CA Unpub Decisions

Christina Schwindt lives in a Newport Beach community governed by a Homeowners Association (HOA) and its Board of Directors (the Board). Schwindt’s next door neighbors, Ruhksana and Akbar Omar, built a room addition that extends into their patio area. The Board had approved the room addition over Schwindt’s objection.
Schwindt then sued the Omars. Schwindt claimed that under the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), room additions cannot be built in patio areas, and that the Omar’s room addition unreasonably interferes with her view. Following a bench trial, the court ordered the Omars to demolish their room addition and return their home to its original state.
The Omars appeal. They argue that the Board’s approval of their addition should have been binding on the parties, unless the trial court found the Board’s approval to be clearly arbitrary and capricious. We agree. That is the correct standard; it is plainly stated in the CC&Rs. But

Plaintiff Danny R. appeals from a domestic violence restraining order that (1) requires him to stay away from his ex-girlfriend, defendant Priscilla R., for a period of five years and (2) dictates the terms under which Danny may visit their minor child. Finding no error, we affirm the order.

Petitioner seeks permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The Attorney General was given an opportunity to file opposition to the request and the order stated that its failure to do so would be treated as agreement to the requested relief being granted without further proceedings.
The response filed by the Attorney General conceded that petitioner is entitled to appropriate relief and is, in accordance with our order filed on July 31, 2018, deemed to constitute an agreement that the requested relief be granted without further proceedings. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740, fn. 7.)
Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to a belated appeal.

Appellant/defendant Raymond Tenorio was charged with first degree murder for beating Kirk Haag to death. Haag was a roommate in a residence with defendant and his family. The beating occurred after defendant confronted Haag about accusations that Haag had touched defendant’s young daughter, and Haag allegedly said that he had done so.
Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. He was sentenced to the second strike term of 17 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the court should have granted his motion to have the jury instructed on an excusable homicide committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion and upon sufficient provocation, as provided in the second paragraph of Penal Code section 195. Defendant argues the court’s refusal to so instruct the jury was prejudicial because he testified that he did not intend to beat the victim, and the jury’s verdict for voluntary manslaughter sho

A jury convicted Erik Dean Boettcher of nine counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act with a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subdivision (a)) (counts 1-9) and one count of furnishing a controlled substance (methamphetamine) to a minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11353) (count 10). The jury found that in the commission of count 1, Boettcher personally inflicted bodily harm on the victim within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivision (d)(7), and that in the commission of count 9, Boettcher engaged in the tying and binding of a person within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivision (e)(5). The jury also found that Boettcher's commission of count 10 involved a minor who was at least four years younger than Boettcher within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11353.1, subdivision (a)(3).

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Eric A. Swenson, Kristine A. Gutierrez and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General; Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
A jury convicted codefendants Reginald Makalea Gravely, Jamicia Nate Gravely and Anthony Bernard Brown of torture (Pen. Code, § 206; count 1), kidnapping (§ 207; count 3), and robbery (§ 211; count 4). It found true an allegation that the robbery was in the first degree. It also convicted Reginald and Brown of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2) and found true an allegation that their conduct was willful, deliberate and premeditated.

Andraga Jones stole $5,800 from her cash register while working as a cashier. She pled guilty to grand theft by an employee in an amount more than $950, and was placed on three years' probation with terms and conditions. On appeal, Jones challenges two probation conditions: (1) an electronic-device search Fourth Amendment waiver condition; and (2) drug/alcohol-related conditions. The Attorney General concedes these conditions were improperly imposed. We accept this concession and order the court to strike the challenged conditions. We affirm in all other respects.

Ruslan Grub appeals a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate challenging the revocation of his driver's license by the Department for refusing to provide a chemical test pursuant to Vehicle Code section 13353. Grub contends he invoked a condition imposed by law when he refused to submit to a blood test without assurances his blood would be drawn by a licensed, qualified technician in a medically approved manner. He also contends he had a right under the Fourth Amendment to refuse to submit to a coerced blood test without a warrant. We conclude the court did not err in denying the writ petition because there was substantial evidence supporting the license revocation based upon Grub's refusal to take either a breath or blood test. We affirm the judgment.

Eighty-seven year old Amir lived with his wife Fatemah and Rostami, their son. On November 11, 2016, Oceanside Police Officer Richard Irwin responded to a 911 call regarding a battery and met with Amir and Fatemah. Amir told Officer Irwin that he had gotten into an argument with Rostami and that Rostami had grabbed him and thrown him to the floor. When Amir told Rostami that he was going to call 911, Rostami took the cordless telephone and left. Amir went to the home of his neighbor, Dolores, to call the police. Fatemah told Officer Irwin that Amir and Rostami had argued, Rostami then grabbed Amir, threw him down, and took the telephone. Officer Irwin's report, however, stated only that Amir had been pushed to the floor. Although Amir appeared flustered, Officer Irwin saw no visible injuries on him.

Defendant Jovan Jackson was convicted of possession of marijuana for sale and attempted export of marijuana for sale, along with failure to appear while on bail. The trial court permitted the People to ask Jackson about his two prior offenses of possessing marijuana for sale to prove his intent, knowledge, motive and lack of mistake in the current case, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Jackson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting this evidence, claiming that his prior acts were more prejudicial than probative. He also contends the trial court erred in finding his prior possessions of marijuana for sale were crimes of moral turpitude and thus admissible to impeach his credibility. He bases the argument on the ground that his prior acts no longer reflect moral turpitude, due to the citizens' changed perception of sale of marijuana, as reflected in Proposition 64, the Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act, which leg

Christine and Steven Haslet, and their business, Lucky Pup Dog Rescue (collectively the Haslets), sued Catherine Sacks and her business, Shelter Dogs to Dream Dogs (collectively Sacks). The Haslets alleged they delivered a dog ("Sandy") to Sacks for training and socialization, and about two weeks later, without the Haslets' knowledge or approval, Sacks took Sandy to a county animal shelter to be euthanized. The Haslets alleged tort, contract, and statutory causes of action.
Sacks cross-complained, asserting claims for defamation, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (UCL), and promissory estoppel.

S.S. appeals the family court's dismissal without prejudice of his petition to have R.D. designated his presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), arguing the family court had jurisdiction over the petition and should have granted it based on the evidence presented. We reverse.

Jimmy Lakdawala (Jimmy) appeals from a January 2017 judgment concerning certain reserved issues in a marital dissolution proceeding involving him and Janice Lakdawala (Janice). Jimmy's claims on appeal all pertain to VDP Direct, LLC (VDP), a company owned by the parties as community property.

This appeal involves a dispute between a commercial landlord, 12400 Stowe Drive, LP (Stowe), and its tenant, Cycle Express, LLC (Cycle). The parties' lease granted Cycle an option to renew the lease when it expired, with rent set at a discounted percentage of the property's fair market rental value. Cycle renewed the lease, but the parties disagreed about the property's fair market rental value and Cycle's rent obligations. Thus, Stowe brought this action against Cycle, requesting catch-up rent, accounting, and ejectment. Cycle filed cross-claims against Stowe, alleging that the roof of the property leaked water each time that it rained and, as a result, Stowe breached its obligations under the lease.