CA Unpub Decisions

Michael E. Barri (Barri), Tristar Medical Group (Tristar), and Coalition for Sensible Workers’ Compensation Reform (CSWCR) petitioned this court pursuant to Labor Code section 5955 (all further statutory references are to the Labor Code, unless otherwise indicated). They seek a peremptory or alternative writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief directing the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) to perform its duties and adjudicate Tristar’s lien claims and not enforce certain unconstitutional provisions contained in newly enacted anti-fraud legislation. (§§ 4615 & 139.21.)

Appellant Isaac Jonathan Sanders stands convicted of multiple offenses, including two counts of carjacking, one count of assault with a semiautomatic weapon, and one count of evading a peace officer. He contends his convictions must be reversed because the prosecutor in rebuttal argument made misstatements of the evidence and defense counsel failed to object, thus rendering ineffective assistance of counsel. In supplemental briefing addressing Senate Bill No. 620, he contends his case must be remanded to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike firearm enhancements. We affirm.

The trial court granted Y.S.'s petition for renewal of a domestic violence restraining order against her son, A.S. A.S. appeals, contending his mother failed to serve the relevant documents on him personally. He further contends service by mail was not allowed. We affirm.

In a first amended complaint, Webb & Carey, APC (Webb & Carey) brought claims for conversion, money had and received, and breach of fiduciary duty against law firm Suppa Trucchi & Henein, and two of the firm's principals, Teresa Trucchi and Samy Henein (collectively Suppa). All three causes of action were premised on Webb & Carey's contention that Suppa acted wrongfully in accepting $284,672.10 from Suppa's clients, and Webb & Carey's former clients, James and Judy Keenan. Webb & Carey contended that it was wrongful for Suppa to accept the $284,672.10 because Suppa knew, at the time it accepted the payment, that the Keenans' property was subject to Webb & Carey's liens, including two judgment liens, premised upon judgments that Webb & Carey had obtained against the Keenans.

A commercial property owner sued the owners of adjacent commercial property seeking declaratory relief on the meaning of a parking use agreement and whether the agreement remained in effect. During the bench trial, the court found the agreement unambiguously had the meaning attributed to it by defendants (the agreement remained in effect), and the court refused to permit plaintiff to produce parol evidence to show the agreement was reasonably susceptible to a different meaning. Based on the court's rulings, plaintiff agreed it could not prove its case. The court thus entered judgment in defendants' favor on the complaint and dismissed defendants' cross-complaint as moot.

Appointed counsel for defendant Lionel Phillip Jacques asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding an error in the award of presentence credit, we will modify the award of credit and affirm the judgment as modified.

In these consolidated appeals, father of the minors challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, the disposition orders removing the minors from his custody, and a subsequent placement hearing order. Father contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction; (2) there was insufficient evidence of current risk to support removal at disposition; (3) the juvenile court erred in combining the disposition hearing with the statutory review hearing; (4) the juvenile court erred in failing to make a specific visitation order for father at disposition; and (5) the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance of the July 25, 2016 placement hearing.

I.C. (Mother) appeals from the jurisdictional findings made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). She argues section 300, subdivision (a), by its terms, requires that a finding of substantial risk of serious harm be based on prior injury to the children. She also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the findings under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) that the children came under those subdivisions because of domestic violence. Finally, she asserts the juvenile court should have ordered informal supervision instead of declaring the children to be dependents of the court. We affirm the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders.

Appellant Margaret M. is the maternal grandmother of minors B.M. and S.M. The juvenile court ordered the children into a permanent plan of legal guardianship with the paternal grandparents and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Over a year later, Appellant petitioned the court to modify the legal guardianship order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. The juvenile court summarily denied the petition on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction to rule on the request for modification. Appellant contends this was an error of law. We agree, and reverse.

A jury convicted defendant Oganes Metsoyan of having made a criminal threat. (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).) Defendant admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to nine years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant argues: the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of a prior incident between defendant and the victim, Luis Gomez, under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b) and 352; there was insufficient evidence defendant’s threat caused Gomez to be in sustained fear; the trial court erred when it discharged a juror; cumulative error was prejudicial; and the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s Romero motion. We reject defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Vivica Keyes sued the County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (collectively, the County) alleging the County violated her civil rights by inadequately investigating and prosecuting a home invasion at Plaintiff’s residence. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s operative third amended complaint, concluding the County was immune from liability for the alleged conduct. We affirm.
The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that an appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct and “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent.” (Denham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham); Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 1997) ¶ 8:15.) The appellant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness and, for this purpose, must provide an adequate appellate recor

Appellant Willie T. Shipley, Jr. was charged and convicted of multiple counts of rape and other forms of sexual assault involving multiple victims. He contends his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial and to confront his accusers were violated by the introduction of the preliminary hearing testimony of one victim and by the introduction of evidence of an uncharged sexual assault. He further contends the prosecution failed to establish that it exercised due diligence in attempting to locate the witness whose preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his Evidence Code section 352 objection to the evidence of the uncharged crime. Respondent contends the court failed to impose certain mandatory assessments. We conclude that the evidence was properly admitted, modify the judgment to include the omitted assessments, and otherwise affirm.

Plaintiff Karan Russell executed a promissory note and deed of trust encumbering residential property she owned in Los Angeles County. After the loan beneficiary’s agent recorded a notice of default on the property, Plaintiff sued Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), the trustee for the securities corporation holding all beneficial interest in the loan, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase,” collectively with Wells Fargo, “Defendants”), the loan servicer, alleging an assortment of claims related to the loan’s origination, securitization, and servicing. Among other things, Plaintiff claimed Chase violated provisions of the California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (the “HBOR”) (Civ. Code, § 2923.4 et seq.) by continuing foreclosure proceedings while Plaintiff was under consideration for a loan modification―a practice commonly referred to as “dual tracking.”
Defendants demurred, arguing a prior judgment operated as res judicata to bar most of the claims an

Defendant Dennis Virgil Gilbert appeals a judgment entered upon his plea of no contest to possessing an illegal weapon. His counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant has been apprised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
Defendant was charged with one count of felony possession of an illegal weapon, a billy club (Pen. Code, § 22210; count one) and one count of misdemeanor driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count two). The complaint alleged defendant had suffered four prior serious or violent felony “strike” convictions (§§ 667, subd. (d) & 1170.12, subd. (b)) and had served five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).