CA Unpub Decisions

A.S. (mother) filed this petition for extraordinary relief after the juvenile court terminated reunification services. She argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in placing her youngest child, A.H., with the child’s alleged father’s grandparents, i.e., the alleged paternal great-grandparents. Mother believes the child should have been placed with her maternal grandparents who, unlike the relatives of an alleged father, are “relatives” under the statutory scheme.

K.W. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction over her six-year-old son and awarding physical and legal custody of the child to his father, J.W. (Father)—with monitored visitation for Mother. The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over the minor, K.W., based on the court’s finding that Mother emotionally abused K.W. by making repeated, unsubstantiated allegations that Father sexually abused the child. Mother does not contest the aspect of the juvenile court’s order terminating dependency jurisdiction, but she charges the court should have awarded joint custody, or failing that, unmonitored visitation, given her bond with K.W. and her behavior during post-jurisdiction visits with him. We consider whether the juvenile court’s custody and visitation determinations were an abuse of the court’s discretion.

On May 21, 2015, defendant and appellant Michael Glavish pleaded no contest to transporting methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a) [count 1]), possessing heroin for sale (§ 11351 [count 2]), possessing methamphetamine for sale (§ 11378 [count 3]), transporting heroin for sale (§ 11352, subd. (a) [count 4]), misdemeanor driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (e) [count 5]), and two counts of misdemeanor obstructing a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1) [counts 6 & 7]). With respect to count 5, Glavish admitted the allegation that he refused to submit to a chemical test. (Veh. Code, §23612.) He further admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of section 11370.2, subdivision (a), for violation of section 11379, and served three prior prison terms under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).

Altamed Health Services Corporation (defendant) willingly litigated the merits of Yesenia Jimenez’s (plaintiff) wrongful termination lawsuit in the trial court for almost two years without raising arbitration as a defense. But as trial approached, defendant changed attorneys and filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceeding. The trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant had waived the right to compel arbitration by waiting nearly two years before bringing the motion. Defendant timely appealed.
On appeal, defendant contends that it could not waive its right to compel arbitration because plaintiff had already waived her right to proceed in the trial court by signing the arbitration agreement. Defendant also contends that the trial court applied the wrong test for determining waiver and “conflated” mere delay with the requirement of prejudice.

Ivy Beverly pointed a loaded gun at her husband and twelve-year-old step-son and was convicted by jury of child endangerment, assault, and possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, she argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence she had care or custody of step-son in support of the child endangerment count, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct on self-defense. We affirm.

Kuei Shen appeals from a judgment the trial court eventually entered after sustaining a demurrer by Dr. Rita Ellithorpe without leave to amend. The trial court ruled Shen’s action against Ellithorpe was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations because, in the course of litigating similar claims in a previous lawsuit, Shen discovered or had reason to discover the factual basis for his claims against Ellithorpe more than three years before he filed this action. We affirm.

Gabriela Schmidt appeals from judgments entered after the trial court granted motions by Universal Pain Management, Inc. (UPM), a pain clinic, and Dr. Ray d’Amours, an anesthesiologist, for summary judgment on her cause of action for negligence. Because UPM and d’Amours met their initial burden on summary judgment, and Schmidt did not submit any evidence in opposition to the motions, we affirm.

Shahriar Lavian appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued in favor of his former wife, Nava Lavian. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to continue the hearing on the DVRO due to his counsel’s unavailability. We affirm.

Defendant Marcos Rodriguez was convicted of attempted unlawful taking of a motorcycle, possession of methamphetamine and possession of burglar tools. He claims the court erred by (a) admitting evidence of a prior unlawful taking of a motorcycle and reopening the case to allow evidence of his guilty plea to that offense, (b) instructing the jury on flight as evidence of guilt, and (c) allowing the parties to stipulate that the reading of the jury instructions need not be reported and thus denying him due process. Defendant also maintains, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court erred in imposing a Penal Code section 666.5 enhancement and a concurrent term on the possession of burglar tools. We remand the case for resentencing, with directions to strike the enhancement and stay the sentence on the possession of burglar tools. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant Steven Albert Navarro appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of carrying a concealed firearm, carrying a loaded firearm, and child abuse. His counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant has been apprised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so.

In 2005, appellant Ray Parker Gaylord (Gaylord) obtained a mortgage on real property located at 140 South Van Ness Avenue #801, San Francisco (Property), secured by a deed of trust. A 2011 assignment of the deed of trust was recorded from the original lender to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), as trustee for a securitized trust. Gaylord defaulted on the loan and Deutsche Bank foreclosed, ultimately acquiring title to the Property through a trustee’s sale. In 2013, Gaylord sued Deutsche Bank among others (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County No. CGC-13-532479; hereafter First Action). The First Action was dismissed after demurrer to his second amended complaint was sustained as to all causes of action without leave to amend. Gaylord then filed this 2016 action (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County No. CGC-16-549778; hereafter Second Action) against respondents Deutsche Bank and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen). Demurrer was ultimately sustained as to all causes of ac

Appellant Christian Uribe appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of transportation of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a) (Count 1)) and possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351 (Count Two)). The trial court found the allegations that appellant had suffered a prior narcotics conviction and related enhancements true (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a); Pen. Code, §§ 1203.07, subd. (a)(11), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court sentenced appellant to the mid-term of four years in state prison for the transportation conviction (Count One), and then imposed a concurrent mid-term of three years on the possession for sale conviction (Count Two), stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654; the trial court struck appellant’s prior strike conviction under Penal Code section 1385. Although not orally imposed at the sentencing hearing, the court minutes and abstract of judgment include various fines, fees,

R.Q., a minor, committed misdemeanor theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851 subd. (a)). The juvenile court ordered R.Q. to pay $2,166.51 in restitution to the victim. On appeal, R.Q. challenges the order, arguing that in determining the amount of restitution, the juvenile court should have apportioned fault in relation to the victim’s own negligence and reduced the restitution amount accordingly. We are not persuaded by R.Q.’s argument, and affirm the order.

Donna McCracken-Dobson appeals from the trial court’s order denying her motion to stay a final custody hearing pending the outcome of a contempt trial. Donna contends the court abused its discretion in denying her stay motion, arguing the court’s denial violated her of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. For the reasons set forth below, we find no basis to overturn the court’s order and therefore affirm.