CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal from judgment after the trial court sustained the demurrer filed by real party in interest Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) and granted the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (Appeals Board), without leave to amend, on untimeliness grounds. Plaintiff Raam Construction, Inc. (Raam) challenges these rulings and the resulting judgment of dismissal as a misinterpretation of the applicable statute, Labor Code section 6627. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Justin Howard of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §187, subd. (a)). An enhancement for having committed the murder by personally and intentionally discharging a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) was also found to be true. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in admitting information derived from his medical records, and in allowing the admission of late-discovered evidence retrieved from his cellular phone. He also raises certain postconviction sentencing and parole hearing issues. We remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion to dismiss gun use enhancement under recently enacted Senate Bill No. 620, as well as to permit defendant to introduce evidence relevant to his future youth parole suitability hearing. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from the imposition of an electronic search condition (ESC) on appellant, A.R., as a term of her juvenile probation. The grounds for the appeal are two-pronged. First, A.R. argues the ESC is unconstitutionally overbroad. Second, citing Riley v. California (2014) __ U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473] (Riley), she argues the ESC violates her Fourth Amendment right to be secure against warrantless searches and seizures. Because A.R. failed to object to the ESC when imposed, she forfeited any claim of unconstitutional overbreadth. We reject her Riley claim on the merits. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellants are three Sales Representatives (SRs) and a Technical and Training Service Representative (TTR) (Plaintiffs) under contract with Hunter Engineering Company (Hunter). Plaintiffs sued Hunter on behalf of themselves and a putative class alleging various Labor Code violations and moved for class certification. The trial court considered the evidence and arguments, applied the appropriate legal standard and denied the motion. Plaintiffs dismissed without prejudice their claims under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698 et. seq.) and appealed. We affirm.

Appellant Dr. Dalia Rashdan (Mohamed), a dentist licensed in Egypt, enrolled in the University of the Pacific’s (University) two-year, International Dental Studies Program to obtain a degree which would allow her to become a licensed dentist in the United States, subject to passing board exams. Appellant completed her courses, but, before her anticipated graduation, the University determined that she had not satisfied the practice requirements. University allowed her to continue for one year to demonstrate her competence in two clinical areas. Her appeal of that decision to the review committee was denied. Instead of completing the remediation, Appellant withdrew from the program and filed this suit. After adverse rulings on her complaint and first amended complaint, she filed her second amended complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and negligence. The trial court sustained the demurrer to all three claims on the ground tha

The trial court denied appellant Arthur Abraham’s application for restoration of sanity and conditional release to a local outpatient program pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.2. Appellant contends: (1) he is being held in violation of due process because the state should have carried the burden of showing he remained insane; (2) the California procedure for determining whether a person found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) has been restored to sanity is unconstitutional because it allows a defendant to continue being held even when he ceases to be insane; and (3) his “traits” do not qualify as a “mental defect, disease or disorder.” We affirm.

Christopher Canon appeals from a judgment upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187). The jury also found true an allegation that defendant personally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In a separate court trial, the court found defendant guilty of assault on a peace officer with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (c)) and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)). In his original brief, defendant contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on manslaughter and that the trial court’s imposition of a 49-years-to-life term constitutes a de facto term of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

This appeal is from an October 25, 2016 statement of decision after a two-day court trial in a dissolution of marriage. The primary issue at trial was whether the source of the down payment for the May 2002 purchase of the parties’ home on Webster Avenue in Monterey (Webster home) was community or separate property. James Story (James) asserted it was community property, while Rone Story (Rone) contended the down payment derived from her separate property. The court held that Rone had failed to establish that the funds used for the down payment were her separate property and she was therefore not entitled to reimbursement for that down payment under Family Code section 2640, subdivision (b).

Defendant Morris Kurtz entered a no contest plea to possession for sale of a controlled substance, possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, and possession of a nunchaku. He also admitted two prison prior enhancements. The court sentenced him to serve a two-year prison term, consecutive to a nine-year sentence he was serving in a case filed in Alameda County.
Defendant on appeal challenges the court’s imposition of penalty assessments on two levies made by the court. The two levies were a criminal laboratory analysis fee (see Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5; hereafter crime-lab fee), and a drug program fee (see § 11372.7). He argues that the crime-lab fee and drug program fee constituted administrative fees upon which the imposition of penalty assessments was improper.

Roberto Patino Aguas, Jr. (Aguas) appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of receiving a stolen vehicle with a prior felony conviction and receiving stolen property. He contends that, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court erred by imposing a narcotics offender registration requirement.
We affirm. At the sentencing hearing, after the trial court imposed sentence in the instant case, the court sentenced Aguas in two drug misdemeanor cases and, in doing so, imposed the narcotics offender registration requirement of which Aguas complains. The court did not impose that requirement in the instant case. We decline Aguas’s invitation in his appellate reply brief to review whether the narcotics offender registration requirement was properly imposed in a case that is not before us. We also decline to address the separate contentions of error the Attorney General has raised for the first time in the appellate respondent’s brief and without filing a notice

James Mason appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Tu Quang Buddhist Center, Inc. (the Center) on Mason’s claims for public and private nuisance seeking injunctive relief. Mason argues the court erred when it misapplied both public and private nuisance law. None of his contentions have merit, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Nicholas Papageorges, III, appeals from the trial court’s marital dissolution judgment awarding him $1,500 in monthly spousal support, rather than the $3,700 he requested, and denying his request that his ex-wife, Susan Papageorges, pay $35,000 of the $58,000 he incurred in attorney fees. As we explain, Nicholas fails to meet his appellate burden to demonstrate the court abused its discretion, and we therefore affirm the judgment.

Howard Dorne, M.D., appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court denied his motion to vacate an arbitration award against him and granted a motion to confirm in favor of his employer, a medical group called Vascular and Interventional Specialists of Orange County (VISOC). Dorne sued VISOC for breach of his employment contract and Labor Code violations after he left the group on grounds of disability. The matter went to arbitration, and the arbitrator found in favor of VISOC on all Dorne’s claims.
Dorne moved in the trial court to vacate the award, and the court denied the motion. It entered judgment for VISOC pursuant to the arbitrator’s award, and Dorne appeals from the judgment entered after this order. He also appeals the subsequent award to VISOC for attorney fees incurred to oppose his motion to vacate the award. The two appeals have been consolidated.
We affirm the trial court’s award of post-arbitration fees to VISOC. The employment contract between Dor

Petitioner David P. (father) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a dispositional hearing on a supplemental petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 387) denying him reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to his now 11-year-old son, Daniel P. Father believes he should be provided reunification services and Daniel should be placed with Cecilia E., father’s spouse. We conclude Daniel’s petition fails to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, which governs the content requirements for an extraordinary writ petition. Consequently, we dismiss the petition.