CA Unpub Decisions

Ruben Edgard-Bustillo Fonseca (defendant) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of first degree robbery of a transit passenger (Pen. Code, § 211), making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a)), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of four years in state prison, consisting of the middle term of four years for robbery, the middle term of two years for making a criminal threat—which the court stayed under section 654—and a concurrent, upper term of four years for the assault. Defendant contends the court should have stayed his sentence on the assault count under section 654. We reject the contention and affirm the judgment.

Chef Robert Fransen was charged with two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm based on evidence he shot at Todd Marshall, narrowly missing both Todd and his wife, Janelle. The magistrate held Fransen to answer on both counts despite finding no evidence Fransen knew Janelle was present at the time of the shooting. The trial court dismissed the assault charge as to Janelle, ruling evidence was insufficient that Fransen knew he was shooting in the direction of a residence. We affirm.

Erlin David Rodriguez (defendant) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)) and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in state prison. He contends the judgment must be reversed because: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by improperly vouching for the prosecution’s witnesses. We reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Florentino A. Garcia appeals from a judgment, following a jury trial and conviction of one count of felony stalking (Pen. Code, § (646.9, subd. (a)) and three misdemeanor counts of disobeying a domestic relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years in state prison for his stalking conviction and imposed three one-year concurrent terms for his misdemeanor convictions. The trial court also issued a 10-year protective order. Defendant was ordered to pay various fines and assessments. Defendant’s appellate counsel raises no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to the defendant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, but has not done so. Upon i

Defendant Melissa Atwood appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury found her guilty of elder abuse, identity theft, commercial burglary and grand theft. The charges arose from defendant obtaining a credit union loan by representing herself to be her mother, Suzi Atwood. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements of Suzi Atwood, who did not testify, and by not giving requested instructions limiting the statements to a nonhearsay purpose. Defendant argues that the admission of the hearsay evidence also violated her rights under the confrontation clause.
Because the challenged statements were not testimonial, we do not find a violation of defendant’s confrontation clause rights. Suzi Atwood’s out-of-court statements were admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of imparting information to the credit union and explaining its subsequent action. While we agree with defendant that the trial court erred in admitting these statements for

This is an appeal from judgment following defendant Remon Arthur Shields’s 1999 conviction at age 17 for special circumstance first degree murder committed by use of a firearm. Defendant seeks remand for resentencing on the basis of alleged miscalculations of his custody and conduct credits. Defendant also seeks remand in light of the electorate’s recent enactment of Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, and subsequent statutory amendments, in order for the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the consecutive term he received for the firearm enhancement. For reasons provided below, we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court to: (1) exercise its discretion and decide whether to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement in accordance with newly amended Penal Code sections 12022.5, subdivision (c) and 12022.53, subdivision (h); and (2) modify the abstract of judgment to award him two additional days of presentence conduct credits.

Defendant Christine Hubbs appeals a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Minor Doe 1 on his complaint for damages arising out of defendant’s sexual relationship with him when he was 14 years old and she was over 40, for which defendant had already been convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced to prison. Between the filing of the complaint in March 2012 and the discharge of defendant’s original attorney in May 2013 because of defendant’s inability to pay her attorney fees, the attorney conducted only minimal discovery and failed to designate an expert witness. When defendant obtained new counsel, the court found good cause to continue the trial but refused to extend the discovery deadline to permit the new attorney to depose plaintiff or to designate a defense expert. As a result, defendant went to trial without an expert to counter the testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness, a psychiatrist, in a case in which the only contested issue was plaintiff’s emotional distress

T. R., biological father (father) of the minor G. M., appeals the juvenile court’s order denying his petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to change the court’s jurisdictional/dispositional order finding him a mere biological father, denying him presumed father status, and denying him reunification services. (§ 395.) Finding no merit in father’s claims, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Z. W. (minor) has been in the custody of D. W. and P. W., who seek to adopt him (collectively adoptive parents), since he was released from the hospital following his birth. According to minor’s biological father, A. B. (father), he and minor’s biological mother, A. L. (mother), selected adoptive parents prior to minor’s birth and agreed to the adoption, and father relinquished his parental rights; mother claims she did not participate in the selection of adoptive parents, did not agree to the adoption, and did not relinquish her parental rights.

After driving suspiciously in a residential area where there had been numerous home invasions, defendant Javier Antonio Valenzuela sped away from sheriff’s deputies in an unmarked van, crashed his car and then backed up into their van when they tried to approach him, cracking the bumper and moving the van a few feet backwards. He continued leading a high-speed chase until his car hit a pole guide wire and he was arrested. Among other offenses, he was convicted of three counts of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury as a lesser included offense to assault with a deadly weapon or by force likely to produce great bodily injury on a peace officer and sentenced to three years eight months in prison.

In this cold case homicide, the jury found defendant Diana Marie Creech guilty of first degree murder but found a personal firearm-use enhancement not true. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 25 years to life, and she timely filed this appeal.

Defendant William Nicholas Garcia appeals following conviction on two counts of sodomy of a child age 10 years or younger and two counts of oral copulation with a child age 10 years or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subds. (a) and (b); undesignated statutory section references are to this Code). Defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on attempted sodomy as a lesser included offense of sodomy, and (2) the aggregate sentence of 80 years to life in prison for offenses he committed between the ages of 18 and 20 is a de facto sentence of life without possibility of parole (LWOP) in violation of federal and state constitutional proscriptions against cruel and/or unusual punishment.

A jury found defendant Andre Arthel O’Roy, Sr., guilty on two counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon S., his three-year-old step great-granddaughter. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate of 25 years in prison.
endered ineffective assistance by not objecting to certain testimony by the People’s expe

J.D. (Father) appeals an order of the juvenile court denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to change jurisdictional and dispositional orders involving his children, J.D. and J.A., persons coming under the juvenile court law. (§ 300, subds. (a), (b)(1) & (g).) We conclude, among other things, that the court did not abuse its discretion by ruling Father did not meet his burden to show a change furthering the children’s best interests. We affirm.