, and “Pete” at Maldonado’s house where they worked out the details. All seven participants “were for it.” The plan was to drive to a secluded street, order pizzas for delivery to an address on that street, and then wait for the delivery man to arrive to rob him. While the group agreed “nobody was supposed to get hurt,” they also decided to use a gun in the robbery. Zamorano told the group that, if the delivery man pulled out a gun or tried to defend himself, “they were going to shoot him.”
The group drove in Marin’s car to a fellow gang member’s house where Zamorano retrieved a rifle and ammunition.

Gail and Stanley Hollander (collectively, the Hollanders), a married couple, acquired an art collection over a period of time. (See Hollander v. XL Capital Ltd. (May 1, 2018, B276621) [nonpub. opn.] (Hollander VII) [indicating Gail and Stanley were married].) In exchange for a premium of $24,966, XL Specialty Insurance Company (XL Specialty) issued the Hollanders an insurance policy, effective from March 2, 2005 to March 2, 2006, that covered their fine art. In the event the fine art were destroyed, the Hollanders would be entitled to collect the “scheduled value” of the property—i.e., the amount assigned to the artwork in a schedule to the policy.
Paragraph 8 of the policy provides a different method of valuation in the case of a “partial loss” to the fine art. That portion of the policy provides in full:
“PARTIAL LOSS AGREEMENT[ ](As Respects Fine Arts Only)