CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant Erik Santiago asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

A jury found defendant Quin Lanson Martin guilty of possessing child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation that defendant possessed more than 600 images of child pornography, including 10 or more images of children under the age of 12 (§ 311.11, subd. (c)(1)). The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to 16 months in state prison.

A jury found defendant Jorge Colon guilty of various offenses after he broke into his neighbor’s apartment, ransacked it, and started a fire inside.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court infringed his constitutional right to a trial by an independent jury and to a verdict not coerced by judicial action when the court ordered further deliberations after learning the jury was split 11 to one, instructed jurors to openly exchange ideas about their respective positions, and later dismissed the holdout juror for medical reasons. Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term on the arson charge because it did not consider defendant’s mental illness as a mitigating factor. Defendant further contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in several respects, including that he failed to file a Romero (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) motion to strike his strike prior, failed to correct a

A jury found defendant Jerome Markel Davis guilty of various offenses related to three separate shootings, including the attempted murder of Q.B., and found several alleged firearm enhancements true. He was sentenced to a total aggregate term of 17 years three months plus 25 years to life in state prison.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) the matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise newly granted discretion over whether to strike the firearm enhancements, and (2) the court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on attempted voluntary manslaughter based on unreasonable or imperfect self-defense as a lesser included offense to attempted murder.
We conclude that the recent legislative amendments giving trial courts discretion to strike firearm enhancements apply retroactively to defendant and we shall remand the matter to the trial court to determine whether to exercise its discretion under the new law. We further conclude that insufficient

This pending action by insureds Silva Trucking, Inc. (Silva) and its employee Elaine McDonold, alleges insurance bad faith and legal malpractice in prelitigation handling of underlying personal injury claims against the insureds. The insureds demand discovery of attorney-client communications between their excess insurer (Lexington Insurance Company or LIC) and its attorney (Ralph Zappala and law firm Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP, collectively LBBS) during prelitigation settlement discussions about the personal injuries.
The trial court denied discovery and granted a protective order, concluding LIC and LBBS met their burden to establish a prima facie case that the documents were privileged attorney-client communications between excess insurer LIC and its attorney LBBS (Evid. Code, § 954), and that LBBS did not also represent the insureds -- who were represented by an attorney hired by the primary insurer. The court further concluded that the insureds did not meet their

After Juan Carlos Munoz-Moreno pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, the trial court granted him deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). Munoz-Moreno later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming his plea should be vacated because his counsel was ineffective in misinforming him of the immigration consequences of the plea. The trial court issued an order granting habeas relief and vacating the plea.
The People appeal (Pen. Code, § 1506), arguing (1) defense counsel’s performance was not deficient, and (2) the trial court applied the wrong standard of prejudice and Munoz-Moreno did not suffer prejudice. We will affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant Alan Duane Doulphus pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery, each with an enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c) for discharging a firearm, and one count of voluntary manslaughter. Sentenced to an aggregate term of 42 years four months in state prison, he appeals. His sole contention on appeal is that reversal is required to allow the trial court to consider striking the firearm enhancement pursuant to the newly enacted Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). We will remand to allow the trial court to exercise its newfound discretion under Senate Bill No. 620. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Jimmy Wayne Brown of negligent discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 246.3), criminal threats (§ 422), being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and animal abuse (§ 597, subd. (a)) with two strikes (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)) and a personal use of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) on the animal abuse count. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus four years for the firearm enhancement.
Defendant now contends (1) his prior Colorado murder conviction cannot support a strike allegation because it does not constitute a serious or violent felony under California law; (2) the matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion regarding whether to strike the firearm enhancements; and (3) a firearm enhancement cannot be applied to his three strikes sentence.

Defendant Cornelius L. Jones appeals from his conviction of attempted premeditated murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault likely to produce great bodily injury. He contends (1) the trial court erred by ruling the prosecution did not unconstitutionally excuse the sole potential African-American juror on the basis of race; (2) insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding he attempted to kill willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation; (3) the court imposed an unauthorized sentence; and (4) the court committed other sentencing and clerical errors. Except to remand to correct the sentencing and clerical errors, we affirm the judgment.

After the most recent 18-month review for six-year-old K.J., the juvenile court found he could not safely be returned to mother T.R.’s care. By this time, K.J. had been a dependent child for five years, and T.R. had received more than three years of family reunification services. The juvenile court terminated services and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother petitions for extraordinary relief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Concluding substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order, we deny the petition.

Penal Code section 1054.9 enables a habeas corpus petitioner sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole to obtain discovery of materials to which he or she “would have been entitled at time of trial.” (Pen. Code, § 1054.9, subd. (b).) This includes “materials that the prosecution would have been obligated to provide had there been a specific defense request at trial, but was not actually obligated to provide because no such request was made.” (In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 696 (Steele).)
Habeas petitioner and real party in interest Dewayne Michael Carey was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in 1996; his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in 2007. A habeas corpus petition is pending in the California Supreme Court, and he filed a motion in the trial court pursuant to section 1054.9 to obtain discovery of the prosecutor’s notes taken during jury selection. He seeks the notes to support his claim that his tria

Defendant and appellant Melvin Williams appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for relief pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18.
In 1988, defendant was convicted of a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) and sentenced to 36 months probation. It appears from the record presented that in May 2004, after successful completion of probation, defendant obtained an order, pursuant to section 1203.4, amending the charge to a misdemeanor and granting a dismissal.
Thereafter, defendant was convicted in case No. TA124662 of attempted murder, among other charges, and is currently serving a sentence of 56 years to life at Folsom State Prison.
On October 31, 2017, defendant filed a petition in the superior court seeking an order redesignating his prior assault conviction from 1988 as a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18.
On December 7, 2017, the superior court denied defendant’s petition, reasoning that defendant’s prior assault

Gregg Ziskind (Ziskind), a legal recruiter, ran Gregg Ziskind & Associates, Inc. (GZA), a legal placement firm. Ziskind had a long-term placement relationship with law firm Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP (Manatt) and a long-term personal and placement relationship with Manatt partner Barbara Polsky. In 2013, at Polsky’s request, Ziskind approached Donna Wilson, a partner at the Buckley Sandler law firm, to determine whether she would like to move her practice to Manatt. Ultimately, Manatt hired Wilson and her “right-hand man,” Buckley Sandler counsel John McGuinness, and compensated Bobbie McMorrow, a legal recruiter not associated with GZA, and not GZA for placing the attorneys.

Defendant was acquitted in a court trial of two counts of robbery and convicted of the lesser included offense of petty theft. He was sentenced to 189 days in jail, with credit for time served, and ordered to pay statutory fees and fines. On appeal, defendant, who represented himself at trial, contends the trial court failed to provide adequate advisements before accepting his waiver of the right to a jury trial. He asserts the error is structural and reversible per se. Employing the “totality of the circumstances” test, we find no error and affirm.