CA Unpub Decisions

Douglas Joseph Gonda was charged with assault with a gun and shooting at an occupied vehicle, with gun use and gang allegations. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (b), 246, 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.5, subds. (a), (d), 12022.53, subd. (c).) In a negotiated agreement, appellant waived his right to trial, pled guilty to assault with a gun, and admitted the gang and gun use allegations. The trial court accepted the admissions and plea.
The probation report and preliminary hearing transcript forming the factual bases for appellant’s plea disclose that on August 7, 2015, deputies were flagged down by a distraught woman whose car window was shattered by a bullet while she was driving with her sister in Fillmore. Appellant admitted being at the shooting scene during a gang confrontation; the women passing in their car were unintended victims. Surveillance camera images and eyewitnesses indicated that appellant was the shooter.

Adriana T. appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights over 12-year-old Kayla G. Adriana contends the court abused its discretion and violated her right to family association by failing to enforce a prior visitation order, which Adriana argues in turn precluded her from establishing the parent-child-relationship exception to termination of parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Adriana, however, did not argue at the section 366.26 hearing that the juvenile court had failed to enforce the visitation order or that she could have established the parent-child relationship exception had the court enforced its order. Nor did Adriana ever ask the court to enforce or revise the visitation order. Therefore, we affirm.

Minor R.P. appeals from the juvenile court’s January 19, 2018, order continuing family reunification services for her father, R.P. We conclude the appeal is moot and dismiss it.
Minor filed an opening brief in this court on April 16, 2018. On April 23, 2018, the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) notified us by letter that because it had recommended the court terminate father’s reunification services below, it would not appear as a respondent in minor’s appeal. Because father would have been prejudiced by a reversal of the January 19, 2018, order, we provided him with an opportunity to file a respondent’s brief. We did not receive a response.
On July 20, 2018, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated father’s reunification services. On August 6, 2018, we notified the parties by letter that we intended to take judicial notice of that fact and invited them to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether the order mooted the appeal. F

Defendant and appellant, Derrick Lynn Johnson (defendant) appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate the judgment entered in 2015, after he was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, §§ 290, 290.008). That conviction was affirmed by this court in People v. Johnson (B270246) an unpublished opinion filed May 2, 2017. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his motion, and his appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. On July 17, 2018, we notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to have considered. That time has elapsed, and defendant has submitted no brief or letter. We have reviewed the entire record, and finding no arguable issues, affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Diane Christine Vigil (defendant) was convicted of first degree residential burglary, a felony. (Pen. Code, § 459 ). On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) requesting that this court conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any arguable appellate issues. On June 11, 2018, we gave notice to defendant that her counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that she had 30 days within which to submit by brief any arguments she wished this court to consider. Defendant filed two supplemental briefs in which she raises several contentions. We have reviewed the record and the briefs and we affirm.

Morgan and Donald C., the mother and father of four year old Devon C., appeal from the juvenile court’s disposition order limiting their right to make educational and developmental services decisions for him under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (a). Morgan and Donald contend the juvenile court abused its discretion in limiting their decisionmaking rights. We dismiss Morgan’s appeal as moot. In Donald’s appeal, we affirm.

R.E. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s final judgment granting sole legal and sole physical custody of the child R.E. (R.E.) to his mother T.M. (mother) and monitored visitation to father under Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4. He contends the court abused its discretion by not granting him joint custody with mother and unmonitored visitation. Mother is not a party to this appeal. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Tamara N. Harris, representing herself as she did in the trial court, appeals the judgment entered after an order granting the City of Los Angeles’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal Harris concedes she filed her personal injury action after the limitations period for her claim had run, explaining she had no other option because the attorney she had retained to represent her in this matter abandoned her. Although we sympathize with Harris’s situation as she describes it, we affirm the judgment.

The Public Guardian of the County of Los Angeles (the County) filed a petition under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 et seq. (LPS Act), to be appointed the conservator of appellant D.P., alleging he was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder. The trial court found that D.P. was gravely disabled and appointed the County as conservator. Following a subsequent jury trial at which D.P. was also found to be gravely disabled, the trial court issued an order confirming the conservatorship.
On appeal from the order confirming the conservatorship, D.P. contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury to begin deliberations anew after it replaced a juror with an alternate. D.P. also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he was gravely disabled.
We hold that any error in instructing the jury after the substitution of the alternate juror was harmless and that the evidence was suf

Defendant and appellant Steven Walker (defendant) was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b) ). On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution by giving a jury instruction on alternative charges, (2) his conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm must be reversed because it is inconsistent with his acquittal for assault with a firearm, and (3) the court erred by failing to instruct the jury it could acquit defendant of both charges. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Gwendolyn Jackson (plaintiff) lost her home in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. She subsequently filed this action against parties involved in the foreclosure including, as is pertinent here, America’s Servicing Company, a division of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (ASC). In plaintiff’s prior appeal to this court, we largely affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of ASC, which judgment was entered by the court after it sustained ASC’s demurrer to the original complaint without leave to amend as to all causes of action. We concluded then that there was a reasonable probability that plaintiff could amend her negligence claim to state a valid claim and, upon remand, plaintiff amended her complaint to allege ASC negligently handled her request for a loan modification. ASC moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of ASC.

Plaintiffs Nayrie and Gary Tarpinian sued defendant Levon Isadzhanyan for trespassing on and damaging their property during construction at a neighboring property and for assaulting Nayrie. They sought damages for trespass and emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict against defendant and in favor of plaintiffs, awarded Nayrie $1 for trespass and $112,500 for mental suffering, and awarded Gary $3,200 for mental suffering.
While defendant asserts a laundry list of errors, he focuses on two exhibits he contends contained hearsay and should not have been admitted. Because defendant has not provided an adequate record, we cannot properly access the alleged errors. We note that based on the limited record presented, defendant has not shown the two exhibits were improperly admitted hearsay. Accordingly, we affirm.

In 1992, Morrad Ghonim paid defendant and appellant Leon Andrew Martinez to murder Ghonim’s 17-year-old wife, Vicki Zepeda Ghonim. The case remained unsolved until 2009, when DNA analysis linked Martinez to the crime. Martinez was tried twice. In his first trial, the jury convicted him of conspiring to dissuade a witness, but deadlocked on the murder charge. Upon retrial, the jury convicted Martinez of first degree murder with true findings on various special circumstances allegations. Martinez contends the trial court erred by taking judicial notice, in his second trial, of the dissuading a witness conviction rendered in his first trial; the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) by failing to disclose a videotape of a 2010 jail cell encounter between him and Ghonim; and the cumulative effect of the purported errors requires reversal. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment.

The superior court granted former University of Southern California student John Doe’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus and ordered USC’s Office of Student Judicial Affairs and Community Standards (SJACS) to vacate its decision to discipline Doe for violating the university’s academic integrity standards. On appeal USC contends the superior court erred in concluding there was insufficient evidence to support the SJACS’s finding that Doe and a second student had cheated on the final examination in Biology 220. In response Doe asserts, even if the administrative record contains substantial evidence of his academic dishonesty, the superior court’s judgment should be affirmed because USC’s internal discipline and review procedures as applied in this case lacked fundamental fairness and did not comply with the university’s own rules, an argument the superior court rejected.
Although reasonable factfinders could disagree, substantial evidence supports USC’s